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Mr. Prime-Minister,
Mr. Deputy Prime-Minister,
Dear Members of Parliament,
Your Excellencies Ambassadors,
Dear Foreign Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues,
Thank you for the interest in the conference ÒFactors for
Economic GrowthÓ in Bulgaria organised by the Center for
Economic Development and the Agency for Economic Analysis
and Forecasting with the co-operation of Harvard Institute for
International Development. 
We are pursuing several goals with this conference. Firstly,
we would like to present the work of a group of Bulgarian
experts over the last few months devoted to the problems of eco-
nomic growth and the growth attainment factors under Bulgarian
conditions. You have already received the papers in written
form. Now you will hear summaries and then we will discuss the
information, their standpoints and ideas. 
Secondly, we would like to hear the opinion of foreign spe-
cialists whom we have invited to discuss these issues. We have
with us today Prof. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner from
Harvard Institute for International Development, Prof.
Dabrovski from the Center for Social and Economic Research
(CASE) in Warsaw, Prof. Woergoetter from the Institute of
Advanced Studies in Vienna, Paul Reynolds from Adam Smith
Institute. It is a pleasure for us to have with us here Prince Kyril
Saxe-Coburg from Lehman Brothers.
Thirdly, we consider it very important to begin a public dis-
cussion among experts and politicians in Bulgaria devoted to the
issue of economic growth because we consider that now is the
moment when, after achieving evident financial and economic
stabilisation, Bulgaria needs to do its best to initiate a stable,
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I would like to congratulate the organisers of this conference
since here, well on time, a start will be given to the discussion of
a problem, which is of extremely great interest to everybody in
Bulgaria. Naturally, the issue about economic growth and its
enhancing becomes topical, after we have successfully solved
some of the most important problems of the economic and finan-
cial stabilisation. 
All of us agree that stabilisation without economic growth
will not provide Bulgaria with what it needs namely success in
increasing its competitiveness and recovery of the incomes. That
is why all politicians and economists, observers in Bulgaria,
pose the issue about enhancement of economic growth. 
And this serious discussion will start quite well on time. In
order to have a fruitful discussion, it is necessary to explain in a
convincing way the initial situation first. I suppose this will be
done here. In almost the same way we need to assess the current
situation as containing the initial prerequisites for economic
growth. Otherwise, if we do not do so, we run the risk of having
different opinions on the Bulgarian economy and by different I
mean differing from professional point of view. 
That is why I hope that one of the tasks of the discussion will
be to find out common underpinning assessments of the situa-
tion in Bulgaria at present, in order to use them as the basis for
identifying the factors for speeding up economic growth. 
This year Bulgaria will definitely achieve growth. The ques-
tion is how big it will be and  what factors will cause it. This is
the second major issue. I would not affirm here, of course, that
the executive power and the politicians have many possibilities
to influence the economic growth factors. However, it is quite
obvious that Bulgaria possesses certain capacity and possibili-
ties, such as the executive power, the legislative power, and is
able to do what is required for enhancing economic growth. I
hope this will be second important topic that will be discussed
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Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria
non-inflationary and the highest possible economic growth
aimed at resolving for a long period of time the basic problems
of our economy and our society. 
Our goal is not so much to complete our work on those mat-
ters with this conference but rather to mark the beginning of a
long-term orientation of the activities of the Center for
Economic Development, the Agency for Economic Analysis and
Forecasting, and I hope of a number of other Bulgarian institutes
where those issues  should be considered  seriously. 
It is a pleasure for me to call upon the Prime Minister of the
Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Ivan Kostov to open the conference. 
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almost already fallen. These achievements  required a lot of
effort. But a completely different effort is necessary now when
we are trying to identify the practical steps ahead. This is an
effort of everyday work, of gradual finding out  the possibilities
of  our country, of looking for answers to the questions, and not
of announcing verdicts, not of throwing accusations for what has
been done, but identifying the really positive steps forward.
Everybody in Bulgaria needs more practicality and I believe that
mainly our foreign guests will help us find out this road of mov-
ing ahead. We need clearly formulated objectives ahead of us,
feasible objectives,  and afterwards describing the steps, which
should be implemented. 
What I can promise on behalf of the executive power is that
with great  commitment we shall abide by our programs in order
to fulfil them. In this, I declare,  we shall differ from everybody
before us. We are going to fulfil what we have planned and we
shall follow the identified track no matter of the cost for us.
Because it was enforcement that Bulgaria was lacking, and not
good intentions. So if this conference achieves positive develop-
ments, if useful recommendations are outlined here, we are pre-
pared to fulfil them, i.e. to be the real executive power, fulfilling
the good ideas, fulfilling everything useful, all useful recom-
mendations. So I would like to assure you that this conference
will be useful for all of you present and of course, for our coun-
try, too, because it needs a consensus, it needs unity when solv-
ing such problems and issues. Because the issues of economic
growth really concern everybody, each and every  Bulgarian cit-
izen. There is no other recipe for improving the lives of the
Bulgarians, for finding out the Bulgarian niche in Europe but
economic growth. This is our common opinion. 
Concluding my short speech, I would like to greet you all, to
wish you successful work and to promise you once again that
our government will cooperate completely. Thank you for your
attention. 
Opening Address
8/9
and on which recommendations for the management of our
country will be formulated. And I assure you that we shall pay
serious attention to these recommendations as we would not pre-
tend that we know all the answers about the Bulgarian economy.
We are clearly aware that both in the first topic that I tried to for-
mulate and in the second one there will be a lot of unknown
things, a lot of blanks about which we have not thought pro-
foundly and sufficiently. It will be good for us to have also the
opinion from a different point of view. This is the other big
advantage of a conference like this one. The administration is
always busy with current tasks, it always strives to fulfil its pro-
grams and that is why it cannot stand aside and have a look at
neither the situation in the country, nor its own activities. That is
why such a conference will definitely be useful. 
I would not like to open up preliminary discussions at this
point, but it will be good if opinions, strongly critical to what is
going on in Bulgaria, are announced and discussed. Such strong-
ly critical opinions, not approving of what has been done as well
as rejecting the prospects outlined by us. Yet, there is one thing
that I would like to prevail in the discussions — the positive
approach to overcome the negativism and the race to prophesy
bad future days for Bulgaria. For nine years now we have been
witnessing a situation of extreme negation, of rejecting absolute-
ly everything, under which circumstances we are trying to find a
solution for the future.  However under the conditions of a com-
plete negation no concrete steps can be identified. That is why I
wish the spirit of looking for decisions to prevail here.  
A man once made a brilliant remark, he was a man that had
done a lot in his lifetime, and who is proud of being a  Bulgarian
surgeon; he said: ÒIt is not sufficient to say that something is not
going on well, it is not enough to point out the weaknesses, what
matters is to say what should be done, what is important is to
offer something constructiveÓ. I believe that the spirit of con-
structiveness will dominate. Bulgaria is fed up with gloomy
forecasts. I am absolutely convinced that even the people who
make such forecasts, to a great extent  they themselves do not
believe them any longer. 
We have achieved a lot in the recent two years. ÒA lotÓ means
that we have stepped back from the precipice into which we had
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The objective of the governmental economic policy is to
increase the economic welfare (the consumption) of each citizen
and the society as a whole. This can be done in a sustainable
manner by increasing the quantity of all goods and services per
head of the population, which are produced in the country (GDP
per head of the population). In a market economy only goods
and services that are valued on the market find their customer
and recover the resources spent for producing them, create con-
ditions for expanded reproduction within certain economic unit
and the economy as a whole. 
Economic theory contains formulations of the basic factors
for economic growth in market economy (the so-called SollowÕs
and Robert BarrowÕs models). For several months now the
Center for Economic Development and the Agency for
Economic Analysis and Forecasting have been working upon the
basic issues for the formulation of the major problems related to
the effect of these factors under the Bulgarian situation. Some of
the conclusions will be announced to you at this conference. 
In these opening remarks I would like to describe the partic-
ular features of the situation in our country and afterwards, the
formulation of the tasks of the governmental economic policy. 
I will start by saying that, unfortunately, in our country until
recently we could not speak of a normal market environment and
application of the market measures for enhancement of econom-
ic growth. 
Our task was to lay down the basic pillars of a market econ-
omy, namely: 
þ basic economic legislation 
þ institutions of the national economy including finan-
cial institutions, social security system, anti-monopoly
Potential for Growth of the Bulgarian Economy
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legislation and the related to it self-regulating authori-
ties, etc. 
þ achieving big portion in the economy of private inde-
pendent economic units by means of privatisation of
the economy and incentives for the newly occurring
private business 
þ adequate taxation system  
þ judicial system that works
þ law enforcement system  
þ optimally organised state administration.
Only in the presence of the above mentioned elements can
we speak about market economy — that is functioning either well
or poorly — and look for ways for its improvement, its produc-
tivity and the factors for its fostering. 
We consider that such a basic condition at a time when we
have already overcome the political, economic and social chaos,
when we have shaped strong pillars for the market economy and
have made it manageable within the framework of market econ-
omy models, will exist only in the year 1999. Therefore we
speak about completion of the foundation-laying reforms and
the beginning of a typical state economic policy for achieving
long-term economic growth — a policy, which is typically fol-
lowed by the governments of most other countries. 
Within this policy the time has come for us to consider more
carefully what market economy we have got or we are about to
establish and to outline the ways for achieving growth. 
1. The first of the factors, which I would like to mention, is
the preserving of macro-economic stability. 
We continue believing that a major factor for achieving eco-
nomic growth is the overall macro-economic stability, which is
based on the principles of a currency board. Recently more and
more the concept is launched that the fixed currency exchange
rate has negative effect on the Bulgarian production and export
An important revenue component in the budget at present is
the money from the privatisation. We should make use of them
for solving long-term problems and not for current expenses.
Restructuring of the large production units and their privatisa-
tion, the initiation of the pensions and health reforms, the infra-
structure and the other investment projects will be the main
spheres in which this money will be spent.
An essential connection exists between the development of the
economy and growth and the structure of revenue and expenditure
in the budget. The policy with regards to this is especially impor-
tant under the conditions of maintaining low deficit. We reduced
the subsidies for inefficient productions from 14,9 % of the GDP
to 0,8 % in 1997 and to even smaller percentage in the last and cur-
rent year. We are definitely moving towards partial self-funding of
health care and education systems, towards more serious reforms
in the social security system. We shall attempt to allocate bigger
budget amounts for local goods and services, and also to direct the
expenses for projects (such as infrastructural ones) which will
indirectly enhance the productivity of the private capital. 
Alongside with the above we realise the necessity of enhanc-
ing the economy by means of a taxation system which treats
equally the economic actors and collects the needed revenue by
means of lower tax rates applied to a wider basis, by means of
equal taxation of the state and private sector, by means of a more
professional tax administration. 
All these measures will preserve the achieved macro-eco-
nomic stability, will increase the trust of the Bulgarian and
international business which will inevitably result in more
investments and thus in higher productivity of the economy. 
2. The second group of factors that should be employed in
order to achieve economic growth is related to the possible
measures of the economic policy affecting the supply. Major
attention should be paid to corporate and personal savings and
to directing them into the investment process. Concerning the
corporate savings it is important a good depreciation policy to
be devised because the greater part of more favourable depreci-
ation rates including partial Óinvestment tax creditÒ and the per-
centage of the value of the investment made will be recognised
Potential for Growth of the Bulgarian Economy
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and that the Bulgarian Lev has to be devaluated. I need to make
two points here: 
þ The positive effect of devaluation upon production and
export is questionable — after a correction of the currency
exchange rate the prices will quickly start increasing and will
compensate the national devaluation. We have already seen this
in the period 1991 — 1997. It was not possible to establish statis-
tically the correlation between the export and the actual curren-
cy exchange rate in this period.
þ The negative effect of the cancelling of the currency
board, however, will be enormous; each stabilisation program
can be successful only if it enjoys the trust in the implemented
policy; the rejection of the policy implemented by now will
cause a feeling of uncertainty and instability which will result in
a number of negative responses by all economic players; some
of these responses are difficult to predict, others are sufficiently
predictable and we would not let them occur. 
We will keep the inflation rate low, although the situation of
1998 will hardly occur again with 1 % cumulative inflation,
because we had also a considerable deflation influence from the
international situation. Alongside with the condition of a cur-
rency board, a means of anti-inflation policy will be the timely
adjustment of administrative prices and not allowing abuse of
monopoly position in economy. The government is not going to
implement social policy through prices, but through granting
benefits to those groups of the population, which cannot pay for
some goods or services. 
The next factor for maintaining macro-economic stability is
achieving a balanced budget, which will allow for gradual
decreasing of the state debt and decrease of the interests paid
from the budget. Furthermore that the fiscal policy by means of
issuing Government security bonds directly affects the basic
interest rate and thus, the economy as a whole. 
Issuing more Government security bonds will also redirect
private investments to giving credits to the government rather
than to the real sector. 
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of services, clear orientation of the separate institutions. It is
necessary to continue the efficient bank supervision and to pre-
vent the re-occurrence of the practice of accruing bad debts.
Alongside with the above the banks should have the required
freedom to work and grant credits because credits are the basic
mechanism for financing the growing business. The condition of
the financial sector should be regularly analysed by the govern-
ment, the Bulgarian National Bank, the banking and business
associations and also methods should be sought for its strength-
ening and development in view of achieving the objectives of
economic growth. With regards to this we established a good
practice at the discussion of the latest amendments to the Banks
Act and we should continue applying this practice. 
4. An extremely important group of factors for fostering eco-
nomic growth is related to the behaviour of the economic units
(companies) at micro-level. They should be driven only by the
strive for increasing the economic performance of their activities
and their managing bodies should have a strong incentive for
achieving such results. For this purpose the companies should
have responsible owners, which we will achieve when the pri-
vatisation is completed in basic terms in 1999. The deteriorated
international situation and the organisational, legal and other dif-
ficulties will not scare us, and each state-owned company that
has an applicant-buyer will be privatised in 1999. Our basic cri-
terion will be to find a responsible and accountable owner. 
At the same time efforts should be made for improving the
corporate and management culture in the big public companies.
They should be managed but also the interests of the small
shareholders should be protected.
Since a certain number of big companies should still remain
state owned, the management of their assets should be
improved. We have prepared a draft of amendments to
Ordinance Ü 7 of 1994 of the Council of Ministers with regards
to this and the purpose is the companies that will remain state
owned to be managed more independently and marketwise. 
The improvement of the corporate and management culture
in the economic sphere is a task, which cannot be tackled by the
state. This is a field where efforts should be made by the busi-
Potential for Growth of the Bulgarian Economy
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for eligible to be deducted from the taxable profit. For the dif-
ferent sectors which the government would like to specially
enhance or due to the essence of the production in them (e.g.
high technology) reimbursement of the capital during the first
year may be introduced as well as some other more flexible
forms of taxation. 
The savings of households are another important source,
which should be made to operate by making the banking system
more active. Alongside with this it is necessary to put into oper-
ation also the capital market as a means of directing the savings
to the real economy and other market purposes. In this respect
different and all possible ways should be employed to support
the best companies (state and private) for entering into the offi-
cial market of the stock exchange and the issuing of corporate
and municipal bonds. 
Undoubtedly the investment behaviour depends both on the
availability of funds with the companies and the population, and
the estimated net rate of return, the sales dynamics and other fac-
tors, which in turn depend on a number of economic parameters
at macro- and micro-level. 
3. The further development of the financial system is an
important independent factor for the economic growth of the
country. The fact that at present bankruptcy of banks rarely
occurs is not an indicator of a good situation of the financial sys-
tem. In Bulgaria the ratio of the total assets of banks to the GDP
is only 35%, while in the developed countries it is more than
100%; the typical mortgage and investment banks do not exist;
the offered banking services are a small number and of poor
quality. The competition on the financial market is vague. There
is an enormous amount of money, which is kept in cash as well
as turnover kept in cash. 
The financial sector policy should be oriented towards
increasing the capital resources, improving the security of bank
transactions and development of long term financing. This will
be achieved by means of the privatisation of state-owned banks,
their consolidation, and by entering in the Bulgarian market of
powerful foreign banking and other financial institutions.
Competition will inevitably lead to specialisation, diversification
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ness itself, its associations, the non-government centres and for-
eign partners. 
5. The next important factor for achieving economic growth,
which can be influenced by the government, is the infrastruc-
ture. Without substituting private investment in it, we can cre-
ate better conditions for attracting them, in certain cases also by
means of state guarantees and by spending a part of the budget
for that purpose. For 1998 the available surplus in the budget
made it possible to make capital expenses amounting to 
USD 181 million. For 1999 this amount is approximately 
USD 361 million. Total for the period 1998 — 2001 the amounts
from the budget allocated for capital expenses, state-owned
enterprises and external grants will be approximately 
USD 5 billion. The major part of them will be spent for infra-
structure projects. It is of great importance for us to establish
better organisation of the process of preparation and implemen-
tation of infrastructure projects. We shall direct our attention to
the assessment of the social economic importance of the pro-
jects and their meeting the international environmental stan-
dards; we shall give priority to projects with high level of readi-
ness due to a longer period of their preparation. 
6. The required conditions for developing and adopting a
long-term strategy for priority development in the field of tech-
nology already exist in Bulgaria. The technological level of the
economy is a separate group of factors for high growth and pro-
ductivity. On one hand, we need to pay attention to the techno-
logical re-furnishing and development of all industries, on the
other hand, to the development of industries, which ensure the
designing, and production of high-tech machines, materials,
software and services. As it is known, these are the most dynam-
ic industries in the world and they can contribute substantially to
the economic growth of each economy. 
Bulgaria has good reasons to direct some effort also for
recovering its high-tech productions. We do not intend to create
again state-owned production structures, which need artificial
conditions to be created for their operation. At the same time it
will be difficult to compensate for the lagging behind without
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assisting the companies in this respect, and this assistance can
be — if not lower taxes, then at least — more convenient taxation
regulations allowing for faster depreciation of the equipment; it
can be also information, marketing, patent rights, form of ori-
enting the scientific potential towards production assignments; it
can be also the education. We are drafting a strategy for the
development of high technologies in Bulgaria and we shall sub-
mit it to the government in February this year. Simultaneously
we are working upon a draft act on high technologies and high-
tech parks which will grant a definite framework of preferences
for their development. Still by the end of the summer this year
the structuring of the first high-technological park in Sofia will
be initiated; its design is being prepared at a fast pace together
with the other relevant documentation. 
7. The greater export orientation of the economy is related to
the other important group of factors for achieving economic
growth. 
Bulgaria has a small domestic market and narrowed domes-
tic demand. These circumstances cannot be radically changed.
The desired outcome will be complete orientation of the
Bulgarian economy towards foreign markets. The development
of international export productions will have important impact
on the general economic stability and the balance of our current
account. At the level of economic policy this requires consistent
and complete liberalisation of the export-import regime. Since
the beginning of 1999 we have made a decisive step by the
accession to CEFTA and signing bi-lateral agreement with
Turkey. What is also important is our consistent policy for the
implementation of the European Union Accession Agreement
and the creating of prerequisites for initiating negotiations for
full membership in the EU. This will finally solve the problem
of the limited domestic market. 
It is necessary also to bring to an end the process of remov-
ing the different non-tariff restrictions to import and export and
the government to find an appropriate form for supporting the
exporters — information services, efficient issue of our diplomat-
ic missions for economic promotion of Bulgaria, direct assis-
tance for developing and penetrating on new markets, consulta-
Potential for Growth of the Bulgarian Economy
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9. An independent generating factor, which promotes the
economic activity and growth, is the protection of property
rights. What is needed is a clear protection of private property
and the opportunities for its economic realisation — without
unnecessary bureaucracy, but with prompt and categorical inter-
vention of the state authorities including the law enforcement
bodies and the court for solving property disputes and for pre-
venting encroachment upon the private and state property. This
will arouse trust between the economic actors and will encour-
age them to undertake the necessary risk for developing eco-
nomic activities. 
This is the orientation of the reform in the judicial system.
Alongside with it is necessary, probably, a special survey of this
issue to be conducted and to carry out reviews constantly for
establishing weaknesses of the legislation, the judicial and
administrative practices. For this purpose we expect to be sup-
ported by business associations, research centres, associations of
lawyers some of which took part in the discussion for the prepa-
ration of this conference. 
10. The last  (but not least) group of factors for growth that
we should take into account is the role of education and science.
Good education of the work force is one of the basic prerequi-
sites for economic growth. In this respect Bulgaria is in good
position on one hand, because the level of education of our
employees and specialist is given high evaluation. 
On the other hand the expenses for education have been
strongly reduced in the recent years, namely from 6 to 4% of the
GDP. 
A great portion of the money is directed for salaries, while
teachers and lecturers are paid poorly. The educational system
should be restructured, the study curricula should be up-graded,
and foreign languages should be studied at a larger scale, as well
as economic and social sciences in combination with mathemat-
ics and computer knowledge. The private sector should be more
active in financing education, science, research and develop-
ment. At the same time the expenses of the state for science
should be tied up directly to the contribution of the scientific
centres, for improvement of the overall business environment in
Bulgaria. 
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tions with regards to foreign trade regimes, investment policy,
legal aspects of international trade activities. 
A decisive improvement has to be achieved in the possibili-
ties for export crediting and insurance in which sphere Bulgaria
is really lagging behind. 
I would like to emphasise that the government does not
intend to implement sectoral policy and create artificially better
conditions by means of hidden subsidising certain export indus-
tries. Such policy will result in inefficient spending of big
amounts of money without achieving long-term effect. We
realise that in some industries there will be a drop of the exports
and for a certain period of time there will be a negative trade bal-
ance in the economy as a whole. This is inevitable under the
conditions of restructuring of the economy. Only in a situation
of a full clash with international competition, however, we shall
be able to develop new productions, which will be the basis for
the future export expansion of Bulgaria. 
8. Both in the sphere of foreign trade where deregulation and
liberalisation are important stabilising factors, and in the econo-
my as a whole, we need to find the most appropriate balance
between establishing the required order, rule of law, protection
of the property and other rights of the economic actors on one
hand, and on the other, the creating of adequate opportunities
for free initiative and entrepreneurship. 
The effort for establishing a modern legal and administrative
framework of the basic economic and other relations in society
has resulted in a number of new institutions and rules, such as
giving state concessions, licensing, registration and strict con-
trol. This made it possible to established the necessary order,
protect the citizens against abuses and gross lack of profession-
alism in spheres such as insurance, banking, communications,
capital market, etc. By achieving certain stability in the different
spheres, with the increase of the public culture and awareness,
with the devising of self-regulative institutions of the economic
actors in different spheres the role of the state should gradually
decrease and become less and less noticeable. This can be
achieved gradually and become an additional factor for enhanc-
ing economic growth in these spheres. 
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Let me say what a great honour it is for me to be participat-
ing in todayÕs conference and to give my small tribute to co-host
this event on behalf of the Harvard Institute for International
Development and my colleague Andrew Warner who works
closely with his Bulgarian colleagues here. We are especially
pleased that we could join the Center for Economic
Development and the Agency for Economic Analysis and
Forecasting to share in todayÕs proceedings. 
I listened very carefully to the remarks Mr. Deputy Prime-
Minister has just made and I have to say I listened with very
mixed feelings, because on the one hand it was a wonderful,
really wonderful speech and on the other hand he said almost all
the things I had intended to say. I can find almost nothing to dis-
agree with. In fact there is hardly anything essential to disagree
with. I just have to find the things to add, amplify and under-
score. My own experience here of two years ago, then one year
ago, and at present, tells me of the great importance if this spell
of time for Bulgaria. I think there is no doubt that this country is
undergoing a wonderful and breath-taking Renaissance. In the
last two years we saw what a remarkable power democratic ren-
ovation has and what a remarkable power the economic reform
has, and what a remarkable power a good government can yield.
So in my opinion Bulgaria today is indeed in the position to
think ambitiously about the future and not just try to survive
from hand to mouth or cope with past disasters. ThatÕs why it is
so exciting to be thinking about the long-term future today, and
not about what is going to happen today or tomorrow. 
On that line of thinking maybe it would be helpful to start
with a very abstract idea about the economic growth and then to
move from the extreme abstraction to the very particular.
Abstractly, economic thinkers over the last 200 years have iden-
tified three kinds of sources of economic growth. I consider it
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With the accomplishment of the basic structural economic
reforms in the country more attention should be paid to the edu-
cation system and the system of state scientific institutions since
they are an important prerequisite for economic growth. 
Concluding, I would like to emphasise the following. 
1. Bulgaria has the basis of conditions for economic growth. 
2. It is clear which are the directions for the future efforts and
work at the governmental and other levels in view of putting into
operation the factors, which enhance growth. 
3. A wide consensus is required concerning these measures
as well as concerted efforts inside Bulgaria and at international
level by politicians, diplomats, the state administration, scien-
tists for putting into practice these efforts. 
If the Bulgarian society and its elite work studiously and in
co-ordination, in my view it is not unrealistic to be able in some
of the years of the next decade to achieve growth expressed by
two-digit figures. Undoubtedly this is the most optimistic option
for Bulgaria, which will result in considerable increase of the
welfare and will create the best possible prerequisites for full
membership in the EU. I think we should not be scared of high
objectives. This is the only way for us to achieve the best out-
come for Bulgaria and all of us.
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to the scientific and technological progress, and the network
economy for the simple reason that genuine science is not the
result of an individual genius sitting in the study, inventing a
New World. The allusion is to a network of scientists each one
participating in the division of scientific labour. The strength of
a good scientist is the strength of his/her colleagues, the people
that read his/her works, the journals that get distributed world-
wide and generate new ideas in this network. 
I do stress these very abstract ideas because I would like to
emphasise that Bulgaria is moving from one kind of strategy of
development to a quite different strategy of development. When
Marks wrote about capitalism he wrote about capital. He con-
sidered capital accumulation as the core of economic life. When
Lenin and Stalin talked about development, they meant how to
squeeze the peasants in order to get more saving and build more
factories. So the idea of growth meant more factories. This,
however, did not turn out a very good idea because although sav-
ing and investment do have something to do with economic
growth, this bit is too insignificant in comparison with the divi-
sion of labour, the networks of interrelations that we live in and
the scientific and technological progress that we can develop
within those social networks. 
Bulgaria has a lot of factories now but these do not produce
enough. Even if they manufacture something it can hardly sell in
many cases. So the question is will anybody buy them? Not will
anybody pay for them, but will anybody take them for nothing? 
The historic experience shows in n extremely tragic way that
accumulation of capital comprises just a limited part of growth.
What counts for Bulgaria more than anything in my view are the
second and the third factors, namely Bulgaria should to be a part
of the worldwide network of economic production and the
worldwide network of science and technology. 
For decades Bulgaria was forced to be part of a very limited
labour division, that of the Soviet Union, in a network of tech-
nology created by force in a strive to compete with the world-
wide network of technologies which finally failed. At present the
main objective of Bulgaria having been part of a former, limited
and failed network, is to rejoin the regional and global labour
division, i.e. the labour division of Europe and the world as a
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important to keep them in mind in the process of developing the
Bulgarian strategy for achieving a double digit economic growth
in the future — a target that I very much like. 
One version of the theories of economic growth is that it is a
result of savings and investments. The economic growth in itself
is accumulating more and more capital, more and more capital
per worker and thereby raising the amount of output per worker. 
This is the most simplistic view of the economic growth. It
used to be the view that underlay the numerous socialist theories
of economic development. The basic idea was more factories,
more savings, more investing, which would evoke economic
growth. This proved to be a very limited view, as I will make it
clear in a moment. 
The second kind of theory of economic growth, as you know,
actually started 222 years ago with the publication of ÒThe
Wealth of the NationsÓ by Adam Smith. We have a representa-
tive of the Adam Smith Institute at the conference — Mr. Paul
Reynolds — whose participation here is very appropriate. Smith
did not talk about savings and capital as being the resource and
essence of growth. He talked about labour distribution, speciali-
sation and producers networks, which lay in the economic
growth. Adam Smith compared the farmer who lived by himself
in his own farm, produced all he needed, built his own house as
a closed economy to the urban centre where everybody had a
very specialised kind of activity and it was the interconnection
of highly specialised enterprises and individuals that raised the
productivity in society. 
So what was important for Adam Smith was mostly special-
isation and what we now call in our world of the Internet the
Ònetwork economyÓ. The larger and more dynamic the network,
the more productive any individual member can be. If you are
part of an Internet network that has a few thousand subscribers,
things seem simple. But think about the worldwide network that
has millions of participants, all of them are far more dynamic
than they used to. So for this purpose 200 years ago Adam Smith
ago gave the idea of the economy as being a network of interre-
lations it seems to me that it is of vital importance for under-
standing BulgariaÕs problems, too.
The third version of the economic growth concepts is related
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enter into the Internet, unless you have the bandwidth, unless
there is a way to make the transmission of information, or the
transmission of goods, or the transmission of ideas. There is no
network unless you have these preconditions. There are many
software and hardware components of that network to connect. I
shall name five of them. 
First, the transaction costs of doing business. Is it possible to
do business in Bulgaria, especially business between Bulgaria
and Western Europe? How big are the transaction costs? By all
accounts of the business community they are still too high. Too
much red tape, too little transparency, too many hassles, too
much petty corruption, and too many difficulties in making
those transactions. 
Second, finance proves to be a key issue in the network.
Financial flows have to support real economic activity and we
know that the financial flows are not working that well now. The
financial markets have not recovered yet; there is no long-term
financing available in Bulgaria; and foreign investors are still
very cautious about making the connection between the interna-
tional capital and domestic markets. 
Third, of great significance are the physical infrastructure
and the connections it provides. The expenses of these connec-
tions are too high. In my opinion, the roads are not good enough
for businessmen and crossing the border takes too long. Is it
right to have one road only and one checkpoint only at the bor-
der with Romania? That is neither a connection nor a network.
That is a bottleneck. 
What Internet access do you have and what price do you pay?
What kind of telecommunications are there? What is their price?
These are crucial questions in modern economic growth because
it is these that establish the real networks on which business is
done. 
Next come the networks on a sectoral basis, i.e. the relations
among the real producers. For all of the remarkable achieve-
ments in last years there is still no establishment at a sectoral
level of Bulgarian production and Western European production
or very primitive. 
As far as the exports are concerned we can find an explana-
tion in the artificial division of labour in the past — what Bulgaria
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whole. It is by being part of that international network of pro-
duction and activities that the real value will come in a long-
term perspective. Bulgaria does not have to reinvent the worldÕs
technologies, the country has to be part of the worldÕs techno-
logical system in order to achieve the dynamic economic growth
the country aspires to and which seems quite realistic to me. 
If we look at the general situation of this country in very
abstract terms again, not in the specific day-to-day terms, I think
the conditions are quite favourable for that long-term develop-
ment 
It should be pointed out that in the worldÕs current geopoliti-
cal situation Bulgaria is well located in Europe, close to the
western European markets, close to the Middle Eastern markets
and close to markets in the former Soviet Union. It is a kind of
node in the international production network, the location is
quite interesting, and interesting proves the best. It is a location
with many positive aspects. Climate and agriculture are also
quite favourable. There are many parts of the world where agri-
culture is developing in such unfavourable conditions that peo-
ple cannot even figure out how they can survive. This is a coun-
try with potentially a very, very strong agricultural base,
although the agricultural system was repressed for a long time. 
As the Deputy Prime Minister said, the educational base for
this renovation is very strong. In a way it is surprising how
strong the science and education could remain under all of the
difficulties that Bulgaria lived through.
According to my colleagues and me Bulgaria truly has main-
tained outstanding educational and scientific traditions which
now ought to give it great opportunities. Due to this fact the
basic position is quite sound. The main problem, however, is that
Bulgaria is not currently a part of its regional or international
network. To a great extent Bulgaria remains economically iso-
lated, because the legacy of the past has not been yet overcome.
In an abstract sense that is the biggest challenge that the country
faces. 
What is it necessary for Bulgaria to become part of the
European and world markets? It is quite insufficient to establish
a market economy. The main issue is how can Bulgaria become
part of this regional and global labour division? You can hardly
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ing it with the European law on a timetable, which will lead to
fast entry into the EU. Just parenthetically the EU has not set
timetables and limits for harmonisation of the legal structure is
a hard work. There thousands of codes and laws, but they really
needs to be ratified as fast as possible. 
Related to that I would like to stress on the need to upgrade
the judicial system. This is not easy to do, because unlike a cur-
rency board, there is no way to magically reform the judicial sys-
tem. There is a very serious concern among international busi-
ness circles about the state of the judicial system. It does not
seem to be functioning transparently, clearly and rapidly in order
to be able to enforce the law or contracts. May be the involve-
ment of the international arbitration and mediation, and the var-
ious conciliation mechanisms may improve the situation
although this will not substitute the judicial reform entirely. 
Second, as the Deputy Prime Minister said, the financial sec-
tor linkages still need improvement. I was very pleased to hear
about the need of the presence of the international bank here
which offer a full range of bank services. There are a lot of
international banks with branches or representative offices here
but they do not offer the full range of bank services. Unless the
country joins the international network, the financial sectoral
sector will remain too week. 
I think more attention needs to be paid to creating a long-
term finance resource in the country. I will remind the audience
that in the US, the home of the free market, our mortgage mar-
ket is supported by government guarantees through the Federal
National Mortgage Association. It was not possible to have a
national mortgage market even in the US economy until there
was government backing for securitised mortgages. I think there
needs to be some creative thinking about how to support long-
term financing on a market base, of course, and with some more
determined government backing. This may sound a little bit
heretical, but I will stand by such a proposal because long-term
finance is really important to get the economy to achieve the
long-term growth. Second, we know that there need to be impor-
tant improvements in financial law. On the one hand we have
lending and on the other hand we have guarantees of the credi-
torÕs rights when the debtors is in a position of insolvency. It is
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used to export and sell was sold on a purely artificial basis,
because of subsidised energy, for example. 
The question is how to establish new network links in the real
sector? There are some signs of progress, but it is still weak.
There is true organic growth in textiles and apparel industries.
Bulgaria is exporting on a market basis to Western Europe in an
area where it was not before, the business is growing, and that
creates real value and real jobs. All this is carried out on a very
restricted scale. And finally fifth, I would like to point out the
state of science and education in Bulgaria. I was extremely
happy to hear Deputy Prime-Minister Boshkov give an annota-
tion of the system towards the end of his speech. I find it of
utmost importance that Bulgaria focuses on higher education
and science now and not let this advantage become weakened or
dissipated because of the economic crisis. The national
resources should really be devoted to maintaining the strength of
the scientific community and higher education. 
So those are the five areas that I would like to discuss in
details and give you a few concrete ideas. There is no magic
recipe for anything. I know of no big tricks to accomplish these
tasks. You have managed to exercise the magic of transition from
chaos to order. But the magic of becoming part of the interna-
tional network is a longer-term work. And I do not think things
can be accomplished overnight. Yet, some ideas can be helpful.
Probably you know most of them.
First, on transaction costs. I see at least a couple of areas
where improvement of the present situation really needs to be
made. I think the effort is on the way, but it can be enhanced.
First, Bulgaria will become part of the EU within the next few
years if it makes the effort. IÕm not sure of the opinion of the EU
on this issue it might happen sooner than the EU presumes. How
fast it will happen will depend on BulgariaÕs own efforts. 
Getting into the EU and adopting the basic law of the
European community, the so called achievements of the com-
munityÕs rights, will be the major way to reduce transaction
costs, because the EU has rules that link economic agents. Being
part of the European legal system will be of crucial importance
for economy. I hope that the government is systematically and
progressively renovating the entire legal structure for harmonis-
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that is a great competitive advantage. Whether clients will buy
shirts from Mauritius or Poland or Sofia will depend on the net-
working and the kind of connection. This is going to be more
and more important. 
The fourth area I want to mention is the sectoral policy.
Bulgaria needs industrial policy. Another heretical remark from
a free market economist. Let me just clarify it. It doesnÕt mean
that the government is going to set up enterprises, and become
owner of enterprises; it does not even mean that the state is
going to select the producer of the year. This means developing
a branch in order to help re-establish the international network.
For example, as the Deputy Prime-minister said, what kind of
tax policy will apply for foreign investment in key sectors, high-
tech industry, or in the apparel sector, or in agriculture, and so
on. I happen to be a big believer from my own experience that
tax policy is a critical variable for attracting foreign direct invest-
ment. I believe in tax holidays, for example, which many other
economists consider sceptically? There exist rules of the game
in order to attract the big firms to specific branches. Let me give
you one example. I worked with the President of Costa Rica for
two years to attract Intel to make a major investment in Costa
Rica. They invested a 600 million dollars in a semi-conductor
factory in Costa Rica, which had an annual turnover of over 3
billion dollars. This is a major change for Costa Rica. It was very
hard to attract the company. In this way the base of the electron-
ic sector is established. Intel took some study tours of Costa Rica
and put Costa Rica on the list of the four most promising coun-
tries, i. e. Mexico, Malaysia, Ireland and Costa Rica. And it was
a tough competition, which took a year. The President of Costa
Rica was personally on e-mail with the President of Intel almost
every day. Literally. ÒTell us about your concerns, weÕll solve
them. We want to win this. We want to attract you here. Tell us
what we need to do.Ó In the end Costa Rica offered a 10-year tax
holiday, it offered industrial land; it changed the customs admin-
istration at the airport and the local university. Intel planned a
new university curriculum for electrical engineers.
That was the package deal in the end. Was it a good deal? No
doubt, it is a hugely favourable deal for Costa Rica. For this pur-
pose a whole campaign was undertaken like a preelectoral cam-
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significant to fill the gap in the legal and judicial system.
The next area that I have mentioned is the infrastructure. Let
me just underscore one obvious point that you all know and yet
it needs emphasis. The international network of production
depends more and more on information technologies. Even the
most humble sectors of an economy now require an extended
access to the international networks, the Internet and the
intranets of different enterprises and industrial branches at a low
cost basis. Otherwise this kind of participation in the interna-
tional division of labour is not effective enough. 
Things have changed in the last five years. If your company
wants to bid on a supplier contract, it should present its offer on
the Internet. This will not be possible unless this economy is
wired up to the international environment and this in itself
requires a lot of attention to the infrastructure backbone of the
economy. It is necessary to provide the amount of bandwidth in
order to realise the cost at which they are provided. As far as I
understand ÔAmerica on LineÕ does not have local Internet pro-
vision here. This fact is worth stating to the companies provid-
ing information services. You have so many excellent software
and computer firms, and specialists here; this problem may be
solved if the regulatory bodies pay more attention to it.
I would like to stress how crucial Internet has become with
the electronic commerce, which it offers. Electronic commerce
comprises an ever-increasing part of international trade. IÕll give
you just one example to illustrate this meaning — the textile com-
pany on the island of Mauritius, humbly and ambitiously they
sell shirts in London. This is the kind of business that many
Bulgarian companies are trying to get in. How does the compa-
ny manage to keep their loyal buyers in London? A few months
ago they created an information technology system in Mauritius
so that their clients in London can know exactly the state of pro-
duction and shipping of every order. When in London you type
onto the firm and you can immediately find out how many shirts
have been sewn and on what date the shipment is to be ready.
This is a very significant mechanism for them to remain com-
petitive in the British market right now. How many of the
Bulgarian textile companies have Internet use of such a kind?
My guess is very few right now but even in this humble sector,
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are selling shirts, a more humble sector compared to modern
sectors, you need sophisticated information technologies. The
same is valid for food processing industry as well. The informa-
tion requirements for shipping your production to European and
world markets are really high. Nothing can be done without
proper science and technology. It is necessary to maintain and
heighten the facilities of higher education. Bulgaria has a strong
base to work on and the government needs to find mechanisms
to enhance this — scholarships for Bulgarian students who study
in Europe and the US; serious competition for those kinds of
placements; programs to encourage local universities and local
businesses to work together. 
One of the peculiarities that we observe on a large interna-
tional scale is that technologies now depend on the link between
industry and university more than ever. The strong private sec-
tors in the US are centred on universities no matter if we are talk-
ing about Silicon Valley in Stanford University, or Harvard, or
South Caroline. Every major centre of industry requires a good
university ground. That connection is not yet established in
Bulgaria and serious work is to be done in this respect, namely
to find a way to stimulate the co-ordination between the real sec-
tor and universities. I think the pay-offs of such an approach can
be enormously strong. 
So let me conclude at this point by saying that I am most
pleased to be here, I am pleased with your ambitious objectives
having in mind the international circumstances you small coun-
try was caught in. So far Bulgaria has operated below its nation-
al potential and you have quite real chances for a rapid growth.
During the last two years there have been built the necessary
base for achievement of this objective. A full and dynamic pros-
perity of the economy is really possible in the decade to come.
Considering what you have accomplished so far IÕm sure that
you will make a next successful step.
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paign. The conditions had to be tailored to the requirements of
this major investment. Of course, you canÕt accomplish that
every time and besides you donÕt need to do it every time. But in
big deals, which prove extremely necessary on order to secure
key sectors you, have to do that. You will need flexibility which
means accelerated depreciation, lowering of the corporate tax
rate, guarantee on land. These measures depend on the kind of
sector, and the type of investment and sectoral strategy. 
ItÕs not a pure theory. And as you know even in the US the
government with their fabulous attachment to free market work
every day to attract investment from Minnesota to North
Carolina, from Massachusetts to Arizona. So for this reason I
encourage you to leave the economics textbooks and focus on a
market-oriented and realistic strategy for key sectors. Which
sectors do I have in mind? You know them very well, they all
need development. 
First, light industry — textiles, apparel, furniture, etc. Bulgaria
has an obvious competitive advantage in these sectors. There
should be a reconsideration of the tax policy and customs policy
for competitive reasons.
Second agriculture and food processing industry — another
area where there could be significant foreign investment because
of the strong endowments here which are still not developed. 
The third area is electronics and information technologies.
You need Intel here or a similar big international company like
Philips, or Ericson, or any other. They should be producing large
scale here. What do you need to attract them? What do they seek
for? How will you manage to compete Malaysia, Mexico, Costa
Rica or Ireland?
Next is tourism. You have great tourist potential for foreign
direct investment. Again we must find the answer of the question
ÔWhat kind of policies on a sectoral level will bring them here?Õ
I would like to stress that in the practical world the prospering
countries do have market-based industrial policy. Ireland has a
10% corporate tax rate; Costa Rica has given a major tax holi-
day. And it is a matter of pragmatism and response to concrete
needs.
Finally, I shall once again underscore the importance of sci-
ence and education base as a base of this economy. Even if you
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since 1991. Exhibit 1 indicates that there was economic growth
only in 1994 and 1995, at a very low rate at that. On the basis of
the data about the nine months, the expectations are for a GDP
increase of about 4 — 4.5% in 1998 as well.
Table 1 shows the contribution of individual component ele-
ments to GDP changes from aggregate demand perspective.
Table 1
Contributions to GDP Growth
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Consumption —9.5 6.6 5.0 0.6 —2.8 —6.4 —10.2 5.4
Capital expenditures —10.5 —4.2 —4.8 —5.7 6.7 —8.1 2.6 3.9
Net exports 3.2 —9.7 —1.7 7.0 —1.0 4.4 2.1 —5.0
Difference 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 —1.4 0.0
GDP —11.8 —7.3 —1.5 1.8 2.9 —10.1 —6.9 4.3
Data source: NIS, own calculations.
In literature macroeconomic stability is generally considered
to be the major prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable
growth. The dynamics of the basic economic indicators sends
signals to businesses and households, which change their behav-
ior depending on their expectations.
A trustworthy stabilization policy is very likely to revive eco-
nomic activity in the country since such policy is conductive to
long-term decisions. Conversely, an unstable environment, that
cannot be predicted, has a stagnating effect on capital expendi-
tures. High inflation rates result in significant changes in relative
prices, which makes it difficult for investors to estimate return
on capital.
The above arguments can be supported by some of the
answers provided in the questionnaires on intended investments
in industry, circulated by the National Institute of Statistics.
Before commenting upon the results, we deem it necessary to
elucidate the method we have used. Questionnaires are filled out
twice a year — in April and in October. The answers to the April
questionnaire are to indicate capital expenditures in real terms,
estimated for the current year, while those to the October ques-
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The paper discusses macroeconomic stability and economic
growth related questions. Special attention has been allotted to the
effects of the economic environment on savings and capital expen-
ditures as major economic growth factors. The paper concludes by
making some recommendations for economic policy measures that
could increase capital expenditures and savings rates.
Unlike the Central European countries, which managed to
stabilize their economies and create conditions for economic
growth rather fast, high inflation rate and a drop in the GDP have
characterized the general development of Bulgarian economy
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hence, the BGL has to be devaluated. Adjustments in the
exchange rate, however, might undermine the popular trust in the
policy conducted and could generate apprehension of future
devaluation. In addition, real exchange rate fluctuations in the
1991-1997 period indicate that, as a rule, the nominal devalua-
tion of the Bulgarian BGL has always been offset by prompt
increases in prices, which means that this cannot have a lasting
effect on competitiveness. (The data available do not display any
statistically significant relationship between exports and real
exchange rates, therefore, the assertions in favor of a cheaper
Bulgarian BGL are mere assumptions.)
The maintenance of macroeconomic stability is in close rela-
tionship with the fiscal policy, conducted by the government. A
budget deficit, funded by the banking system, has a crowding
out effect on private investments. A growing deficit is bound up
to diminish government savings and if the drop is not compen-
sated for by an increase in private savings (due to the multipli-
cator effect), the overall level of savings goes down. Given the
current prime interest rate-setting system in Bulgaria, all other
conditions equal, and the state of the budget has a direct effect
on interest rate levels.
In addition to its stabilizing role, fiscal policy has an effect on
economic growth through budget expenditures. If budget alloca-
tions are used for local goods or services, which are not traded
on international markets, the expense incurred results in boosted
domestic aggregate demand. The purchase of imported goods,
however, as well as of commodities produced locally, which can
be sold internationally, has no effect whatsoever on production.
It only results in increases in the balance of payment current
deficit. In this connection, the government investment program,
which stipulates funding of the consolidated state budget to the
amount of $ 1.3 billion, will have a significant effect on the
economy, which will depend on the distribution of expense
between local and imported goods and services.
Stabilization of the economy is conditio sine qua non for
long-term growth; however, this is not sufficient. Potential
investors could rather keep their moneys in liquid assets, rather
than invest them in the real sector.
The low level of savings restricts all too often investments. In
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tionnaires — capital expenditures intended for the next year.
The Exhibit shows that investment intentions grow more
intense in periods of relatively low inflation rate (1995 and after
April 1997), and grow weaker in times of imminent financial
instability (April and October 1996).
The NIS current economic set-up information of April 1998
does not contain any data about the distribution of firms on the
basis of their investment plans. However, if a comparison is made
of the amounts of estimated capital expenditures, it will show that
they have gone up 1.6 times, as compared to the October 1997
figures. This could be assumed to be an indicator of the busi-
nessesÕ expectations for a more favorable environment.
An analysis of a stabilization program usually boils down to
a mere analysis of its major components, i.e. monetary policy,
currency exchange rates, present state of the budget and, some-
times, income policy.
Since July 1, 1997, the question of BulgariaÕs monetary pol-
icy has been irrelevant, since the currency board in the country
implies automatic determining of money supply.
The currency exchange rate level, however, continues to be a
sensitive issue. There have been assertions that the fixed
exchange rate has a detrimental effect on Bulgarian production;
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economy, households in Bulgaria were until recently the only
institutional sector generating positive savings.
As a rule, most of the corporate savings in the country today
are in the form of depreciation. The adopted depreciation
scheme is of prime significance for the amount and structure of
corporate savings in the course of time. In case of accelerated
depreciation, the payment of the tax is deferred and savings
accumulate fast at the beginning of the useful life of the asset.
(In the extreme case, when the full investment amount is deduct-
ed from the taxable profit, all savings accrue within the first
year, while the tax is paid in the periods to follow).
In view of stimulating investment activity, accelerated depre-
ciation could be used in combination with investment tax loans.
The investment tax loans do not merely postpone the payment of
tax but directly cut it down. This mechanism played a funda-
mental part for the encouragement of investment in the USA, for
instance, for about two decades. 
There are accelerated depreciation allowances for tax purposes
of the non-current tangible assets of the second type (machinery,
production equipment, appliances, computers and software) as
well as for electric energy carriers, communication lines, steam
lines and water conduits in the Bulgarian Corporate Income
Taxation Act adopted in 1997. A kind of investment tax credit
amounting to 10% of the investment value made in the high unem-
ployment rate municipalities was introduced by its amendment
dated 23.12.1998. Three essential restrictions strike us therein:
first, there is a preferential treatment of certain regions, second, the
ordinance is applied only in the events when the financing of
investments is at the expense of their own resources and third, the
reduction of the tax is applied only to the assets indicated in Article
22, paragraph 2, item 1, i.e. for solid structures, equipment, trans-
mission devices, electric energy carriers and communication lines.
Bearing the above-mentioned peculiarities in mind, the con-
cessions envisaged in Article 60 of the Corporate Income Taxation
Act divagate from the traditional understanding of an investment
tax credit. One of the basic taxation principles has been violated —
the neutrality principle. The solution of social problems by means
of taxation re-distribution is not an economically viable one and
experience also indicates that the introduction of preferences does
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an open economy the short supply of internal resources, which
are to fund investments, has an adverse effect on the balance of
payment current account.
The capital expenditures and savings rate in Bulgaria has
gone down considerably since 1991 (see Figure 3).
It should be noted here, that the low investments/GDP ratio is
not a characteristic feature of the transition period. For Slovakia,
one of the Central European countries with the highest growth
rate, the 1997 indicator was 39%, for Latvia it was 19%, and for
Lithuania — 22% (according to European Commission data).
Bearing in mind the unfavorable trends in the dynamics of
capital expenditures and savings in the past few years, some eco-
nomic policy measures aimed at encouraging savings in the
economy and transforming these into productive investments, is
likely to step up growth rates.
In the public sector, reducing budget deficits usually attains this,
while accentuating interest rates encourages private savings. Under
a currency board, however, the relevant authorities have a relatively
slim possibility of intervention, since the market sets interest rates.
Tax policy is another powerful instrument for exerting influence
upon investment decisions and savings in the private sector.
Unlike the industrialized countries, where corporate savings
traditionally account for some 50% of aggregate savings in the
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Investment and Savings (in % of the GDP)
Data source: NIS, Bulgarian National Bank, own calculations.
COMMENT
Professor Andreas Woergoetter
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
Congratulations on this wonderful event I am able to partic-
ipate in. I would like to concentrate my comment on an obser-
vation.
The taxi driver that brought me from the hotel to this
Wonderful Palace of Culture was charging 5000 leva and I only
had a 10 000 leva bill. So he asked me whether I would mind to
take 3$ change. For the first time it occurred to me that dollars
would be offered here instead of the local currency, even at a
more or less corrected exchange rate. In that respect we can say
that macroeconomic stability has come to the everyday life of
Bulgaria, and that is not a phenomenon of statistics, but of real
life. 
When we are talking about the relationship between the
macroeconomic stability and economic growth, then my hypoth-
esis, and that is what I would like to explain, is that macroeco-
nomic stability is a foundation but not a substitute for economic
growth. It is a foundation on which you can build a house but it
is not the house itself. Macroeconomic stability itself is of
course a prerequisite for growth. But in order for growth to hap-
pen, actually, many other things have to take place.
So macroeconomic stability is offering opportunities and it
will translate into economic growth only when these opportuni-
ties are utilised. And the statistics that we have just seen should
be alarming in the sense that it is still a long way to go for the
Bulgarian economy to be able to utilise the opportunities of
macroeconomic stability. Growth in 1998, estimated at around 
4%, and decelerating into 1999 is not really what we would like
to see as a successful and forward-looking response to the enor-
mous macroeconomic stability that the Bulgarian economy has
achieved. To be clear I would say the issue of macrostability is
not an issue of choice for the Bulgarian economy neither for the
Bulgarian politicians. That is of course linked to the currency
board system and it was an outcome from previous failures. Of
course we could wish for the much more beneficial flexibility of
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not guarantee the achievement of the desired effect.
If investment demand stimulation is the real objective of the
economic policy, an investment tax credit shall have to be ush-
ered in for all the companies functioning on the territory of the
country, no financing sources requirements should be set and the
range should be expanded by including all the depreciable non-
current tangible assets (with the exception of buildings perhaps).
Bearing in mind the significant decapitalisation of Bulgarian
economy on account of the high inflation rate in the last few
years, an even more radical approach could be resorted to for the
achievement of rapid accumulation of corporate savings. Such is
the method of Òrecovering capital expenditures in the first yearÓ.
It consists of the following: in the year of the asset acquisition a
deduction is made adding to the amount of the sum total of the
present value of all future depreciation installments. The dis-
count percentage to be adopted at the present value calculation
shall be applied for updating the losses carried over in future
financial periods as well. The advantage of this method, which
is an accelerated depreciation final variant, consists of inflation
rate effect elimination and increase in the companyÕs free cash
resources. However, there must be other investment-generated
income to accomplish savings.
With regard to household savings, tax relieves for taxpayers
that are most eager to save could also increase the supply of funds
in the economy. Usually medium or high-income persons are in
this category. There is no information reliable enough about
BulgariaÕs population savings depending on their income. Yet it
can be stated on the basis of NIS household income and expendi-
tures observations that the average savings/income available ratio
in the highest income persons group (over 165 000 BGL per
month) is about twice as high as that of the previous group (from
150 000 to 165 000 BGL). The fact that the household budgets
estimate results have been strongly ousted towards the poorer
households since a large group of high income persons declined to
participate in the research is to be taken into consideration as well. 
Of course, such investment and savings increase measures could
be eventually carried out on condition that adequate budget pro-
ceeds have been guaranteed. Otherwise, the budget deficit is bound
to grow, which, in turn, would endanger macroeconomic stability.
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nesses, able to provide the crucial services in the areas of edu-
cation, health, culture, research and also infrastructure. 
In that sense I am fully in line with what Prof. Sachs said in
his presentation. Coming back to the presentation of Mr.
Rozenov, of course, investment and saving is crucial. He men-
tioned Slovakia, with its current 40% share of investment from
of the GDP. I believe that we may observe quite a serious eco-
nomic crisis in Slovakia over the next one or two years, when it
turns out that these investments will not be generating the rev-
enues that are necessary in order to pay back what has been
invested.
A high investment rate as such may be an area of concern. A
clear example of recent years is Indonesia, where investment
rates have been very high. It turned out that the investment was
channelled into the economy in such a way that did not really
generate revenues.
Therefore we have to see macroeconomic stability and
investment not in an isolated form, and not only be concerned
with figures. We have to see it for the economy as a whole. In
that respect I would say a lot remains to be achieved and to be
done for the Bulgarian economy.
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exchange rates, of Bulgarian National Bank carrying out an
independent monetary policy. Unfortunately, Bulgarian policy
makers in the past have proven so decisively and so clearly that
hey are not able to use these opportunities, so that the interna-
tional community has decided, at least for the foreseeable future,
to eliminate any freedom of choice in that area. So, Bulgarian
economy has to live with macroeconomic stability in order to
benefit from it and contribute to growth. 
Who is able to make use of these attractions? First, we think
of those that are in need of loans and take credits at lower inter-
est rates. Low interest rates are beneficial only for those that
obtained credit. And therefore the reform of the banking sector
is of utmost urgency; and it is of course very important that the
interest rates are reduced not only for the state, but also for small
and medium size businesses. This is the experience we can learn
from with other economies. It is the expansion of small and
medium size businesses that is bringing growth to the economy.
That has been the case in Poland, the case in Hungary, and we
could observe that in all of the OECD countries in the post-war
reconstruction period.
Another attraction of macrostability is stable prices. Of prices
benefit only those that command purchasing power and income.
Therefore an efficient labour market, providing income oppor-
tunities for the population is crucial. 
Macrostability and that have to be mentioned clearly, has
costs and the costs are more or less determined by the efficien-
cy of macroeconomic structures. One of the costs is the unem-
ployment that you need in order to keep wages at a level that
keeps your prices competitive on the world markets. The more
competition you have on the goods and the labour markets the
less restriction for market entry.
Another cost, more visible, is lower government expenditure.
Here the main issue is the question of what is the level of tax rev-
enues that the Bulgarian government is able to receive from the
economy. The level of government spending is of course crucial
for a catching up and growing economy. It is a very deep mis-
understanding to think that in a market economy the state has no
role. Especially in a dynamic market economy we need a strong
state that is able to secure the framework for the private busi-
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ket economies, the profitability of the state-owned companies
was squeezed, which fact in itself however should not be seen as
an indicator of deterioration of the positions of the public real
sector. In the same way, accounting profits, engendered by
changes in the price levels, are not an indicator of an essential
improvement in the positions of the real sector in 1996—97.
Other factors that also contributed to the increase in the opera-
tional profit of the companies, are the curbing of part of the costs
in real value typically incurred in the basic operational activity,
particularly labour costs and depreciation.
Data shown in Table 1 at the end of the text indicate that the
distribution of companies from the two parts of the real sector is
very similar. The companies of the first group, whose liquida-
tion is very likely, if not inevitable, account for 17% and 18% of
all private and public companies, involved in the sample in 1996.
In 1997 their relative share was decreased to 12,3% for the pri-
vate and 14% for the public sector. In the same time the compa-
nies with positive EBIT both in the private and public sector
constituted 60% and over 60% of all the companies from the
sample in 1996 and 70% in 1997.
The companies of the first group, which are the major loss
generators in the two parts of the real sector have a relatively
small impact on the size of output produced — around and less
than 5%. In the same time, the companies with negative prof-
itability account for a relatively high portion of the funds allo-
cated for labour costs (compensation for employees, social secu-
rity contributions, etc. payments related to labour salaries). This
gap is the largest with the ÒweakÓ companies, whose relative
share in funds spent on labour is about and more than twice big-
ger than their contribution to the size of output produced.
A similar model of behaviour of public companies has been
observed in periods of transition.1 What should be noted here is
that the relative share of the group of the weakest companies was
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The Real Sector in 1996—1997
The issue of ensuring conditions for stable economic growth
is largely analogical with the issue of ensuring conditions for
sustainable development of the non-financial businesses.
Exclusively the situation and potential of the non-financial com-
panies to expand their business activity and market share pre-
condition the opportunities for economic growth. From this
viewpoint, any restrictions levied over the expansion opportuni-
ties of the non-financial companiesÕ pose as a factor influencing
negatively the opportunities for increase in the rate of economic
growth.
Data from the annual financial statements show that both the
public and private companies, that constitute the two compo-
nents of the real sector, have reached a positive financial result
(profit) before paying interest, taxes, etc. extraordinary pay-
ments (earnings before interests and taxes — EBIT) in 1996 and
1997, and in 1997 there is an increment of 14% in the profit in
real value as compared to 1996 (the above figure deflated with
the average annual manufacturer price index). Profitability of the
companies of the sample has also grown in terms of EBIT from
9,5% in 1996 to 11,5% in 1997.
The business activity of the companies however was reduced
both in 1996 and 1997. In 1997 only the volumes of income
from sales of the companies from the sample was reduced by
more than 6% in real value. The growth of the operational prof-
it of the companies in 1997 was mostly due to the high inflation
during the second half of 1996 and the first months of 1997.
Such a development — increased profit and profitability due to
acceleration of the price dynamics — was observed in Bulgaria in
1991, as well as in some other Eastern and Central European
countries (e.g. Poland in 1990). In 1998, which saw a reduction
in the inflation rate to levels that are typical for developed mar-
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1For more details see: Avramov Roumen, Kamen Guenov — The Economy of
Transition: Structure and Types of Behaviour of Enterprises from the Banking
SectorÓ. ÒBankov Pregled, No 3, 1995; and Guenov Kamen — Adjustment of the
Real Sector to the Measures in the Macroeconomic Policies in ÒPrehodutÓ, ed. R.
Avramov and V. Antonov, Sofia, 1994, p. 139—159.
over the major industries has a negative effect not only on the
quality of their management and market policies, but on their
investment policies as well.
A decisive accomplishment of the privatisation process
would help resolve yet another essential problem of the real sec-
tor, namely — would place strict budget constraints on all eco-
nomic agents in the country. These strict budget constraints are
important not only in terms of improving the companiesÕ com-
petitiveness, but also with a view to the currency board func-
tioning in the country. Generating budget deficits is impermissi-
ble in such conditions, since they could be eventually trans-
formed into deficits of the state budget.
Of paramount significance for loosening the strict budget
constraints on a micro-level is the increasing indebtedness of the
companies to suppliers, state budget, commercial banks, etc.
Whether the companies have been adjusted to the requirements
of the market economy can be evaluated through the extent to
which they service their debt to other economic agents.
The financial flows between the real sector and the state bud-
get include budget subsidies allocated from the state budget to
the companies, and taxes paid by the companies to the state bud-
get. The state budget can also extend temporary financial aid to
some companies, which is, in essence, lending by the govern-
ment to the real sector, under conditions quite beneficial for the
companies. If such financial aid is not claimed within the terms
due as envisaged by the state departments, it can acquire the
character of a subsidy rather than a credit.
The level of budget subsidies as compared to GDP has been
significantly reduced since the beginning of the transition
towards a market economy, as compared to the years of central-
ly planned economy — in the period 1995 — 1997 it constituted
1% of GDP. This level is consistent with the level of budget sub-
sidies in the other transition states, even in EU states. So, they
could not be regarded as a mechanism that has ensured soft bud-
get constraints for the majority of companies in the state sector.
They were strongly concentrated in a small number of public
companies, mainly connected with certain branches and activi-
ties, such as railway transport, energy sector (heating plants and
mining industries), certain forms of public catering, etc. Almost
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gradually reduced both in the volume of the output and in the
size of funds paid for salaries.
The expenditure structure of Bulgarian companies differs
significantly from the structure in other countries2. The relative
share of labour costs from total costs in Bulgaria is much lower
than the one in the East German provinces and this is a direct
sequence of the low level of labour salaries in the country.
Many experts see the low level of labour costs as an extraor-
dinary competitive advantage of the Bulgarian economy. Such a
view may be well grounded from a theoretical point of view, still
a great portion of the Bulgarian companies remain non-compet-
itive at the international market. There are cases where this rel-
ative advantage of the Bulgarian economy is utilised (mostly in
dressmaking and textile industries), but in general the low labour
costs have not made Bulgarian goods more competitive. The
most energy-intensive industries, such as metallurgy and chem-
ical industries account for the greatest portion of Bulgarian
exports (and these were supposedly the most competitive
Bulgarian products). Hence, the major relative advantage of the
Bulgarian economy was in the low price of the energy sources,
which have been to a very high extent subsidised by the state
budget either directly or indirectly.
The depreciation share in the total costs of the Bulgarian
companies was relatively low as well. Bulgarian firms incurred
costs on depreciation whose relative share was between 2% and
4% in 1996 and below 1% in 1997, while at the same time for
East German companies it was approximately 6%.
Problems of the Development of the Real Sector
One of the main reasons for the low competitiveness of the
real sector is the low level of its business management. The pri-
vatisation process, particularly the entry of highly qualified for-
eign management in the major industries, determining the struc-
ture of the Bulgarian economy, is expected to step up the quali-
ty of business management. The retention of state ownership
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their prudence in extending commercial loans is quite natural.
We could expect therefore that suppliers would strive to place
their clients under more rigid budget constraints in this country.
Even in cases where the companies may have imposed soft
budget constraints for their clients, it was the Government rather
than the individual companies that accounted for that. Directly
or indirectly the Government tolerated delays in payment for gas
supplies, oil products, coal, power supplies, etc. and this was
possible due to the fact that almost all companies producing or
supplying these goods are state-owned, even more — holding
monopoly positions. Similar relieves were targeted primarily on
other state companies in a financial crisis and the common
explanation was that these are industries of a too great signifi-
cance for the Bulgarian economy. It is necessary to put an end to
this practice and the Government economic policy must be real-
ly unbiased to all companies suffering economic or financial dif-
ficulties, irrespective of their size, branch or type of ownership.
In order to assess whether the commercial banks in Bulgaria
have secured soft budget constraints on the companies, it is nec-
essary first of all to assess whether companies which cannot
cover their operational costs have received net bank financing,
measurable through the change in the face value of bank loans,
from which interest payments are deducted. If the net bank lend-
ing for companies in the situation of an economic crisis turns out
to be positive, then cash-flows have run from the commercial
banks to the companies and they have been placed in the condi-
tions of soft budget constraints. And vice versa, a negative net
bank lending for loss generating companies will mean that com-
mercial banks have imposed rigid rather than soft budget con-
straints on these companies.
Enterprises with negative operational income account for
24% of all companies that have received large bank loans (over
135 mil BGL as of the end of 1996). Broken down by sectors
they are: about 18% of all public companies and about 30% of
all private companies. The relative share of public companies
with negative rate of return and positive bank financing is 78%
of all public companies 88% respectively. It can be assumed that
for a great portion of these companies the increase in the net
bank financing is due to the depreciation of the national curren-
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all-remaining activities, except for health care, education and
government were not subsidised by the state.
One of the main ways to loosen the budget constraints on
companies in transitional economies is by creating conditions
for increase of their tax liabilities.
Data from the financial statements of the companies for FY
1996 show that tax liabilities of the companies (including liabil-
ities to the National Insurance Institute) constituted 19,2% of
GDP. This level has grown by almost 6 per cent points as com-
pared to the year-end of 1995. If we assume that the level of tax
liabilities to GDP was about 0% at the end of the functioning of
the centrally planned economy (the end of 1989), we can calcu-
late that in the period 1990—95 there was annually a cash flow
from the state budget to the companies amounting to 2,5% of
GDP. This means that the cash flow, which was due to the
increase of tax liabilities, was higher than the cash flow from the
state budget to the companies, resulting from direct state subsi-
dies.
Tax liabilities accumulated by loss generating companies can
be seen as a mechanism for loosening the strict budget con-
straints, while the tax liabilities accumulated by profitable com-
panies are an indicator of the lack of financial discipline, weak
tax authorities or lobbying for certain companies or activities.
Data for 1996 show that the concentration of tax liabilities
was higher in the loss generating companies, while in the private
sector higher concentration of tax liabilities was observed
among the profitable companies. It turned out that delaying or
even evading paying taxes was a successful strategy for the
Bulgarian companies in this period. This is an indicator of the
weakness of the tax system in the country, and of the total lack
of fiscal discipline.
Data about the commercial loans, derived from the balance
sheets of the companies, do not support a statement that suppli-
ers have placed their clients in the conditions of soft budget con-
straints. The size of commercial lending in Bulgaria is not big-
ger than the one in the developed market economies, where it is
common practice for suppliers to strive after expanding com-
mercial credit for their clients. Since the trade laws in Bulgaria
do not protect efficiently enough the creditors (incl. suppliers),
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up, find it even more difficult to reach access to bank loans.
Different studies of the sector show that no more than 8% of the
companies in this sector has ever had access to bank loans. Very
few of the small and medium companies do apply for bank
loans, even though the lack of financial resource is a major prob-
lem for their business development. The conditions for their
granting are the main reason for this fact.
The issue of promotion of investment and restructuring of the
economy is closely related to the issue of the functioning of the
financial system in a way that would allow the companies to
reach their optimal capital mix. Numerous studies have been
conducted on this problem both in the developed market
economies and in the countries of CEE.3
The regression analysis that was made is trying to establish
whether the bank system in the country has performed success-
fully its functions of a financial mediator4. In all cases the signs
before the multipliers of the independent variables are identical,
which means that factor variables have influenced in one and the
same way the dependent variable for both private and public
companies in 1996 and 1997 as well.
The sign before the variable multiplier, characterising the
profitability of the companies, is negative. One possible expla-
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cy in 1996 if the loans extended to them by that time had been
in foreign currency. With only 9% of all companies with nega-
tive rate of return (11 companies) the net bank financing has
grown more than twice, and with 4 of them — more than 5 times.
It is not justifiable to assume that with these latter companies the
increase in the net bank financing was due exclusively to the
depreciation of the national currency.
Commercial banks should be more willing to increase their
lending for companies with positive profitability. Nevertheless,
the relative share of companies with positive profitability and
relatively large increment of the net bank financing is smaller
than the one of companies with negative rate of return. This
might be due either to the structure of loans already extended
(both in BGL or forex) or to the reluctance of companies with a
positive financial result to increase their bank loans, because of
their high price when measured against the level of real interest
rates on bank loans.
Data about public companies in 1998 show that in the first
half of the year there was a tendency of loosening the budget
constraints only on the part of the state budget for companies
from this sector of the economy. As for suppliers and commer-
cial banks, they strove for reducing their accounts receivable
from these companies during the first half of 1998. The increase
of the debt of the companies to the state budget and the National
Insurance Institute identifies the state as a major economic agent
loosening the financial discipline of the companies from the
state sector. This is a symptomatic fact, which can be observed
in many other states of Eastern Europe, whose governments are
trying to rescue enterprises, which are in a bad or even hopeless
financial condition.
Financing of the operational and capital improvement activi-
ties in the real sector is a problem of extreme importance for its
growth.
The capital market and the corporate securities market have
not been developed yet. Bank loans and own resources still
remain the only source of funding available for the companies.
Commercial banks are still reluctant to extend new loans
because of the high risk related with the real sector in the coun-
try. Small and medium enterprises, most of which are newly set
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3 The analysis contained herein is similar to the analysis in: Corneli,
Francesca, Richard Portes and Mark Schaffer — ÒThe Capital Structure of Firms in
Central and Eastern EuropeÓ, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion
Paper No 1392, 1996, concerning the factors for bank lending for companies in
Hungary and Poland.
4 The independent variables of the regression analysis of the public companies
are based on data for 1995. Due to the fact that we do not have data about income
and expenses of private companies in 1995, the independent variables in this case
have been computed based on data for 1996. As for 1997 we have not made two
separate calculations for the two components of the real sector and have used the
data for 1997. This is a deficiency of the model, because the behaviour of the com-
mercial banks (lending) has probably been based on data of the companies for pre-
vious periods. That is why we verified the model for the public companies for 1996,
by computing all independent variables with the data for 1996. The signs before the
multipliers of the independent variables remained the same, while the statistic char-
acteristics of the model were not degraded. If we assume that the situation with the
model of the private companies for 1996 and for 1997 will be the same, then the
signs before the independent variables will be the same like the ones that we have
obtained when using data for 1996 instead of for 1995.
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nation is that the negative multiplier in the implicit equation of
the demand for credit has prevailed over the positive multiplier
in the equation of supply of credit. As noted before, this was due
to the asymmetric nature of available data, hence — to the high
price of lending resource. Another possible explanation is that in
this period the short-term state of the enterprises may not have
been a good indicator of their future potential and the banks
therefore did not use it as an indicator when assessing the cred-
itworthiness of the companies. Still, the fact that more profitable
companies have a smaller gearing/total assetsÕ value ratio is a
signal that the financial system has not provided the companies
with the best conditions possible for reaching an optimal capital
mix.
The sign before the multiplier of the ratio Non-current
Tangible Assets/Total Assets is also negative. Various reasons
may account for this. In this case we use the book value of the
assets (of NCTA as well) derived from the annual financial state-
ments of the enterprises, which might be well apart from their
market price (higher or lower). Secondly, the bankers might see
the capital-intensive branches, which typically have high values
of this ratio, as branches with the worst prospects for future
development. We checked additionally the correlation between
profitability and the ratio NCTA/total assets and it turned out to
be negative with both private and public companies. Therefore,
if we still retain the assumption that profitability is positively
related to the supply of credit resources, then the latter must be
in a really negative correlation to the ratio NCTA/total assets.
The sign before the multiplier of the logarithm of sales is
positive, but the multiplier itself is close to zero, which means
that the relation between the size of the companies and their
access to bank loans is not very clear, which is actually what we
expected to find out.
It is also necessary to update the system of state standards
and quality requirements for goods and services, so that they can
match the requirements prevailing at the markets of major
importance for Bulgarian exporters. It is also necessary to
improve the quality assurance system to make sure that these
standards are met. We do not mean that introducing new quality
requirements, licenses, etc should unnecessarily increase state
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bureaucracy. If these steps are undertaken, conditions will be
created for introduction of foreign quality requirements even
when realising the products at the domestic market. Presently
the segment of low-income consumers, who give preference to
the strategy — low prices for low quality, overwhelms the
Bulgarian market. The presence of competitive imports does not
allow the Bulgarian manufacturers to raise the prices of their
goods and services directly, and they do this by degrading their
quality. The end users are generally scattered and do not have the
efficient demand needed to exert an impact on the producers and
force them improve the quality of products. This function there-
fore, has to be taken over by a system of quality control over
products. The strategy Òlow prices for low qualityÓ might be suc-
cessful for the Bulgarian manufacturers at the domestic market,
but it reduces their export potential in the long run. What is
more, such a strategy can be successful at the domestic market
for a relatively short period of time, because it is quite easy to
copy from foreign producers. In such a case the local producers
usually start demanding protectionism against low-quality
imported goods, against imports at dumping prices, etc., which
is, in effect, a demand for protection against their own strategy,
applied at the domestic market.
Table 1
Distribution of Sales and Labour Costs by Companies According 
to Their Profitability (% of all Sales and Labour Costs 
in the Respective Sector)
Number of Share in Share in  
Companies the Sales the Labour 
in the Sample of the Sector Costs for 
the Sector
1996
Public Companies
EBIT5/assets<= -10% 1673 4.3 8.9
—10%<EVIT/assets<=0% 2120 20.1 22.9
0%<EBIT/assets<=10% 2876 28.7 24.8
10%<EBIT/assets 2945 46.9 43.5
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5 EBIT — earnings before interest, taxes, etc. divided by total assets.
Table 3
Level of Commercial Credit in Some OECD States and
Transitional Economies (as of Year-end, % of GDP)
State Year Com. Credit (% of GDP)
Czech Republic 1994 49
Hungary 1993 24
Kazahstan 1996 25
Poland 1995 15
Russia 1996 27
Finland 1990 20
France 1990 38
Sweden 1990 21
Great Britain 1990 20
Bulgaria 1995 14
Bulgaria 1996 22
Bulgaria 1997 19
Data source: (Schaffer6). NIS, own calculations.
Table 4
Results of the Regression Model — Private Companies without
Foreign Holding
Dependent Variable: Gearing/Assets 1996
Independent Variable Multiplier Standard Error T
Constant 0.457 0.074 6.205
EBIT/assets 1996 —0.511 0.004 —126.689
Logarithm of sales 1996 0.028 0.008 3.460
NCTA/total assets 1996 —0.224 0.058 —3.836
Average value 
of dependent variable 0.6630
R2 = 0.352
Number of companies 29708
Data source: NIS; own calculations.
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Number of Share in Share in  
Companies the Sales the Labour 
in the Sample of the Sector Costs for 
the Sector
Private Companies
EBIT/assets <= —10% 5583 5.1 11.7
—10%<EBIT/assets <= 0% 6253 17.9 26.6
0%<EBIT/assets <= 10% 12 219 45.0 32.1
10%<EBIT/assets 7554 32.0 29.5
1997
Public Companies
EBIT/assets <= —10% 593 8.1 12.0
—10%<EBIT/assets <= 0% 687 23.4 20.7
0%<EBIT/assets <= 10% 2009 40.9 35.0
10%<EBIT/assets 974 27.6 32.3
Private Companies
EBIT/assets <= —10% 4764 2.0 5.0
—10%<EBIT/assets <= 0% 6478 12.0 12.3
0%<EBIT/assets<= 10% 18 395 37.2 35.5
10%<EBIT/assets 8812 48.8 47.2
Data source: NIS, own calculations.
Table 2
Structure of the Expenses of the Companies
1996 1997
Public Companies
Material expenses (include, goods
purchased from other enterprises) 77.9 66.5
Labour Costs 15.2 12.9
Depreciation 2.5 0.4
Other costs 4.4 20.2
Private Companies
Material costs (include, goods purchased 
from other enterprises) 87.3 71.8
Labour costs 7.6 13.1
Depreciation 1.2 0.9
Other costs 3.9 14.2
Data source: NIS, own calculations.
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6Schaffer, Mark — ÒDo Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget
Constraints? A Reconsideration of Concepts and EvidenceÓ, CERT Discussion
Paper 97/20, also in: Journal of Comparative Economics.
COMMENT
Julian Pankow
CASE, Warsaw
In my comments to the presentation of Mr. Lubomir Dimitrov
I would like to focus on one segment of the real sector — on the pri-
vatised former state owned enterprises. My remarks are based on
the findings of a survey. The survey was conducted in September
and October last year. It involved interviews with 52 medium and
large Bulgarian companies, privatised before the end of 1996. The
purpose of the survey was to study the interdependencies between
applied in Bulgaria approach to privatisation and its impact on the
performance and the issues faced by the privatised enterprises.
A basic prerequisite for the privatisation of the state owned sec-
tor is the creation of the necessary conditions for increasing of eco-
nomic efficiency and of the competitiveness of the privatised com-
panies. The rich experience accumulated by a number of countries
in transition proves that formal privatisation does not always lead to
the expected results, especially for a short period of time.
The efficiency of privatisation, viewed as methods of restruc-
turing, depends on a number of factors. In a great degree the legal
and institutional framework for privatisation, applied methods,
techniques and the procedures for transformation of ownership
determine them. They must reflect the priorities in the policy of the
economic reform. They also should create favourable conditions for
the postprivatisation restructuring of the enterprises. It leads to
structural changes in the economy and to economic growth.
The privatisation of the enterprises surveyed started as early
as 1994. The privatisation of a specific enterprise may require a
series of contracts because it aims at the usage of several tech-
niques and offers for sale to several buyers. In 15 enterprises
(29% of the sample) only one contract has been signed; in 13
enterprises (25% of the sample) — two contracts; 11(21%) —
three contracts, and in 5 (10%) — five contracts. By the time of
the investigation above 50 % of the shares have been sold in
more than 90% of the joint-stock companies.
The transformation of ownership as a rule takes a long time
(starting from the date of the decision for transformation till the date
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Table 5
Results of the Regression Model — Public Companies.
Dependent Variable: Gearing/Assets 1996
Independent Variable Multiplier Standard Error T
Constant 0.354 0.028 12.428
EBIT/assets 1996 —0.738 0.025 —28.994
Logarithm of sales 1996 0.049 0.003 17.157
NCTA/total assets 1996 —0.657 0.021 —31.663
Average value of dependent variable 0.4637
R2 = 0.197
Number of companies 6826
Data source: NIS, own calculations.
Table 6
Results of the Regression Model — Public and Private Companies.
Dependent Variable: Gearing/Assets 1997
Independent Variable Multiplier Standard Error T
Constant 0.475981 0.012 41.37339
EBIT/assets 1996 —0.20238 0.005 —39.4086
Logarithm of sales 1996 0.015228 0.001 14.65685
NCTA/total assets 1996 —0.37786 0.007 —52.4864
Average value of dependent variable 0.485907
R2 = 0.093576
Number of companies                            37 877
Data source: NIS, own calculations.
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of the signing of the last transaction): 20 months in average. In half
of the cases the transformation lasts more than a year and a half, in
15% of the cases — two or more years. In many of the companies
private ownership starts to prevail typically after 13 months, and in
half of the joint-stock companies — only after one year from the date
of the decision, and in 15% of the cases — at least after two years.
In acquiring of the ownership of the objects to be privatised
(fully or in large blocks of shares) often a buyer is obliged, in addi-
tion to paying the price, to take a number of obligations.  The var-
ious kinds of obligations appeared in the process of privatisation
of over 70% of the enterprises of the sample. This is possible due
to the fact that in the process of privatisation of most of the enter-
prises the strategic investor is determined at the very first stage.
Findings suggest that the authorities responsible for the pri-
vatisation have tried to impose obligations to the investors
always when it has been possible technically. Most often these
obligations have been in the form of specific packets containing
two or three, and sometimes four or five kinds of obligations. 
Among all registered kinds of obligations the most frequently
used one — and the most controversial because of its anti-market
character — is restriction to change the previous profile of activity.
The periods in which the profile of activity is supposed to be kept
are usually rather long — over three and often even over five years.
On the second place are the social obligations, which concern
nearly 2/3 of the investigated enterprises. The greatest attention
is being paid to the workplaces. Eighty percent of the social
obligations are connected with keeping up the present level of
employment — in more of half of the cases for a long period of
time — 5 or more years. Also in about 30% of the cases the
investor obliges to provide social benefits in the form of free
lunches, free medical care, etc. In about 40% of the cases the
investor takes more than one social obligation.
The category of obligations whose expedience is least object-
ed is on the third place. These are the obligations for investment.
In the whole sample such obligations are present in 60% of the
enterprises. The periods for realisation of the investments are
long — in 2/3 of the cases they are as long as 5 years, the short-
est of them being no more than three years.
In half of the investigated firms the strategic investors are oblig-
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ed to pay the debts of the former state-owned enterprise. Such an
obligation usually includes paying the greater part of the debt, and
in 90% of the cases its full size. The obligation for the debts most
often concerns the joint-stock companies whose strategic investors
have been obliged to accept the whole packet of obligations. 
At the end are the ecological obligations. These obligations
are being realised only in every fourth company.
The analysis of the structure of ownership of the investigated
enterprises makes possible to distinguish three features.
The first characteristic feature is the relatively low share par-
ticipation of the insiders as new owners (at least in the investi-
gated sample i.e. in the enterprises in a process of advanced
stage of privatisation). The insiders, in spite of the alleviations
for the present and former employees of the state-owned enter-
prises in the process of privatisation of  Òtheir own firmÓ, are not
the greatest category of shareholders. 
The second characteristic feature is the slow changes in the
structure of ownership after the privatisation. The reasons for the
great inertia in the change of the ownership of the enterprises
studied are the restrictions on the change of the property of 39%
of the firms. These restrictions have been introduced in 1/3 of
the enterprises transformed into joint-stock companies. In 63%
of the investigated firms there is no turnover of shares.
The third characteristic feature in the structure of the property
of the investigated enterprises is the high degree of concentration
of property. In 69% of the firms there is a strategic investor who is
the owner of more than 50% of the shares. In 32% of the firms the
investor owns more than two thirds of the property which gives him
full control. In the rest 21% of the firms the largest investor has no
influence over the management because he owns less than 1/3 of
the shares. In 87% of the joint-stock companies no more than three
of the largest investors own the controlling blocks of shares.
As a result of the transformations in the investigated enter-
prises, four basic models of the structure of property have been
formed. The first and most widespread one (55% of the firms) is
with prevailing ownership of the domestic outsiders, of which
25% of the firms are investment funds, in 30% — the rest of the
domestic legal entities. The second model includes the predom-
inance of the insiders. The third model is with the prevailing par-
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The simplest mechanism of adaptation used by the enterpris-
es is connected with getting free from the unnecessary assets. It
concerns the clearance sale both of the production and non-pro-
duction assets. The process of getting free from the unnecessary
production assets has finished only in every seventh or eight
investigated enterprise. Only one of ten enterprises has got rid-
den of the unnecessary non-productive assets.
The undertaking of the next measures for restructuring does
not exceed the limits of the elementary mechanisms for adapta-
tion in the enterprise itself and are connected with relatively
available potential. One of the ways is a substantial reduction of
the general expenditures and raising the productivity of the
available resources. 
The greater part of the investigated enterprises are going to
undertake concrete actions or are in a process of their imple-
mentation. There is ongoing the process of a considerable reduc-
tion of the general expenditures in nearly 2/3 of the enterprises,
but has been finished only in one of six of them. A substantial
reduction of the costs of raw materials has been completed in no
more than 1/3 of them, and a considerable reduction of energy
consumption — in less than half of them. The number of the
enterprises in which a considerable reduction of the employment
has been started is (17,3%) or those in which the reduction of the
employment has finished are (26,9%), which is relatively high,
having in mind that in about 80% of the cases the new owners,
within the limits of the social contract, are obliged to keep the
level of employment and even to create new jobs. 
A more advanced are the concrete actions for restructuring,
connected with the changes of the profile of activity, widening
of the range of manufactured goods (offered services) or with
the introduction of technological changes. 
Seemingly the fact that most of the privatised enterprises have
the previous profile of activity could be shocking. This is under-
standable because nearly ˇ of them have taken this obligation in
their contracts. For this reason the enterprises do not have a choice
for their profile of activity at least temporarily. The greater part of
the enterprises has undertaken (more than 1/3) or completed
(more than 1/4) concrete actions for widening the range of manu-
factured goods products. Technological changes have been under-
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ticipation of foreign investors (12%), the fourth one — without a
prevailing participation of any of the owners (12%). 
Table 1
Patterns of the Ownership Structure in the Surveyed Companies
Patterns of the Ownership Structure
Categories of Companies Dispersed Prevailance Prevailance Prevailance
of Insiders from of Foreign 
Domestic Investors
Outsiders
TOTAL 12 21 55 12
Methods of transformation
1. Transformation into 
a joint-stock company 12 24 54 10
2. Transformation into a limited 
liability company 17 — 67 16
3. Sale without preliminary 
transformation (direct sale) — 20 60 20
Techniques for privatisation
1. Cash: 11 31 42 16
— workersÕ-management 
buy- out 6 56 25 13
— auction / tender 25 25 50 —
— negotiations with 
potential buyers — — 57 43
2. Bond 11 16 69 4
Sector
1. Heavy industry and mechanical 
engineering 9 18 73 —
2. Elektrotechnical and electronic — — 33 67
3. Chemical 11 33 56 —
4. Clothing and textiles 15 31 46 8
5. Food processing industry 15 8 62 15
Profile of manufactured goods
1. Investment 12 15 65 8
2. Consumer 12 29 46 13
Phase of manufacturing
1. Raw-material, semi-part 
manufactured goods 10 20 70 —
2. Final goods 12 23 52 13
Employment
1. Less than 300 persons 11 21 63 5
2. 300 — 1000 persons —32 47 21
3. More than 1000 persons 29 7 57 7
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First, during the first three analysed years, the average
amount of investment obviously falls down. This is explained by
the fact that after the payment of the prices for the acquiring of
the firms their owners have no funds for the restructuring.
Secondly, the relatively small discrepancy between the
amount of funds, considered as necessary, and those practically
realised confirms the fact that the actions, connected with the
restructuring, are undertaken and conform with the financial
potential of the firm. 
Third, compared to 1997 — 1998 is declining the number of
the firms, which intend to continue the financing of the restruc-
turing. At the same time the amount of funds, necessary for the
further financing of the programs for restructuring, remains
nearly at the level, reached in 1998. 
The crucial issue is the availability of the sources for financ-
ing of the restructuring processes or rather their unavailability
from the viewpoint of the enterprises. 
Table 3
Sources of Financing of Restructuring programs (in % of the
Companies)
Share in the Financing Sources of Financing
the Restructuring (%)
Own External
Financial Increase Credits Strategic
Resources of Capital Investor
0 30.8 92.3 82.7 90.4
up to 10 3.8 — 1.9 1.9
from 10.1 up to 20 5.8 3.8 5.8 —
from 20.1 up to 30 1.9 1.9 — 3.8
from 30.1 up to 40 — — — —
from 40.1 up to 50 — — 1.9 —
from 50.1 up to 60 1.9 — — —
from 60.1 up to 70 1.9 — — —
from 70.1 up to 80 5.8 — 3.8 1.9
from 80.1 up to 90 — 1.9 — —
from 90.1 up to 99,9 — — — —
100 48.1 — 3.8 1.9
Almost half of the investigated enterprises cover the expens-
es for restructuring fully by their own resources. Only in sepa-
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taken or introduced in more than half of the enterprises. 
The processes of restructuring related with the system of
management of the privatised enterprises and the changes in the
sphere of motivation are relatively in an advanced stage. 
A relatively great number — nearly 2/3 of the enterprises — have
undertaken or completed the changes in the organisational struc-
ture. 
More advanced restructuring measures are connected with
the reorientation of the privatised companies from traditional
manufacturing oriented into market oriented. Two thirds of
enterprises under investigation have started to develop a new
marketing strategy, one fourth of them has it already done. Also
every fourth of companies has completed investment programs.
Generally, the results of the survey indicate that the restruc-
turing of the privatised enterprises is being made by their own
efforts, by their conception, and mainly by their own resources.
This most probably is related to the character of actions for
restructuring. As we have already said, mostly only elementary
and superficial procedures for restructuring, not requiring great
investments or efforts, are being used.
This is partially confirmed by the analysis of the amount of the
expenditures spent already and, according to the enterprises, nec-
essary for the implementation of the restructuring programmes. 
Table 2
Expenditures for Restructuring (thousand Leva)
Year
Amount of the 
Average Annual
Expenditures 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Amount 
of necessary funds 152 400 143 400 92 700 185 400 186 000 181 200
Realised 
investments 147 700 153 000 130 100 166 600 X X
Number 
of enterprises of 
which have made 
investments 
for the year 6 8 20 22 13 13
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COMMENT
Krassimir Angarski
Economic Secretary to the President of the Republic of Bulgaria
You probably know, that Professor Georgi Petrov, who is
going to make an intervention later, and myself have for so many
years now defended the thesis that the only way to raise funds or
increase the capital and labour supply in Bulgaria, is by reducing
taxes. There was yet another opportunity last year and the year
before, when many big investors tended to come to this country,
when Bulgaria had its 15 minutes, as Prof. Jeffrey Sachs put it.
At that time our administration, which was referred to, was not
prepared to receive them and conclude the deals right away. So
we saw the crises in Kossovo emerge, the crises in Russia grow
acute, the global finance crises appear and thus missed our big
chance. We have to make twice and three times bigger efforts
now, but the big investors may still not come. I therefore, would
not like to ignore the issue of the factors of economic growth.
I would not like to comment the report that tackled the
issues of the real sector. I will just outline some of them, which
seem to me to be of particular importance. There is a very accu-
rate definition in the report that ÒBulgarian production is in
decline and is suffering from lack of competitivenessÓ. I would
like to relate right now this issue to the issue of the exchange
rate that has been subject to so much deliberations here.
Associate professor Stoyan Alexandrov was right when stating
in Borovets that whoever raises the question of the exchange
rate would be immediately accused of speculating against the
Board. It seems to me that there is no use of merely stating
whether the rate is realistic or not, whether it is an obstacle or
not. This exchange rate is not likely to persevere, as we heard it
in the comments today, and as we know from other countriesÕ
experience. Why should not then the competent bodies that
conduct explorations make a detailed analysis on how this rate
impacts agriculture and food industries for example, what an
influence it has on their exports. Does it influence industrial
production and other branches? So that we can say it clearly:
there is no need to change the exchange rate during the next two
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rate cases as a source of financing of the restructuring the
increase of the capital of the joint-stock company is being used,
at a low level at that. A little more frequently the funds for
restructuring are related with attracting strategic investor. The
tendency of taking credits for financing the programs is not
greater. This source is being used by 17 % of the firms, but only
7% of them receive the necessary amount of credits. 
The positive results of the privatisation of the Bulgarian
enterprises include a high degree of concentration of the proper-
ty, especially having in mind the fact that it has become as a rule
due to the participation of outside investors. In this way the typ-
ical problems of transformation of property faced by many of the
post communist countries are avoided.
The survey shows a number of issues, which should be
solved in order to improve the process of privatisation and cre-
ate favourable conditions for privatised companies. 
The privatisation includes joint stock companies with restric-
tions for turnover of shares. It contradicts the very idea of the
joint stock company. The restrictions hamper the concentration
of the shares by the most effective investors and delay the
process of the redistribution of the property rights and develop-
ment of the securities market.
When selling of privatised property the state imposes on the
investors a number of obligations. The greater part of these oblig-
ations does not correspond to the principals of market economy
and burdening investors. This reduces the attractiveness of the pri-
vatised enterprises which leads to serious problems in finding of
the strategic investor, has a negative influence on the price of the
transactions, reduces the chances for privatisation of the enterpris-
es which are in a difficult economic and financial situation.
The obligations imposed on the investors not only hamper
but also sometimes make active strategies of restructuring
impossible which results in a further delay of a real improvement
of the performance of the privatised enterprises. That is why,
where it is expedient, there must be a reduction of the obliga-
tions to the rational minimum; the investment obligation must
have a priority and of the social ones only those connected with
employment and sometimes with ecological obligation.
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the enterprise is still functioning, the wages are growing. There
are lots of examples like this, and as I told you, a huge amount
is at stake — 1 billion leva debt to the state budget, or a total of
one and a half billion DM.
The second option that could be applied is to use different
financial schemes. We used to call them triple transactions
before. They are absolutely prohibited now on the grounds that
these are not clean deals, but still when it comes to privatising
an enterprise in the very short run, when there is a buyer, then
opportunities should be sought for participation of the state. For
example — by raising the capital or providing some kind of tem-
porary assistance through the Reserve Fund for Restructuring.
The third option is by forming the market. The Task force
supports this market approach. We suggest that a market of debt
is established. Our politicians, the legislature however is much
scared of this method. They are afraid that once the debt comes
out on the market, the privatisation will come to an end. This
fear must be overcome. 
I would like to tell Professor Sachs that we do have sector poli-
cies, even though not very distinctly outlined. For the agricultural
sector for example — we have provided a five-year tax vacation for
the producers, but still the problems we are faced with in this sec-
tor are so numerous, that such a relief plays practically no role.
Tourism was also quoted as an example. We had a big debate
whether VAT should be levied on tourism or not. So the problems
here come mainly from our advisers or the ÒsupervisorsÓ of the
three-year program — IMF. We shall hear their opinion on this
issue, but they have explicitly forbidden any tax relief. We have
eliminated absolutely all relief for foreign investments. Illian
Vassilev suffered a lot. I am in favour of policies that would allow
us to attract capital, at whatever price, because Bulgaria does not
have the capital that could step up economic growth.
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or three years but not individual experts like myself to be
accused of opposing the Board. 
I would like to mention that together with three legal experts
and many advisers from the banking sector, I was one of the team
that drafted the two laws on the Currency Board. These laws as
you can see it now are operating in a perfect manner. What rais-
es my greatest concern in the report we just heard, is that, while
discussing economic growth, we heard that there is a very big
intercompany indebtedness, rather indebtedness of the compa-
nies to the state. Data provided by the Ministry of Finance show
that this is in the range of one and a half billion DM as this fig-
ure applies only to state-owned and municipal companies. I am
not talking about the private ones. Their debt to the state budget
only amounts to over one billion DM. This is a huge amount and
if that is so, what kind of growth could we possibly talk about?
Now I would like to share the good news that a task force has
already been set up at the Center for Economic Development to
work on this problem, because if it going to develop along the same
lines as to date, we cannot expect any serious economic growth.
What really scares me is the conclusion that was made that the state
has undertaken no steps to resolve this problem, thus almost foster-
ing its aggravation. There was something like that in the report. 
What are the ideas of the task force, which was asked to pro-
vide positive ways of solving the problem? 
One of the options is to use the approach applied some time
ago to the banks. I do not mean to say that the so-called ZUNK
bonds solution was very successful. Other states did it simultane-
ously — cleared the banks and enterprises of their bad debt togeth-
er. In 1994 we applied it to the banking sector only. Despite this
however, the lack of bank discipline and serious banking supervi-
sion brought about the bankruptcy of many banks, even though a
Law on Settlement of Bad Debt was enforced. Such a develop-
ment is not likely today, due to the Currency Board, or even if it
takes place, this would be an exceptional case. 
I would like to see something like that in the real sector. We
cannot tolerate a situation when an enterprise has a debt to the
state amounting to billions of leva and it is pretty clear that the
debt will never be repaid. Take Bulgargas for example — one of
the biggest debtors with 350 billion leva. And, in spite of this,
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was, ÒWe get the best from Colombia but the manufacturers are
those who do not give us products of better qualityÓ. Then they
went to the manufacturers who sewed the bags and asked, ÒWhy
do you manufacture bad quality products?Ó And the manufac-
turers answered, ÒWe do a perfect job — the sewing is OK, the
design is excellent but the leather itself is not of very good qual-
ityÓ. Then they went to the leather suppliers who said, ÓNo, we
do everything perfectly. The processing is in accordance with the
latest technologies, itÕs perfect, but the problem is that the hide
is of poor qualityÓ. Then they went to the hide suppliers who
said, ÓWe get it in that condition from the slaughtering houseÓ.
They went the slaughtering house and were told the following,
ÒNo, itÕs not our fault. We get it from the cowboysÓ. They went
to the cowboys who said, ÓOh, that problem? ItÕs the cowsÕ fault
because they rub themselves against the treesÓ. So following
several months survey it was found out that the cows were to
blame for it.
The moral of the story is that nobody will invest in an econ-
omy where the cows are to blame. All the factors listed by Prof.
Sachs shall not have a positive effect in an economy where the
cows are to blame. Nobody shall direct cash flows to an econo-
my where the cows are the guilty ones. Nobody shall invest in
an education and nobody shall care for an infrastructure because
like the cows, like the infrastructure, let alone the establishment
of sector networks because where it is the cowsÕ fault, it is evi-
dent that nobody listens to and nobody cooperates with anyone
else. So there is no interaction network to be talked about. 
We go back to the first issue, the one relating to the transac-
tion costs. I would say that we know the problem very well and
we all heard in the morning what and how to do it. Why is it very
closely related to the economic development issue? Because, in
my opinion, and as Prof. Sachs mentioned, this issue comes
ahead the others. We can list some 20 other factors for growth.
The problem with transaction costs and hence the property rights
problem are in the first place because we all talk about growth in
the framework of a certain market environment and competition
within the economy. Without any guarantees of property rights
and without any developed patterns for the reduction of transac-
tions costs there shall be no market and no competition. And it
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I would like to emphasise the topic I am going to present to
a certain extent in prospect, summarising Professor SachsÕ pre-
sentation and then I will tell you a story. Prof. Sachs in general
pointed out five basic recommendations for the achievement of
economic growth in Bulgaria. I was particularly impressed by
the prioritisation of these recommendations and in particular, by
his giving high priority to the transaction costs. Transaction
costs as a major issue for Bulgarian economy growth and the
topic I am going to talk about, namely the property rights relate
to that very question. He mentioned flows of funds and espe-
cially flows of funds to Bulgaria in the second place. Third he
placed the need of investment in the material infrastructure,
fourth — the development of sector networks that provide for the
co-operation and interaction which are indispensable for the
growth and development of competitiveness in the contempo-
rary world. 
In the fifth place Mr. Sachs ranked science and education.
Now, let me tell you a story, which I read in a book entitled
ÒPloughing the SeaÓ. Some time ago Colombian leather bag
manufacturers faced the following problem: their products did
not sell, they were not competitive though they were consider-
ably cheaper than, letÕs say Italian products. Therefore they
asked a company to make a survey and to tell them what the rea-
son for that situation was. The company followed the chain and
they went to the North-American market and asked, ÒWhy, in
your opinion, do those products not sell?Ó ÒWell, indeed, they
are three or four times cheaper but it seems that the quality of
the leather is not good enough. Yet, they are designed for more
wealthy people who would like to buy quality thingsÓ — was the
reply of the buyers. Then they went to the Colombians exporters
and asked, ÒWhy do you export goods that are not of good qual-
ity although they are cheaper ones?Ó and the exportersÕ answer
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disappear in the unfathomable sands. And there shall be no
result whatsoever.
The reason for that status is that the structure of property
rights and in particular of their application in Bulgaria has not
been ratified yet. Property rights are not protected yet. When an
economic entity has receivables, it is not sure at all that it will
settle them. Let alone the time it will take to get paid and the fact
that in the meantime the circumstances might have changed.
There are two basic elementary points without which economic
growth is impossible. The first thing is the ability to anticipate
terms and events, which means at least a kind of prediction of
the future, and the second thing is the level of co-operation
among the economic entities in the economy.
When property rights are not protected, forecasts are made
for shorter periods of time — for 1, 2 or 3 months ahead, no
longer. Nobody in Bulgaria can anticipate things two years
ahead. There is no such an economic entity. The economic cul-
ture in Bulgaria is still based on the lack of co-operation, on the
so called single hit i.e. two economic entities meet hoping never
to meet again, they deceive each other, instead of co-operating
with each other and establishing a good relationship in this way,
one of those relationships that are so important for the creation
of value generating networks. In Bulgaria there are value appro-
priating networks and probably I neednÕt convince anyone of it,
but there are still very few value generating networks. The rea-
son for that and I come back to the main subject again, is the
lack of guarantees, the non-protection of the property rights.
I do not think I should further emphasise the importance of
this topic, but let me make some recommendations. To my sat-
isfaction the two recommendations I can make based on this
analysis are identical to Prof. SachsÕ recommendations and cor-
respond to some of Minister BoshkovÕs views when he talked
about the plans for the future. The first concerns the reform of
the legal system. When I say reform of the legal system I mean
the court of law, the investigation, the prosecution and of course
the procedure acts rather than the substantive acts, both civil and
penal acts that could make the jurisdiction, the implementations
of regulations, the observance of rules, the performance of con-
tracts predictable. Then, if an economic entity considers it nec-
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is useless to speak about any growth in an economy without a
competition and a market.
Where is the problem itself? The problem is that it is well
known and we all heard what and how to do this morning. It is
very well known and I suppose the farmers also know very well
what and how to do in order to produce good quality leather. The
question we are still discussing in Bulgaria is not ÒwhatÓ and
ÒhowÓ but ÒwhoÓ and ÒwhyÓ. Let me go back to a topic of this
morning and this is the energy efficiency. Who and why would
implement energy efficient technologies and would save energy,
either a company or a household, if they can steal power? Why
should they implement such technologies? If there are incentives
to implement energy efficient technologies and to save power,
this will bring results. However, if incentives are not introduced
and even if the government bursts out more subsidies than nec-
essary for that sector, then energy wonÕt be saved and the spe-
cific energy consumption of the Bulgarian GNP wonÕt drop. But
once we have introduced incentives then we could say: ÒYes, this
sector is suitable for investments, here they could help some-
howÓ. But it is useless to discuss any investment programs
before this has been implemented.
Now letÕs go to the issue of property rights. It relates to the
opportunity of stealing or appropriating, if we are to use a
euphemism. Another euphemism for this is the economic term
Òsoft budget restrictionsÓ. At a time when an economy allows
the mass existence of a number of economic entities that have
had the opportunity of appropriating from others by not fulfill-
ing their obligations for a long time, such an economy cannot be
an economy of guaranteed property rights. The market and com-
petition analysis there is performed based on totally different
principles, not on the traditional ones, which we are used to
applying from and according to the economics textbooks. And
then, at a certain moment it turns out that the policy has become
irrelevant, the political actions of the state authorities have
become disconnected from the current processes, which are tak-
ing place in the real economy. Because the state authorities may
adopt an excellent investment program which we shall hear in a
moment about, they may adopt an excellent energy program and
it is possible that all the monetary funds allocated for them will
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COMMENT
Paul Reynolds
Adam Smith Institute, London
It is very nice to back in Bulgaria, returning to a civilized
country, after last place I was. It seems to me that it is a testi-
mony to the achievement of the government over the last two
years that the subject matter for debate is how we could get a
double-digit growth in the economy. And the fact that the
international financial institutions are assuming a positive
growth rate for the country describes an extraordinary achieve-
ment.
The perspectives put on by Mr. Boshkov and Mr. Sachs is an
excellent testimony to the achievement of the government,
although the Bulgarian economy still lags significantly behind
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. But it is catching up
quickly. The two reformist governments elected roundabout the
same time- one here, one in Romania-it is all pretty clear to
everybody which one is doing better than the other, contrary to
the popular expectations a couple of years ago.
In this presentation I will make some comments about an
implicit question which may not have received a sufficient
emphasis. And I will comment on one or two points of detail,
which I donÕt particularly agree with, given that this is a bit of a
debate, the things that are not necessarily agreed upon are inter-
esting for people.
The first point I want to make is on the role of government.
In Bulgaria, I do not believe that the consensus on the role of
government has reached a sufficient maturity in ÒNarodno
SabranieÓ and amongst the public generally. And the institution-
al question of reform is one which ÒdogsÓ that government and
has made reform more difficult. The previous speakers quite
rightly referred to questions like removing obstacles to reform
and made reference to economic discipline. I would like to com-
ment on this question of economic discipline, because it is often
implied that if you have sound economic discipline then growth
will come. I think this is not probably the case, it is certainly not
the case in Bulgaria. A way to look at this question of econom-
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essary to sue another one, it will be able to predict how long it
would take to have a court decision without being sure what the
decision will be since the court may rule a decision that he or she
has not expected. However, the point is about being able to antic-
ipate things before someone concludes a transaction with anoth-
er economic entity he or she does not know. It is good if he or
she has confidence in the legal system according to which this
transaction is being concluded because, otherwise, the transac-
tion becomes too expensive and will most likely not be signed.
And when there are no transactions, there is no specialisation, no
networks, no market and no growth.
The second thing that can be formulated as a recommenda-
tion is the development of the education, because we are talking
about the necessity of changing the economic culture of the
whole country and this cannot be done without a proper educa-
tion. Bulgaria must focus on the education and try at least not to
prevent people from studying.
As a person who is trying to teach in Bulgaria at the moment
and has graduated abroad I encounter serious difficulties.
People should not to be prevented from studying economy
and other subjects that will develop culture based on the co-
operation, creation of networks and long-term thinking and not
culture of short-term thinking based on a single hit and appro-
priation. 
Only when those two things are united together in Bulgaria,
i.e. a system of property rights that are protected and applied
plus an economic culture in the society that duly acknowledges
the importance of the indispensability of co-operation which
means sometimes sacrificing something or missing a good mar-
ket opportunity in order to be able to co-operate with another
economic entity, only then growth an be achieved. Without this
any program of those that are to be discussed this afternoon shall
work.
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not enough simply to have prices above costs, because this is
economic discipline, but itÕs not enough. The idea of having
prices above costs is that it forces the government to do those,
which are necessary. If you have prices above costs in Bulgarian
energy, people know how inefficient energy is in this country.
Having prices above the costs is only one half of the coin. The
other half of the coin is that the costs come down, this means
that the government is faced with the most difficult side of the
coin, which is to address those things which those economic dis-
cipline things have made more painful. It seems to me that in
this discussion that weÕve been having about growth we see the
government still faces very difficult problems in dealing with
these consequences of economic discipline. 
In the microeconomic sector, in the enterprise sector there
are still lamentable practices, which have been referred to by
both in the presentation from CASE and by Prof. Jeffrey Sachs.
Disclosure is a big problem in this country. Trying to find out
about enterprises, trying to purchase equity in this countryÕs
enterprises is very difficult, and the disclosure. There are lots of
enterprises, which do not submit proper accounts. And itÕs very
difficult even to find out about the ownership structure of many
enterprises in this country. ItÕs partially because of the fact that
there are still quite a large number of enterprises under state con-
trol. As this CASE presentation was telling us a moment ago,
there are great difficulties with those enterprises which have
been privatized through sale to insiders, who have not yet tried
to take those reforms in order to become efficient. Much of
economy is still under informal monopolistic arrangements, they
require a concerted action by the government. These are my
comments on the question of economic discipline both on the
micro side and the macro side. 
The other moment I want to talk about, related to this, are
some of the measures the government is considering taking for
the future-things, in my view, may well be ill-advised. One of
them on the macro side is for the government to go down the
route of quasi-guarantees in the banking sector in order to deal
with this problem of the other side of the economic discipline
coin. Some examples were cited from the USA of government
guarantees in the mortgage sector. In the UK these practices are
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ic discipline is to say that if the government has economic disci-
pline in the economy-all itÕs doing is getting Bulgaria onto the
playing field, so to speak. But youÕve still got to play and win the
game. It really is a necessary condition but not a sufficient con-
dition for economic growth. 
There are other aspects of economic discipline. One of them
is the currency board, about which there is much controversy.
We at the Institute strongly support the currency board system.
Secondly, disciplines in the macroeconomic sphere, in particular
those from reforms to the enterprise sector of which privatiza-
tion is one. This process has begun. Inflation has come down.
But there is a negative side effect for growth prospects- that
credit has squeezed substantially. It is not unreasonable because
there was a free fall before this government came to power, and
the pendulum has swung a little past equilibrium in order for dis-
cipline in the banking sector to be established very firmly. But
there is a downside. These are the problem of try and play the
game and win it, rather than just are on the playing field.
The currency board itself forces the government, should
force the government to get the banks into the private sector, for
the banks to rely on the profit motif, to ensure that credit is lib-
eralized, and when credit is provided it is provided on econom-
ically rational basis. This means an increase in the number of
banks in the sector; it means banks which are private; it means
no longer monopolistic characteristics in the banking sector; a
situation where small businesses and medium size businesses
who have reasonable prospects for growth to be able to borrow
money reasonably.
In Bulgaria we are a long way from that position. The finan-
cial discipline is there, the pendulum has swung, and necessari-
ly itÕs what would happen. Now the government is faced with the
need to normalize the banking sector and to develop a healthy
functioning market in lending. The parallel is also in the micro-
economic sector. If you have private ownership you have private
enterprises and you have a system youÕve got to go and carry it
through and implement those things which make you win the
game, rather than just be on the playing field.
What I mean by that is the example with the energy sector
with prices, which are still below a long-run marginal cost. ItÕs
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not prevalent and would be regarded by with horror by policy
makers.
The second difficulty is that of tax reform, or tax holidays.
Tax holidays have a very small limited effect. And our research
across the world has proven this time and time again. ItÕs done
and just because it is a commonplace it doesnÕt mean to say that
it is the right thing to do or itÕs effective. ItÕs like a popular myth
about these tax holidays. 
The way to look at this is: What the government may do and
offer are a number of things to encourage investment. And some
of those things cost a lot of money, and some of those things
donÕt. Providing improved infrastructures for investors cost a lot
of money but the benefits it would accrue are substantial indeed.
Developing international networks in the banking sector to allow
transactions to be a lot easier has a beneficial effect. Similarly,
improvements in corporate governance and disclosure, and in
company law, company law is still a bit of a mess in Bulgaria-
these things have very substantial benefits to investors.
Tax holidays, frankly, encourage short-term investment. And
if you give a tax holiday to a large Japanese manufacturer, locat-
ed in Bulgaria, it might make a difference over a five-year peri-
od, a period when they are not going to be showing significant
profits in the first two or three years. A tax holiday on corporate
income tax is not particularly attractive, but if itÕs offered itÕs
usually taken. If a large Japanese manufacturer gets one or two
million dollars in tax benefits in the first two or three years-is
that really going to make a significant difference for an invest-
ment decision. Is the investment decision winded on if weÕve got
a million-dollar benefit if we invest here, on a three or four hun-
dred million investment? The investment is very fragile and itÕs
not very effective. For the government, however itÕs very costly
indeed. On the one hand, itÕs not a particularly big deal for a for-
eign investor to have a small tax concession at that time. But if
youÕve got a government here with wide-spread tax arrears from
the enterprise sector, and the government is trying to get finan-
cial discipline into its own budget efforts, the government is
short of cash. ThatÕs clear and obvious. So when the government
has a very important objective to pursue proper tax discipline in
the economy then this idea of giving away tax holidays o people
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sends the wrong signals to society. In that sense a tax holiday has
a very big cost on the economy and the cost in relation to the
benefit of the investor is much too high.
Of course in many other countries they give away tax holi-
days. They donÕt have such a budget problem, the cost is may be
not so high. But for Bulgaria itÕs not very appropriate. On those
two points of disagreement on what has been said I will con-
clude and I wish the government well in its search for growth. 
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adequate assessment of the actual size of government and cross-
country comparability. 
Official fiscal statistics on the cash basis do not necessarily
cover all the cases of fiscal activities and fiscal disequilibrium.
This relates, for example, to debt restructuring of banks and enter-
prises by issuing special government bonds as it happened in
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and some other countries. It increases
the size of public debt and future fiscal burden though it is not
reflected in the current budget composed on the cash basis1. 
Apart from the officially recorded fiscal operations, central
banks or commercial banks are sometimes involved in quasi-fis-
cal (QF) activities. This phenomenon was particularly frequent-
ly observed at the beginning of transition when central banks
were still heavily dependent on government and parliament,
most of commercial banks publicly owned, and fiscal account-
ing standards did not meet the international norms. Among the
most frequently observed forms of the QF operations, one may
distinguish loans granted by the central bank at subsidised inter-
est rate, purchases and sales of foreign currencies under the sys-
tem of multiple exchange rates, servicing public external debt by
a central bank on behalf of government, netting out operation of
inter-enterprise debt, and co-financing of public investment pro-
jects. 
Despite numerous attempts to estimate the scale of quasi-fis-
cal operations in (see e.g. De Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996;
Budina, 1997; Markiewicz, 1998) they will not be included to
my analysis because I do not have a complete and comparable
data. However, one can assume that in most transition
economies this is already a history and QF operations either
were totally terminated, or play the marginal role only. 
Table 1 illustrates different level of fiscal redistribution of the
GDP, i.e. different size of government among transition
economies2. One can distinguish three groups of countries
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Discussing the interrelations between fiscal policy and eco-
nomic growth means touching the very fundamental question of
the role of government in economic life of the country. This is
strictly connected with the issue of quality and general philoso-
phy of government involvement in economic management. Of
course, it is a very broad theoretical topic going far beyond the
agenda of my presentation. In addition, it constitutes a very hot
political and ideological issue in any country. Certainly, it is not
my task and my interest to be engaged in this kind of debate.
Hence, I want to concentrate myself on three selected questions
having a very practical importance in elaborating a macroeco-
nomic strategy of any transition country, including Bulgaria.
First, I will discuss the size of government, i.e. the share of
expenditures and revenues to GDP, and its consequences for an
economic growth. Second, the structure of government expendi-
tures and revenues will be analysed. Third, I will comment the
role of fiscal policy in determining macroeconomic stability.
Finally, I will formulate some brief recommendations for
Bulgaria. My remarks and conclusions will base mainly on a
comparative experience of transition economies. 
1. Excessive size of government 
in transition economies
Analysing the share of government expenditure in GDP, I
will have in mind so-called general government, i.e. consolidat-
ed fiscal accounts of the central (federal) budget, regional and
local budgets, and extra-budgetary funds and institutions of sim-
ilar character (for example, public health insurance companies).
However, general government concept does not include revenues
and expenditures of public (i.e. state or municipally owned)
enterprises, which are considered as a part of the private (busi-
ness) sector. Only such a comprehensive approach allows for
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FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Marek Dabrovski
Vice President, CASE, Warsaw
1Markiewicz (1998) gives the extensive overview of different concepts and
definitions of fiscal deficit.
2I decided to skip Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in table 2 because I
doubted about comparability of fiscal indicators of these countries with rest of the
sample (mainly because these countries continue large-scale quasi-fiscal opera-
tions). 
according to their general government expenditure to GDP ratio
in 1997: 
1. The group of high level spending countries (between 40
and 50% of GDP) which contains all the Central Europe —
Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Macedonia, and
the Czech Republic, plus Ukraine, Russia, Belarus3 and
Moldova among the CIS group. 
1. The group of medium level spending countries (between
30 and 40% of GDP) which contains three Baltic countries
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Bulgaria4, Romania,
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3 In 1997 general government expenditure to GDP ratio in Belarus amounted
to 42.1% (WEO, 1998, table 19). 
4 From 1997 only. Earlier Bulgaria belonged to the high spending group. 
Table 1 
Revenues, Expenditures and General Government Balance in
Transition Economies (in % of GDP)
Country Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997
Central European and Baltic countries
Croatia Revenue 43.2 45.8 47.0 46.8
Expenditure 41.8 46.7 47.4 48.2
Balance 1.5 —0.9 —0.5 —1.4
Czech Rep. Revenue 44.9 43.8 42.7 40.7
Expenditure 46.0 45.7 43.9 42.8
Balance —1.2 —1.8 —1.2 —2.1
Estonia Revenue 41.3 39.9 39.0 39.4
Expenditure 39.9 41.1 40.5 37.0
Balance 1.3 —1.2 —1.5 2.4
Hungary Revenue 51.4 48.1 46.8 44.9
Expenditure 59.7 53.2 49.9 49.5
Balance —8.3 —7.1 —3.1 —4.6
Latvia Revenue 36.5 35.5 36.5 39.0
Expenditure 40.5 38.8 37.8 37.6
Balance —4.0 —3.3 —1.3 1.4
Lithuania Revenue 32.7 32.8 30.1 33.5
Expenditure 37.5 37.3 34.7 35.4
Balance —4.8 —4.5 —4.6 —1.9
Macedonia Revenue 51.0 45.3 44.3 42.4
Expenditure 54.2 46.5 44.7 42.7
Balance —3.2 —1.3 —0.4 —0.3
Poland Revenue 47.5 45.7 45.1 44.1
Expenditure 49.5 48.4 47.5 45.8
Balance —2.0 —2.7 —2.5 —1.7
Slovakia Revenue 46.4 47.1 46.9 41.5
Expenditure 47.7 46.9 48.3 46.4
Balance —1.3 0.2 —1.3 —4.9
Slovenia Revenue 45.9 45.7 45.2 45.0
Expenditure 46.1 45.7 44.9 46.2
Balance —0.2 —0.0 0.3 —1.2
CIS and Balkan countries
Albania Revenues 24.5 23.9 18.3 16.4
Expenditures 31.2 30.8 29.0 28.4
Balance —7.0 —6.9 —10.7 —12.0
Armenia Revenues 27.7 19.3 17.2 17.4
Expenditures 44.1 30.4 26.5 24.1
Balance —16.4 —11.1 —9.3 —6.7
Azerbaijan Revenues 24.5 15.0 16.2 17.4
Expenditures 36.0 19.3 18.8 20.2
Balance —11.4 —4.3 —2.6 —2.8
Bulgaria Revenues 39.9 36.6 34.3 31.5
Expenditures 45.7 43.0 47.6 34.1
Balance —5.8 —6.4 —13.4 —2.6
Georgia Revenues 7.7 7.1 9.4 10.4
Expenditures 24.2 12.3 13.9 15.3
Balance —16.5 —5.3 —4.5 —5.0
Kazakhstan Revenues 22.5 24.6 22.9 23.4
Expenditures 29.6 26.8 25.9 27.1
Balance —7.1 —2.2 —3.0 —3.7
Kyrgyzstan Revenues 20.8 16.7 17.1 17.6
Expenditures 28.6 30.2 23.4 23.3
Balance —7.7 —13.5 —6.3 —5.7
Moldova Revenues 33.5 33.9 32.1 34.3
Expenditures 42.6 39.7 38.7 41.1
Balance —9.1 —5.8 —6.6 —6.8
Romania Revenues 32.1 31.9 29.8 27.0
Expenditures 33.9 34.5 33.7 31.5
Balance —1.8 —2.6 —3.9 —4.5
Russia Revenues 34.6 31.9 32.1 33.0
Expenditures 45.1 37.7 41.6 40.4
Balance —10.4 —5.8 —9.5 —7.5
Ukraine Revenues 41.9 37.8 36.7 38.4
Expenditures 50.6 42.7 39.9 44.0
Balance —8.7 —4.9 —3.2 —5.6
Uzbekistan Revenues 32.3 34.6 34.2 30.2
Expenditures 38.5 38.7 41.5 33.0
Balance —6.1 —4.1 —7.3 —2.8
Data source: WEO (1998), tables 17—19.
flow abroad (or to the zone of shadow economy). In effect, high
taxes lead to the so-called LafferÕs curve effect, i.e. erosion of
the tax base. High social spending usually discourages the inter-
est in legal employment and distorts the labour market. 
High government expenditure and revenues create also temp-
tation towards a discretionary fiscal redistribution. This, in turn,
leads to distortions in resource allocation, tax evasion, intensive
rent seeking, corruption, etc. 
Finally, microeconomic effectiveness of government spend-
ing is generally lower than private spending. This relates both to
consumption and investment expenditures. 
Comparative analyses [e.g. Sachs & Warner, 1996] give an
excellent evidence that very high rates of economic growth in the
South East Asia (higher than in other geographic regions) have
their roots, among others, in small government. On the other
hand, Western European countries representing typical pattern
of the welfare state experience serious problems with continuing
even very moderate rate of economic growth. This was a reason
why Scandinavian countries (particularly Sweden) had to reduce
their welfare state in the end of 1980s and in 1990s. Now the
core EU countries — France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, face the
same challenge. 
The level of fiscal redistribution in second and third group of
countries is much lower than in the first group and represents
downward trend in most cases. However, apart from the Baltic
countries, it is hard to say that this tendency results from the
conscious political choice (like in the case of Estonia). Dramatic
decline of revenues caused by numerous shortcomings of the tax
collection and tax administration and unsatisfactory work of
other government administrative institutions can be seen as the
main reason of this spontaneous decrease of the fiscal redistrib-
ution (see Dabrovski, 1998). 
2. Structure of government 
expenditures and revenues 
Structure of public expenditures is strictly connected with the
concrete role of government in economic life. The recommen-
dation to avoid excessive size of public expenditures (see section
1) means a necessity to concentrate them on these activities
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Mongolia5 and Uzbekistan. 
1. The group of low level spending countries (below 30% of
GDP) which contains all remaining CIS countries of Central
Asia, Caucasus, and Albania. Tajikistan and Georgia represent
extremely low level of public spending amounting to ca. 15% of
GDP. 
According to the so-called Wagner law, the level of fiscal
redistribution is determined, to certain extent, by the level of
country development. The share of general government expen-
diture in GDP is increasing with the higher GDP per capita level.
However, even a very superficial insight into above grouping
shows us cases of evidently low-income countries (Macedonia,
Moldova) belonging to the highest spending category. 
So high level of fiscal redistribution can be observed in
Scandinavia and some other Western European countries only,
but this group of countries represents much higher GDP per
capita, even in comparison with the most developed group of
transition economies, i.e. the Central European group. When
Western European countries represented the same level of eco-
nomic development as Central Europe now (some 30 years ago)
their general government expenditure to GDP ratio did not
exceed 30—35%. Similar (or even lower) level of fiscal redistrib-
ution can be observed now in Latin America representing GDP
per capita level close to the Central Europe. 
The high share of government expenditure in GDP will not
stimulate the economic growth in the long perspective as it reduces
the rate of private saving available for the investment financing.
This effect is particularly adverse in transition economies where
the rate of saving is rather low and budget is strongly dominated by
consumption oriented expenditures (see next section). 
High tax rates necessary to finance so large public expendi-
tures6 hamper the private business activity and stimulate its out-
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5 In 1997 general government expenditure to GDP ratio in Mongolia amount-
ed to 38.0% (WEO, 1998, table 19).
6 I assume that high expenditure level must be eventually financed by taxpay-
ers. If country runs a fiscal deficit (see section 3 of this paper), the latter will have
to be covered either by the inflation tax (immediately or with certain time lag), or
by higher tax burden in future (necessary to finance public debt service). 
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countries. This means that other important spending items such
as infrastructure investments or education programs must be sac-
rificed in order to maintain such a high level of pension transfers. 
Table 2 
Social Security Transfers in Selected Transition Countries, 1996
(in % of GDP)
Country Social Transfers (in % of GDP)
Croatia 13.5
Czech Republic 12.2
Estonia 11.0
Hungary 14.4
Latvia 16.1
Lithuania 8.8
Poland 20.8
Slovakia 14.5
Slovenia 20.2
Data source: WEO (1998), p. 112, table 24. 
Unfavourable demographic trends force many governments,
for example in Western Europe and in the US, to carry out pen-
sion and other social reforms. The same necessity exists in tran-
sition countries where demographic structure of population will
gradually deteriorate. 
What concerns the structure of government revenues, and
construction of the individual tax instruments, solutions friend-
ly for economic growth stay very often in conflict with the so-
called social justice or fairness. The latter is often interpreted in
a very egalitarian way, i.e., that tax system should take into con-
sideration differences in income and wealth status of taxpayers.
This usually leads to a progressive scale of direct taxation, and
to preferences and exemptions in indirect taxation related to so-
called basic goods and services. However, this would be in con-
flict with postulates of tax neutrality, simplicity, and its fiscal
effectiveness, which are of crucial importance from the point of
view of support for economic growth and fighting a shadow
economy. 
Historical experience shows that the lump sum tax, i.e. fixed
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where government is irreplaceable by a private sector or has a
clear comparative advantage. They are mostly connected with
providing basic public goods. 
Three priorities should be mentioned in the case of transition
economies: 
Providing the classical public goods such as public security,
justice administration, law and contract enforcement, protection
of private property rights, regulation of financial markets, etc.
These activities are usually publicly financed and publicly pro-
vided. They are of fundamental importance for guaranteeing
safety and stability of private sectorÕs economic activity and cre-
ating a good investment climate. Most of post-communist coun-
tries experience fundamental difficulties with financing and pro-
viding this kind of public services. It is strictly connected with
phenomenon of big but weak and ineffective state. 
Human capital investments. In the contemporary world basic
education is publicly financed but may be at least partly private-
ly provided. Most of transition countries represent a rather fair
level of public education expenditures but their effectiveness
(and quality of provided services) is rather low. 
Part of infrastructure investment such as public roads, which
are publicly financed but can be built or even operated by private
enterprises on the basis of public tender. In most of transition
economies budget expenditures for this purpose (in relation to
GDP) are very low comparing to developed countries and enor-
mous investment needs. 
Overly generous social programs, particularly pension sys-
tems are responsible for general over-expansion of government
expenditures in transition countries and crowding out the above
mentioned priorities. Table 2 shows a very high level of social
security transfers in Central Europe and Baltic region. According
to these data, only Lithuania could avoid the trap of ‘post-com-
munist welfare stateÕ. Table 3 contains data on public pension
expenditures representing a main component of the social trans-
fers. This statistics shows that the problem of excessive social
spending relates not only to the most developed transition
economies but also the less developed ones. The level of pension
expenditures in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan is evidently higher than fiscal capacities of these
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ThatcherÕs experiment with local poll tax showed. 
Broadly based indirect, multi-stage taxation (VAT) can be
seen as the next best solution from the point of view of alloca-
tive neutrality and revenue collection capacity [see Neneman,
1999]. In addition, a well-constructed VAT allows taxing, to cer-
tain extent, a shadow economy. This is probably a reason why
the VAT constitutes a basic foundation of contemporary tax sys-
tem in all industrialised countries apart from the US, and in
many developing countries. However, VAT is not an easy instru-
ment to be administered and its good implementation usually
needs a relatively long period of preparation. 
Retail sale tax (RTS) is much simpler and cheaper in admin-
istrative operation, especially in federal country (the example of
the US). However, it creates more allocative problems because
the same goods can bought both as consumer goods and as
investment or intermediary goods. Additionally, the absence of
tax refund mechanism (which exists in VAT) eliminates the
interest of enterprises to buy intermediary or investment goods
from legal sources and therefore gives more opportunity for tax
avoidance. Sale tax can also become much easier target for lob-
bing pressure in order to get preferential tax rates for certain
goods and services. 
Direct taxation creates much more motivation problems
because this is in fact a kind of penalty for getting profit or other
sort of income. If such taxation is high and its scale is progres-
sive, tax avoidance becomes prevailing and tax administration
extremely complicated. The same can be said about payroll taxes
traditionally providing money for public pension and unemploy-
ment taxation. This works in similar way as proportional income
taxation and if tax rate is too high it can push a part of business
activity and employment into the informal sector. 
However, in the economic and political realities of the con-
temporary world direct taxation and social insurance contribu-
tion are hardly avoidable. The practical choice is limited to their
size and simplicity. More rates, and more exemptions has the tax
system, it is more distortive, more complicated is its administra-
tion, and taxpayers have more incentives to avoid tax obliga-
tions. This rule also relates to indirect taxation. 
The presence of many tax exemptions usually reflects weak
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amount paid by each citizen independently of his/her income
and wealth status is this kind of instrument, which guarantees
the maximal allocative neutrality, the simplest and cheapest
administration, and allows to solve the problem of tax avoidance.
However, relying on this kind of taxation would be economical-
ly realistic only in the case of very low government spending to
GDP ratio (probably ca. 10%). Additionally, this kind of taxation
usually raises a lot of political resistance on the ground that it
does not take into consideration any differences in taxpayers
income and wealth status. It makes difficult to introduce such
taxation even as one of many instruments, as Margaret
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Table 3
Public Pension Expenditures in Transition Countries, 1996 
(in % of GDP) 
Country Pension Expenditures (in % of GDP)
Central and Eastern Europe
Albania 6.8
Bulgaria 9.5
Croatia 10.2
Czech Republic 8.4
Hungary 9.7
FYR Macedonia 11.2
Poland 14.4
Romania 5.8
Slovakia 8.3
Former Soviet Union
Armenia 3.1
Azerbaijan 2.5
Belarus 8.4
Estonia 7.6
Georgia 1.7
Kazakhstan 5.3
Kyrgyzstan 7.7
Latvia 10.8
Lithuania 6.2
Moldova 8.1
Russia 4.5
Tajikistan 3.0
Ukraine 8.7
Uzbekistan 6.4
Data source: WEO (1998), p. 115, box 10.
government position and intensive rent seeking of different lob-
bies. Of course, these lobbies always use argument of public
interest or protecting poor. However, constructing well-targeted
tax exemptions addressing exactly the declared social problem is
extremely difficult in practice. Exemptions in direct taxes are
used mainly by high- and middle-income groups and not by the
poorest ones (this is, for example, with housing tax exemptions
in Poland). What concerns similar preferences in indirect taxa-
tion the potential mistargeting and revenue losses may be even
greater (see Neneman, 1999). Social assistance for poor people
should be carried out through system of direct well-addressed
subsidies rather than through tax instruments. Low and uniform
tax rates are much better from the point of view of tax neutrali-
ty and simplicity, and therefore, more supportive to economic
growth. 
Countries in transition did not have any great choice in
designing general institutional frameworks of their tax system.
They had to rely on the experience of developed Western coun-
tries, particularly that of the EU countries. It was determined by
the necessity to have the basic institutions compatible with those
existing in main trade and investment partners. In the case of
Central and East European and Baltic countries, the strategic
goal to join the EU played an additional, very important role. 
3. Fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability 
When country is unable to secure fiscal balance, the addi-
tional impediments to economic growth do occur. Fiscal deficit
is connected with several negative macroeconomic conse-
quences. 
Financing fiscal deficit means absorption of private savings.
Assuming other things being equal, it must lead to either
decreasing investment activity, or to worsening current account
balance (as the latter reflects investment-saving imbalance).
Interest payments crowd out other expenditure items, worsening
the structure of government expenditure. 
When fiscal deficit is financed by a central bank credit it
results in increasing monetary base (reserve money) and, assum-
ing unchanged money multiplier, in proportional increase in
broad money supply. Eventual inflationary effect depends on a
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size of deficit financing, money multiplier, and demand for
money (monetary level). Higher is the deficit financed from
monetary emission and lower is the monetary level, stronger are
the inflationary consequences of fiscal disequilibrium (other
things being equal). 
In most countries the role of central bank direct credit to gov-
ernment was predominant during first years of transition when
other sources of deficit financing, particularly T-bills market
were not available yet. In fact, it was the most important factor
staying behind initial high inflation/hyperinflation episodes in
most of transition countries, apart from unfreezing accumulated
monetary overhang (see Antczak, 1998). 
As the markets of treasury bills had developed, the scale of
monetary financing of fiscal deficits diminished. For instance,
in 1993, the National Bank of Bulgaria credit covered 32% of a
fiscal deficit, in 1994 — 26%, in 1995 — zero, but in 1996 — when
macroeconomic situation deteriorated — the NBB again financed
over 50% of the budget deficit (Markiewicz, 1998). According
to IMF (1998, table 5) data the size of NBB credit to government
reached 14.5% of GDP in 1996. Returning to the central bank
crediting of fiscal deficit could be observed also in Russia and
Ukraine in 1998 when market demand for government T-bills
failed dramatically as result of credibility crisis. 
Switching to the so-called non-inflationary deficit financing,
i.e. issuing T-bills, Eurobonds, or other borrowing on commer-
cial terms can in fact relax inflationary pressure only temporari-
ly. Massive domestic and external borrowing can solve fiscal
problems and support macroeconomic stability in short run only.
Increasing debt overhang (the pace of debt accumulation is par-
ticularly fast under continuos decline of GDP) leads to explosion
of interest payments and can bring very easy the situation of the
debt trap and liquidity crisis of the government finances. 
A relatively short history of economic transition can already
give a number of striking examples of government liquidity
problems and devaluation crises caused by excessive fiscal
deficits: Hungary in 1994—1995, Kyrgyzstan in 1996, Romania
in 1996—1997, Bulgaria in the end of 1996, Russia and Ukraine
in the second half of 1998 (see Markiewicz, 1998). 
BulgariaÕs crisis of 1996—1997 resulted from slow and incon-
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deficit financing, mainly through rolling over the existing stock
of T-bills. This caused the further erosion of the exchange rate. 
Finally, devaluation became unavoidable. Devaluation led to
the new wave of inflation, banking crisis (especially serious in
Russia), further explosion of interest payments, shift from
domestic currency to foreign currencies, and capital outflow.
Default of the Russian government on the T-bills market and 90
days moratorium on repayment of Russian commercial bank lia-
bilities finally undermined the country credibility among
investors. Ukrainian crisis although a little bit less severe than
the Russian one brought very similar consequences (see
Dabrovski at al., 1999). 
As result of Russian and Ukrainian crises, other CIS coun-
tries experiencing problems with persistent fiscal disequilibrium
became in the end of 1998 subjects of speculative attacks of both
domestic and foreign investors. This relates, among others, to
Belarus, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and
Georgia. Transition countries having stronger fiscal and macro-
economic fundamentals, i.e. most of Central European and
Baltic countries could avoid adverse contagion effect. 
The above empirical examples clearly show that non-mone-
tary financing of fiscal deficit can be also inflationary though
with a certain time lag. 
4. Recommendations for Bulgaria
Experiencing a very dramatic financial crisis of 1996—1997
Bulgarian authorities turned to radical measures in the sphere of
monetary and fiscal policies. From July 1, 1997 the currency
board regime was introduced. In 1998, country achieved fiscal
surplus and the debt to GDP ratio went down significantly. As
result, end-of-year CPI inflation amounted to 1% in 1998. Real
GDP increased by 4% in 1998. Continuing such a policy is the
most important recommendation for Bulgaria. Any public dis-
cussion about abandoning the currency board regime can only
again damage the countryÕs credibility. The only exit from the
currency board leads through the EMU membership in the
future. Currency board will be a sustainable solution in the long
run if a fiscal policy continues to follow a tough stance of 1998.
It will be possible if structural and institutional reform progress
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sequent structural reforms, weak fiscal and monetary policies,
and the very high domestic and foreign debt exceeding the level
of 100% of GDP. Massive bailing out of the loss making enter-
prises and banks became the substitute of privatisation and
restructuring based on hard budget constraints. It put a new debt
burden on the government finances in addition to the old debt
inherited from the communist period bringing the Bulgarian
economy to the situation of a real debt trap. 
The lack of financial discipline also led to banking crisis in
the beginning of 1996 that overlapped with an overall macro-
economic destabilisation. Premature attempts to decrease inter-
est rate by the NBB in the end of 1995 (in order to relax the
interest payments burden) became a detonator of the serious cri-
sis and finally bring results completely opposite to the expected
ones. Decreasing interest rates provoked chain reaction: decline
in demand for leva, capital outflow, foreign exchange market cri-
sis, dramatic collapse of the exchange rate of leva, inflation
shock and further decline in demand for leva. NBB effort to stop
this spiral by increasing interest rates came too late and was
insufficient in scale. However, it brings the dramatic increase of
interest payments: in 1996 they reached the level of 20% of GDP
(!) while the total tax revenue amounted to 25.5% of GDP.
Fiscal deficit amounted to 13.4% of GDP, despite the drastic
reduction of all expenditure items apart from interest payments. 
Russian and Ukrainian developments two years later look
very similar to the Bulgarian ones. Series of Asian crises in 1997
reduced drastically the availability of relatively cheap external
financing for emerging markets. Reacting on changing interna-
tional atmosphere and signs of domestic political and fiscal
instability non-resident investors decided to withdraw their
holdings from the T-bills markets of both countries. It brought
immediately two kinds of problems: liquidity crisis of the gov-
ernment, and pressure for the official foreign exchange reserves.
The next step was the speculation of both non-residents and res-
idents against the exchange rate, which constituted the only real
stabilisation anchor. Attempts to defend exchange rate were very
costly in terms of lost foreign reserves and high interest rates but
did not stop the speculation and only drastically increased the
interest payments. Central banks had to come back to a fiscal
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It was for the first time, since 1990, that in the Republic of
Bulgaria a UDF Government took political responsibility for
developing a public sector Mid-term Investment Program. It
covers the period of 1998 through 2001.
The Program is a tangible result from the positive progress
made in creation of a favourable macro-economic environment
to activate the investment market.
¥ Economic stability has been achieved as a result of acceler-
ated economic reform in key sectors of the enterprise economy.
Expected GDP for the next three-year period is 3.5 — 4 %.
¥ By implementing the Currency Board System the main
objective of the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) is to maintain
the stability of the national currency. It is achieved by a fixed
Bulgarian lev-German mark exchange rate of 1000:1. 
¥ The implemented monetary and fiscal policies restored con-
fidence in the national currency, led to lower inflation rates (1%
monthly), stable prices, lower interest rates and smaller budget
deficit.
¥ The Bulgarian Government maintains a balanced budget,
based on the guaranteed stability of its revenue part.
¥ The foreign trade balances of the country are being sta-
bilised through developing and undertaking activities to encour-
age and enlarge the export, reduce the trade balance and the cur-
rent accounts deficit to rates that do not endanger the stability of
the Currency Board.
¥ Mid-term agreements with the international financial institu-
tions have been achieved for the foreign financing of the country.
¥ The three-year Agreement with IMF, concluded on 25th of
September 1998, which guarantees a significant backup for the
balance of payment in a period of important structural changes
in the Bulgarian economy, is an important factor for the eco-
nomic development.
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in much faster pace than it has been so far. 
Financial crisis brought down both general government
reenues and expenditures. Government of Bulgaria must resist a
pressure to increase public spending again. It should also try to
restructure budget expenditures in order to create more room for
financing investments in basic technical infrastructure and
human capital. It means the necessity to continue reforms of
social spending, particularly of the pension system. 
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THE INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 
OF THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT 
Tsveta Kamenova
Head of Investment Department, Council of Ministers of Bulgaria
on the Balkan Peninsular and within the Black Sea Region.
¥ The decisions taken by the EU Ministers of Transport for
building infrastructure corridors crossing the territory of the
Republic of Bulgaria, including:
A) Transport Corridor No 8, connecting the Adriatic Sea with
the Black Sea in the destination of Duras—Tirana—Sko-
pie—Sofia—Plovdiv—Burgas—Varna. It is an important factor for
enlarging  the processes of integration in South—eastern Europe
and making it a  peace and stability zone;
B) Transport Corridor No 4, connecting Western Europe with
Asia—with several destinations — Dresden/Nurenberg—Pra-
gue—Vienna/Bratislava—Gur—Budapest—Arad—Konstanza/Krajov
a—Sofia—Thessaloniki/Plovdiv—Istanbul;
C) Transport Corridor No 9, connecting Northern Europe
with Southern Europe in the destination of Helsinki—Saint
Petersburg—Moscow/Pskov—Kiev—Lyubasevska—Kishinev—Buch
arest—Dimitrovgrad—Alexandropoulus/Istanbul;
D) Transport Corridor Ü 7 — the River Danube destination.
The national investment program includes projects of
investors that operate in the public sector Ñ ministries, commit-
tees, agencies, municipalities, large economic organisations with
prevailing state interest such as the National Electrical Company
(NEC), the Bulgarian Telecommunication Company (BTC), the
Bulgarian Railroad Company (BRC) and others.
The basic criteria for project selection are:
¥ Facilities of inter-regional, regional and national impor-
tance that are relevant to the development strategy and policy of
the country and the region of South-eastern Europe;
¥ Contribution to the economic capacity growth and acceler-
ation of the countryÕs economic growth;
¥ Regional socio-economic and environmental relevance of
the investment projects;
¥ Guaranteed complementary financing (co-financing) of
projects, included in international programs, of which foreign
financial aid agreements have been concluded;
¥ Opportunities to create  alternative employment;
¥ Level of project readiness;
¥ Administrative capacity for reclaiming of investment and
the its efficient management. 
The Investment Programme of the Bulgarian Government 
92/93
¥ The achieved investment growth in 1998 is an important
condition for the development of the economy. The lower inter-
est rate and the consistent measures taken to liberalise the
domestic and foreign trade facilitate the growth mechanism,
based on investment demand.
¥ Financial support is provided for the implementation of the
countryÕs strategic investment in the public and enterprise sec-
tors through EU subsidies and loan agreements with internation-
al financial institutions Ñ EIB, EBRD, World Bank, Export
Credit Agency, Kuwait Fund for AEU, Japanese Overseas Co-
operation Fund and others.
1998 Ñ 2001 INVESTMENT PROGRAM
Given our belief in the extreme importance of investment for
the economic growth and stimulation of development in other
areas of social and economic life in the country, the Government
of the Republic of Bulgaria over the next three years, will strive
at the achievement of the following basic goals:
¥ Revival of the economic growth and creation of prerequi-
sites for sustainable development.
¥ Acceleration of the national economyÕs restructuring in
compliance with the adopted strategy for economic development
of the country under market conditions.
¥ The countryÕs integration within the European space
through priority investment in infrastructure projects, which are
part of the trans-European network of transport corridors, equip-
ment and systems. 
¥ Transformation of the Republic of Bulgaria into an impor-
tant transport and energy juncture in South-eastern Europe and
on the Balkans.
¥ Preparation of Bulgaria for an equal partnership and partic-
ipation in the European integration processes.
¥ Balanced allocation and reasonable concentration of public
finance.
Following the basic goals, the Program takes into account the
additional factors that have an impact on the identification of
investment priorities. These are:
¥ Geo-strategic location of the Republic of Bulgaria in Europe,
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MAJOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS
The key position in the government investment program is
occupied by projects in the technical infrastructure — telecom-
munications, roads, transportation and energy sector.
Telecommunications sector
By enacting the Law on Telecommunications the legal pre-
requisites for liberalisation of telecommunication activities and
services are established and for equality between all operators.
This policy proved successful in promoting greater investment
activity in the sector, which started developing on the basis of
market principles.
The telecommunications sector is of great importance for the
national economy and for the expansion of the integration
processes. Therefore an extensive program is being implement-
ed there. It includes the following:
¥ Privatisation of the national telecommunications operator —
BTC Co.
¥ Final completion of sites under the project DON (digital
network) at the total amount of USD 260 m, funded jointly by
international banking institutions and BTC. Within this project
the following has been constructed:
a) new international telephone-exchange unit in Sofia;
b) Ground satellite station, oriented to a satellite over the
Atlantic;
c) Optical cable tracks leading to the borders with Turkey,
Romania, Macedonia and Serbia;
d) Submarine optical cable in the Black Sea (CAFOS project)
funded jointly by BTC and the communications agencies of
Romania and Turkey.
Roads and Water Supply Sectors
¥ Major projects:
a) Rehabilitation of existing road sections with a total length
of 600 km, construction of a new motor way 32 km long. The
implementation of the program will finish by the end of this
year.
¥ Program ÒTransit Roads — 2Ó which is underway with the
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The total figure of planned investment in the private and the
public sectors for the period of 1998 through 2001 is USD
9,754.9 m.
The planned investments in the public sector Ñ total for the
period of 1998 through 2001 Ñamount to USD 3,948 m as bro-
ken down by financial sources:
¥ From the consolidated state budget Ñ(republican budget,
off-budget funds, own budget resources and own off-budget
resources for the major investors Ñ ministries, related institu-
tions, regions and municipalities, capital transfers with the
exception of the railroads) — USD 1,339 m;
¥ From the resources of the state-owned economic organisa-
tions (own resources, state-guaranteed loans and company
loans) Ñ USD 2,609 m, incl. USD 1,049 m of own resources,
USD 1,302 m state-guaranteed loans and USD 247 m company
loans. These are mainly facilities within NEC, BRC, BTC, large
infrastructure facilities like Sofia Airport, Air Traffic Control,
transit roads Ñ 2 and 3, rehabilitation of the railroads, restruc-
turing of the water facilities, expansion of Port Burgas, etc.
¥ Additional reserves to encourage investment activities in
the public sector: projects envisioned for concession contracting
with initially planned investment at the amount of USD 1,324 m;
¥ Projects that will be financed on the basis of bilateral agree-
ments, through grants from bilateral intergovernmental agree-
ments with The Kingdom of Denmark, the Confederation of
Switzerland and the American Agency for Trade and
Development, and the European Union.
By the year 2001 Bulgaria will have a larger access to the
European funds. That will build additional capacities of financ-
ing investment projects in the areas of technical infrastructure,
environment and others, relevant to the criteria and requirements
of the European institutions, under the programs like PHARE
Transborder Co-operation, Pre-accession Funds, Large — scale
Infrastructure, ISPA.
While entering the stage of EU pre-structure accession sev-
eral budget directions are being outlined that are also directed to
the sectors of agriculture and cultural identity Ñ programs like
SAPARD, Rafael and World Foundation for Cultural
Monuments.
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improvement of quality standards of drinking water.
¥ Outside water supply systems will be built in the tourist
regions in the mountains and along the coastline.
Transport sector
The investment to be secured through the consolidated state
budget will amount to 19% of total funds planned for the period
1998 — 2001.
Main projects:
1. Development of air traffic in Bulgaria — funded through
the consolidated state budget (own revenues) and through a loan
with sovereign guarantees to be provided by EIB.
2. Construction of a new 2,5 km railroad, from railway sta-
tion Gueshevo to the Bulgarian-Macedonian border and major
reconstruction of railroad Radomir—Gyueshevo (88 km)— to be
funded with the support of PHARE program.
3. Reconstruction and upgrading of railroad Plovdiv—Dimi-
trovgrad—Svilengrad—Kapitan Andreevo — to increase the speed
to 160 km/h., which will redirect part of the road traffic and thus
improve the natural environment conditions.
4. Reconstruction and upgrading of railroad Dupnitsa—Kulata
(119 km.) from corridor 4 in the destination Bulgaria—Greece.
The project covers: construction of electricity powering network
and energy supply, reconstruction of separate sections of the
railroad.
5. Construction of a new pier and new terminal in the port of
Burgas — USD 113 m (facility of corridor Ü 8), to handle loose
goods.
6. Expansion and reconstruction of oil port Burgas—Rosenets
— funded from own revenues and foreign grants. Planned to be
granted for concession.
7. Repair and development of Sofia airport (corridor 4 and
corridor 8). The project includes:
a) passenger terminal with necessary equipment for 2,5 mill
passengers per year; relevant platforms and regulation tracks;
roads and parking places;
b) extension of existing runway;
c) cargo terminal for 30.000 tons  per year.
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financial support provided by the PHARE (grant to the amount
of USD 31 m) and a loan extended by EIB;
¥ Implementation of the program ÒTransit Roads — 3Ó which
will involve rehabilitation of 600 km. of the first class road net-
work, to be financed by EIB (loan agreement signed for USD 60
m) grants to be provided through the PHARE program (USD 30
m)
b) program for granting concessions to road infrastructure
facilities
Major projects:
¥ Repair and reconstruction of road E-79 in the section Sofia-
Kulata — part of trans-European corridor Ü 4. 
The implementation of the project will reduce journey time
by approximately 30 min. and will improve safety on the road.
¥ Construction of a section of motor way Maritsa — in the
direction Orizovo—Kapitan Andreevo (road E-80) —
Bulgaria—Turkey border — trans-European corridor Ü 8
A structural element of trans-European corridor Ü 4. Total
length — 108 km.
¥ Completion of motor way Trakia in the direction
Orizovo—Vetren, part of trans-European corridor Ü 8 (destina-
tion the Black Sea). A feasibility study has started with the sup-
port of the PHARE program. The national investment program
envisages the process of concession contracting to begin in
1999.
¥  Rehabilitation and reconstruction of road E-79 in the sec-
tion between Bulgarian—Romanian border — Sofia.
¥ Construction of motor way Black Sea in the section
Vetren—Priseltsy, part of trans-European corridor Ü 8 connect-
ing the two biggest Bulgarian ports Varna and Burgas.
¥ Rehabilitation and reconstruction of section Kalotina —
Sofia — part of international road E-80, connecting Northern
Europe with Asia (via Turkey).
In the Water Supply sector, the Government program envis-
ages:
¥ Completion, as a priority task, of the water treatment plants
and the construction of the main water supply systems. A main
priority will be to secure the purity of Transborder rivers and
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7. FACTORS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BULGARIA
The ensuring of sufficient investments for economic restruc-
turing, privatisation and capital market development is central to
a successful reform. Investment in highly capital- and technolo-
gy-intensive export-oriented sectors will be instrumental in ren-
dering Bulgarian commodities and companies competitive as
the country heads for integration with the EU, EFTA, CEFTA,
the WTO and signs bilateral free-trade zone agreements. Greater
demands are being placed on labour productivity, the capital
base, management quality, corporate adaptivity and flexibility,
management and diversification of entrepreneurial risk, admin-
istrative management, international mobility, market develop-
ment, etc.
Within this context the levels of investment to a large degree
shape the dynamics and character of economic growth.
EXPECTATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
TO BULGARIA
Global direct investment in 1999 is expected to exceed USD
440 bn of which Central and Eastern Europe may expect some
4.6 to 4.8% or some USD 20 bn. Over the years, BulgariaÕs share
in this amount has ranged between 0.75% and 3.25%.
In 1999, direct foreign investment in Bulgaria is expected to
outstrip USD 1 bn. Privatisation proceeds, undertaken commit-
ments and investment programs will boost BulgariaÕs total
investment resource and foster the servicing of its domestic and
external debt. Privatisation generates a resource that is unique in
time, one that can be employed as much for covering current
deficits as for promoting longer-term growth.
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8. Development and reconstruction of Burgas airport
The project will increase the handling capacity of the airport,
improve passengersÕ service and safety of flights; improve ser-
vice quality and decrease noise.
9. Combined transport terminal in Sofia. The objective of the
project is to create a modern combined transport terminal in a
juncture of strategic importance for the country — Sofia.
10. Container terminal in Rousse port (corridor Ü 7) located
on the trans-European corridor Ü 8 and including upgrading
and technological re-equipment of Rousse port.
11. Cereals terminal in Rousse port.
Energy Sector
1. Reconstruction and modernisation of unit 5 and 6 of NPS
(Nuclear Power Station) Kozloduy.
2. TEPP (thermo-electric power plant) Maritsa-iztok 1. Two
stages of construction.
3. TEPP Maritsa-iztok 2 — rehabilitation of units 1 to 4.
4. TEPP Maritsa-iztok 2 — purification installation for sul-
phur in block 8, funded through the program Energy 1.
5. TEPP Bobov Dol -construction of a transportation system,
calibration and storing of coal.
6. Hydro power plant Tsankov Kamuk — the project is ready,
technical designs and tender documents to be developed by
NEC.
7. Water cascade Gorna Arda — a project in a region under-
going industrial restructuring, to be granted for concession.
8. Dam Yadenitsa of PHEPP (Pump Hydroelectric Power
Plant) Chaira — completion of equipment.
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS A RENOVATION 
FACTOR FOR BULGARIAN ECONOMY 
Ilian Vassilev
Chairman, Foreign Investment Agency, Sofia
HOW FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IMPACTS COMPETITION
How direct foreign investment (DFI) impacts the recipient
country will largely depend on the latterÕs macro-economic
indices and even more so on the overall assessment, whether gen-
uine or perceived, of their state and prospective development.
Now that the process of investment and capital regeneration has
assumed a global scale, there needs to be seen a due change in the
national and corporate policy. Even in cases where export is not
an essential condition for the sale of certain goods or services,
foreign competition, if directly present on the latterÕs home mar-
ket will give a thrust to their international competitiveness.
A direct flow of funds is not the only expression of DFI; we
can also identify it with the capital effect produced by the trans-
fer of technologies, know-how and other intangible assets of
international business, which are as important as hired labour
and financial capital. How competitive and viable individual
economies are will highly depend on the high-tech and science-
intensive industries and services that foreign investments will
bring in, and on the national economyÕs ability to generate and
add value, and absorb and maximise the DFIÕs effect (example
with the ISO standard and the SAP systems).
The impact DFI will have varies with its manner of employ-
ment: while direct investment in manufacturing boosts a coun-
tryÕs export potential and produces a maximum effect, the net
effect is considerably weaker in the case where investments are
made to build commercial and distribution networks, in as far as
this generates little added value to the recipient country.
DFI has an immediate impact over competition in Bulgaria in
several ways:
First, it is beneficial whenever it encourages local industries
(i.e. improves the foreign balance of trade in technologies);
thereby replacing imported products and technological process-
es. A technological advantage, whether own or obtained, has a
more durable value and counts more than a dozen other compet-
itive factors, such as cheap labour and inputs, to name but a few. 
Second, the arrival of DFI acts as a catalyst for capital con-
centration and consolidation, being the only option for
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Table 1
Foreign Direct Investment World-wide, in Central and Eastern
Europe, and in Bulgaria by Years
Year      World-wide          Central and Bulgaria
(WW) Eastern Europe (CEE)       
million USD million USD % of WW    million USD % of WW % of CEE
1992 175 841 4 439 2.52 34 0.019 0.77
1993 217 559 6 143 2.82 102 0.047 1.66
1994 242 999 5 914 2.43 211 0.087 3.57
1995 331 189 14 214 4.29 163 0.049 1.15
1996 337 550 12 344 3.66 256 0.076 2.07
1997 400 486 18 428 4.60 636 0.159 3.45
Total 1 705 624 61 482 3.60 1 402 0.082 2.28
Data source: World Investment Report, 1998 Foreign Investment Agency.
In this year, for the first time in many years, Bulgaria is expect-
ed to register a flow of foreign investments to its infrastructure in
the form of feasibility studies, preliminary project- and logistical
preparation of multiple large projects in its energy sector,
telecommunications, transport and municipal infrastructure.
On the overall, both the structure and trends marking invest-
ment flows into Bulgaria are identical to those, characteristics of
the region and global markets.
Table 2 
Direct Investment into Bulgaria by Type and Year (in USD mn)
Privatisation Capital Profits Other* Total
Market Reinvested
1992 34.4 34.4
1993 22 80.4 102.4
1994 134 76.7 210.9
1995 26 136.6 162.6
1996 76.4 3.8 176.2 256.4
1997 421 29.7 5.5 179.6 636.2
1998* 168 54.8 16 239 477.9
Total 848 84.5 26 922.9 1880.8
*ÒOtherÓ includes Greenfield investment and additional investment from abroad
into companies with foreign equity.
Data source: The Foreign Investment Agency.
FACTORS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BULGARIA
duction through traditional methods (depreciation allowances
and tax preferences); faced with the permanent threat of losing
markets or segments (real or imaginary) they will have the
strongest impulse to act.
Rapid penetration of the local market by external competitors
via goods not accompanied by their actual manufacturer may
sharply raise competitive pressures. The premature or abrupt
administering of orthodox market principles, which fails to take
into account local specifics, can cause more harm than good.
The only justification for such a policy would be if the Ôimport-
edÕ competition were deprived from support, as are its Bulgarian
counterparts. 
INVESTMENT POLICY 
AND INVESTMENT RESOURCES 
1997 will go down in economic history as the first year in
which the volume of international capital in circulation exceed-
ed that of goods. Therefore investment will climb ever higher in
every governmentÕs management and economic policy priorities
(take South Korea for example).
To accomplish its structural and technological renovation
Bulgarian economy needs to get hold of two types of invest-
ment- domestic and foreign. It is no secret that servicing the
countryÕs enormous external debt ÔeatsÕ into domestic invest-
ment resources to the tune of approx. USD 1 bn. Viewed against
savings which are expected to have run at 14 % of GDP in 1998
and against government investment, this haemorrhage is critical.
Any analysis of BulgariaÕs medium and long-term credit and
financial resources — and especially of the countryÕs weak
deposit base — makes it clear that foreign capital flows are the
only viable option for financing Bulgarian long-term growth.
Increased lending to the private sector is predominantly due
to worker-manager buyouts and not to credit for investment
goods purchases. Unfortunately we have no information on the
external private loans (borrowed from foreign companies), but s
simple extrapolation of foreign investment volumes in Bulgaria
of about USD 1,9 bn and the size of its domestic debt unequiv-
ocally show that lending as a source of DFI is prevalently exter-
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Bulgarian companies to make a successful emergence on the
international arena. 
Third, DFI spills into raising the quality of corporate policy
and more particularly its management and organisational
aspects, ability to analyse and develop corporate advantages
against the backdrop of a dynamically changing external market,
etc. DFI has invariably the same ÔspilloverÕ effect: regardless of
whether investment is in manufacture or under a delivery and
distribution contract, it places higher demands on quality, regu-
larity and timeliness of delivery, pricing policy flexibility, etc.
Fourth, the penetration of a market by external players often
produces Ôripples in stagnant waterÕ, especially as regards
monopolistic companies. This pushes companies, at first indi-
vidual and then all sectors of the economy to speed up their
restructuring in alignment with international criteria.
Fifth, the stringent enforcement of internal corporate man-
agement rules, control and reporting mechanisms helps draft
clear rules of the game which fiercely clash with non-market
forms of competition on the local market. The emergence of
prominent external stakeholders is practically a chance to get the
local market and social relations back to normal as they will,
among other things, magnify the concealed defects of the socio-
economic environment, such as contraband, corruption, crime,
etc. Such an effect is envisioned to occur once the investment by
METRO — a large multinational concern, which, made by big
insuring companies and others, bears fruit.
Sixth, once the Ôspirit is released from the bottleÕ and com-
panies are ousted from their Ôsnug comfortÕ to be placed in a
normal international medium, there will be price cuts (i.e.
expenditures will shrink and goods and services purchased from
monopolists will grow more competitive), and a need for local
companies to adopt a corporate culture closely resembling that
of large multinationals. Staunch domestic competition is the
cheapest and most efficient way to teach Bulgarian companies in
the art of competitiveness, all the more because Bulgarian busi-
ness people encounter difficulties to travel, import technologies
and export capital. As companies compete, they will restructure
their technologies faster and enhance the efficiency of their pro-
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Corporate Income Tax Act by the Customs General Directorate
on the entire registered import of machines and facilities (under
leasing contracts inclusive).
Figure 1
Investment Goods Import by Years (in USD mn) 
and GDP Real Growth (in %)
It is clear that foreign investment plays a decisive role in the
technological renovation of Bulgarian economy and is thus a
key factor in shaping its prospects for competitiveness and
growth. Considering the existing currency board restrictions,
import of competition and technological crisis, the govern-
mentÕs only rational economic policy now is to encourage com-
panies to employ their own and borrowed funds in investment as
much as possible, also through reducing the liabilities to the
state in the form of taxes, duties and other ÒentryÓ costs.
The most realistic opportunity of increasing corporate invest-
ment resources would be to effectively reduce business start-up
and running costs. Financial stabilisation and more effective
budget management would permit the launch of active invest-
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nal. This refutes the assumption that foreign companies are oust-
ing their Bulgarian counterparts from the lending market.
A circumstance of particular concern is the fact that
BulgariaÕs foreign trade deficit has grown not so much as a result
of the increased import of investment goods -the so-called Ôuse-
ful deficitÕ, as of private consumption goods import (food prod-
ucts inclusive), a market segment for which Bulgarian economy
has the greatest potential. The current level of investment goods
import does not condition a pronounced technological renewal
of the economy or prospects for long-term growth. 
Table 3 
Structure of Imports by Basic Categories of Goods
1995 1996 1997 19981
Category million % million % million % million %
USD USD USD
Food, drinks 
and tobacco 455.6 8.1 402.7 7.9 428.4 8.8 520 11.2
Fuel and lubricants 1525.4 27.1 1711.3 33.7 1492.3 30.5 1008 21.7
Chemical products 
including 
Pharmaceuticals 802.3 14.2 637.1 12.6 593.3 12.1 715 15.4
textiles, leather, 
Confectionery 
and shoes 572.5 10.2 545.5 10.7 651.4 13.3 659 14.2
Investment goods2 706.9 12.6 567.7 11.2 562.7 11.5 613 13.2
Miscellaneous 
Goods 1575.5 27.8 1209.6 23.9 1157.7 23.8 1129 24.3
TOTAL 5638.2 100 5073.9 100 4885.8 100 4644.0 100
1 The 1998 forecast is based on the correlation between the first nine months
of 1997 and 1997 as a whole, as compared to the first nine months of 1998 plus
structural data for the same period of 1998.
2ÔInvestment GoodsÕ includes machinery, equipment and apparatus, electrical
and electronics goods, after subtraction of domestic appliances.
Data source: NIS.
Additional light on the stake of DFI in this process is shed by
the data, extrapolated for the machines and facilities imported
under the Foreign Investments Act and repealed under the
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such, investment directly contributes to mutual links of inter-
corporate and state nature. Moreover, while it is impossible to
mark rapid advance in other factors influencing investment
(such as corruption, ÒgreyÓ economy, government administra-
tion, the inadequate quality of legal and physical infrastructure
etc.), tax and investment incentives messages are readily com-
municable and bear fruit in a relatively short time. 
Despite most international institutionsÕ firm opposition to
incentives and preferences which ÒerodeÓ the rules of the mar-
ket game, recent years prove that the offering of incentives and
preferences is a mass and spreading phenomenon among all
countries which have no substantial surplus of capital.
Conversely, the assumption that the state ought to withdraw
from its active involvement in regulating and stimulating eco-
nomic processes has not found convincing support by any coun-
try, occupying a more backwards position among the emerging
markets. 
A consequence of regional and European integration process-
es is the appearance of a single investment market that makes it
practically impossible conduct a purely national policy.
As whole Bulgaria has rather few unique and operational
sales points vis-à-vis other CEE countries. One of its strongest
competitive advantages  — the labour cost/quality ratio in con-
siderably capital-intensive sectors — is now Ôout of orderÕ. It is no
secret that we are already experiencing a shortage of skilled
labour especially in high tech industries. Migration abroad and
away from the main profession of over 500 thous. citizens has
practically rendered the problem a systematic one.
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT: 
A CONDITION FOR GROWTH
Economic stabilisation after March 1997 radically changed
assessments of political and economic risk in Bulgaria. Along
with the improvement of macroeconomics parameters, it is
extremely important for economic benefits to be derived from
political stabilisation.
Our limited human, physical and time resources clearly call
for a selective approach and for the prioritisation of problems. A
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ment incentives by means of cutting and relieving tax, duty and
other ÔhiddenÕ costs linked with tax administration effectiveness
and the investment environment as a whole. BulgariaÕs growing
foreign trade deficit only denotes that we are paying the taxes in
other countriesÕ budgets. The same holds true for duties. 
THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT 
INCENTIVES AND PREFERENCES
The strongest incentive for multinational corporations to
maintain a pro-investment mindset are the multiple forms of
direct or indirect financial support on the regional, national and
economic block level. Beside the all-valid factors of the invest-
ment environment, access to financial assistance programs, sub-
sidies, low-interest or interest-free loans and other forms of
financial commitments on behalf of the recipient country are
central in shaping a decision to invest.
The CEE investment market cannot be ranked equal: internal
financial resources are limited, dearer and less accessible. The
economic policy is deficit-ridden since public and government
administration propensity to Ôthink businessÕ is not over pro-
nounced.
Investment incentives and preferences based on strict and
clear-cut criteria are features of improved and proactive govern-
ment commitment that encourages and rewards corporate
growth and industriousness, faster restructuring and higher eco-
nomic efficiency, contributions to a positive balance of pay-
ments, etc. Regrettably, although a growing share of GDP is
generated outside industry, the countryÕs export structure is still
dominated by traditional and primary process industries.
Conversely, services — a sector where Bulgaria has a weak
export standing — are taking up a growing part in the GDP.
Foreign investment and economic growth are the only realis-
tic chance to solve problems like inadequate technology intensi-
ty and poor corporate management and business culture in this
country. A recent OECD survey shows Bulgaria lagging way
behind most economies as regards this indicator.
Investment volume and structure is an indicator of an econo-
myÕs degree of integration into regional and global processes. As
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selected to negotiate without a tender or a competition if there
were no hidden benefits involved. If in time the international
business community starts viewing the assignment of state con-
tracts, the sale of state or municipal property, the awarding of
concessions etc. as unfair or not transparent, that would form a
negative impression among market participants too. This is not
so much a matter of whether tendering or procedures are to
international standards but of how they are perceived by partici-
pants and the media (so-called market and opinion makers).
In this respect, experience gained in carrying out large infra-
structure projects can play an exceptionally useful role.
The attained and projected levels of domestic, foreign and
outgoing investments to a large extent determine the dynamics
and character of economic growth. They are also capable of con-
siderably influencing this process by adopting changes in the
macro- and micro-economic government policy of the recipient
countries, adequate to the expectations of the investment process
stakeholders. 
Our chance to do this in the foreseeable future by the year
2001 is unique. We should not let it slip by. 
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condition for attracting foreign investment is the drawing up of
clear principles and priorities for individual sectors, provinces
and nations to which investment policy will be directed. Being
growth orientated involves stimulating the development and
investment behaviour of the basic engines of growth: privatised
and newly created businesses with or without foreign participa-
tion.
Success in ensuring a smooth transition between privatisa-
tion-led and infrastructure-led investment is of strategic impor-
tance in the policy of seeking foreign investment. The
announced investment programme of the Government is good
basis precisely for the elucidation of criteria and targets which
should be set and attained by various authorities and institutions
in various periods. Foreign investments have a strong spillover
effect on government procurement. It is logical to assume that
the state should attempt to leave as big as possible a portion of
its costs in the country, thus generating domestic consumption.
It is clear that the state plays an important role in encourag-
ing the infrastructure investment. The essential danger here lies
in the state metamorphosing from being an honest broker and
regulator into becoming a monopoly participant. There are many
temptations since the dividing line between the two roles is thin:
the lack of a culture, a tradition, and clear and open procedures
favours the substitution of pseudo-state for business priorities.
The greatest possible openness in offering and carrying out
infrastructure projects and government contracts is the most
appropriate way to encourage competition and hence invest-
ment. To a large extent assessments of each nation as an invest-
ment environment emerge from the way macro projects are
offered on the international market. In this sense, every project
or procedure which is insufficiently transparent to the local or
international public is also a missed opportunity for creating a
desirable image. A number of companiesÕ claim they would
never bid for tenders, as if this were below their interest thresh-
old. Their motive is more than obvious — to retain a set of priv-
ileged relations and contacts — for as long a period as possible.
In fact there is no company in the world that would miss out
on business it is interested in. The opposite is also true: compa-
nies would not invest just because of the privilege of being
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ment has to accelerate the inflow of public utilities privatization.
Once you have done the Telecom the other ones are going to be
a bit easier. Energy is probably the biggest AchillesÕ heel in
Bulgaria. Because it is, as people said this morning, an energy-
intensive sectors. A lot of the foreign investors who are buying
the big tickets, this year, or by the end of next year, are in an
energy-related processing industry. We have to sort out the ener-
gy at the most cost-efficient way and have an energy plan, which
is realistic for the new demand.
Finally, the financial sector- because thatÕs part of the infra-
structure for the small end medium enterprises. We will look at
how many more private banks can do business, try to help them
with more training. ItÕs not just a question of lending money, but
the collateral laws must be put in place.
The EBRD is going to, hopefully increase substantially its
business and we would like very much, in the context of what
has been done today, continue to also be part of this dialogue
between experts to bridge the bottle- necks of growth.
COMMENT
Vassil Manov
University of National and World Economy, Sofia 
The subject matter of the conference entitled ÒFactors for
Economic Growth in BulgariaÓ implies that several questions
should be answered, for instance: does the country need eco-
nomic growth; what is the type of growth in the developed world
and which are the major trends in the changes of economic
growth at the end of the 20th century; are the factors for eco-
nomic growth typical for the economy at large at the turn of this
century present in Bulgaria; under what conditions can foreign
savings be a factor for economic growth; what are the potentials
of privatisation in its capacity of a growth factor; what is the
relationship between stabilisation and growth?
1. Before we start to deliberate on the issue of how to make
the transition from financial stabilisation to economic growth, it
is necessary to prove the need for growth. There has been a suf-
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COMMENT
Olivier Descamps
Director of Balkan and Caucasian States Department, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London
We have learned a lot today. IÕve learned a lot. I think it was
very good to have the government invite domestic and interna-
tional experts to give an educated advice. So I can only encour-
age such forums to help the transition from a state-led economy
to a privately led economy. 
If I had to wrap up what the three panel members talked
about, in one way, is to say: foreign direct investment seems to
be, no question, one of the only and major sources of support for
the growth of a country. I could just give three suggestions.
On the privatization: the wind of opportunity exists but it
may not last forever. There has been a very good progress in two
or three things: prices have become more realistic, the privatiza-
tion process is more transparent and accelerated. But you still
have huge transaction costs, contingent liabilities, old debt,
licensing, concession, legal risk. Without that, this privatization
is not going to happen. The Privatization AgencyÕs attitude to
seek the investor versus waiting or negotiating from the position
of a supposed strength is now much more realistic to go after.
On the MBOs (management buy-outs), there is no doubt that the
local private entrepreneur has the right, the talent hopefully, to
run his own business. ItÕs a way to transfer ownership. All these
MBOs are going to fail in the near future except if you have a
turn-around management for them, if they have new cash equity
available, and if there is some strong corporate governance and
institutional support.
The investment climate in Bulgaria. We can talk about giving
a tax incentive, about promoting Bulgaria, but the investment
climate is what at the end of the day everybody is going to look
at. Is it going to be costly or difficult to do business in Bulgaria?
Most of the advisors do agree on that- itÕs certainly a huge cost
of investing currently in Bulgaria.
And infrastructure. The needs are enormous. And the one bil-
lion in concession or BOT is not enough. Probably the govern-
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economic development, between economic growth and social
development, between economic growth and environmental
equilibrium. At the end of the 20th century, qualitative growth
has replaced quantitative growth both in the sense of the positive
result from growth and the productivity through which this result
can be achieved.
3. Third, we have to answer the question: ÒDoes Bulgaria
possess the factors of growth available for the economy of the
third wave?Ó What we need at large is an assessment of the
endogenous potential of the Bulgarian economy for develop-
ment, and the role of the Bulgarian economic environment
which can either hamper or facilitate the country to make use of
this potential. We need to assess the tendencies in the political,
economic, social, natural, and technological environment of the
Bulgarian economy, and what is of particular importance — to
assess the impact of these tendencies on the Bulgarian econo-
my3 — both from the standpoint of creating additional
favourable conditions for its development, and additional prob-
lems and hindrances for this development. We need to assess
the potential of the Bulgarian economy for development, the
possible rate of growth that can be achieved by this potential. In
a different way and order the necessary rate of economic growth
should also be examined and established. What is meant is the
rate, which secures for the country the necessary conditions for
a more rapid transition from a lower to higher degree of eco-
nomic development and on the basis of this creates conditions
for a systematic positive change in the living standard of the
population. If the highest possible rate of economic growth,
determined by the inherited structure of the economy, is lower
than the necessary rate of economic growth, the country will
inevitably need some kind of a ÒdopeÓ (i.e. foreign, exogenous
Foreign Investment as a Renovation Factor for Bulgarian Economy
112/113
ficient amount of negative experience from the past when cam-
paigns used to be launched, our todayÕs subject matter included.
In order to exonerate the initiatives connected with economic
growth from the suspicion of a yet another campaign and an
exercise for its own sake, we should first prove and substantiate
the objective need for attaining economic growth. And this need
is not dictated by something external, it is determined by the
logic of human development.1 The success or failure of a reform
is dependent and predetermined by the ability of this reform to
imbibe in itself and obey the imperatives of human2 develop-
ment from lower to higher stages of civilisation. Experience
shows that successful reforms can be observed where and when
they secure not only procedural freedom for the citizens of a
country but also when they first and foremost guarantee a gen-
uine freedom — without hunger and the concerns for the day-to-
day existence.
2. When the first question has been answered, the second one
follows: ÒWhat is the type of growth in the developed world and
what are the major trends in the changes taking place in it which
bear upon the economy of the 21st century?Ó The economic
growth of the first wave (as described by A. Tofler) has been of
one type, it has been of another type in the economy of the sec-
ond wave. Quite different is the type of growth in the economy
of the third wave. When speaking about economic growth at the
end of the 20th century, it would be a gross mistake to embody
it in the notions about the economy of the second wave, and still
worse — to think about the economy of the first wave. In other
words, we need to clarify the link between economic growth and
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1C.f. Schlecht, Otto, Foundations of and prospects for the socially-oriented
economy, translation from the German language, published by Informa-Intellect,
Sofia, 1997, p. 107: ÒIn the conditions of an economic and social order, Otto
Schlecht writes, based on the principles of freedom, the state should recognise eco-
nomic growth as its major task; this economic growth should be established on the
basis of societyÕs interests and should stem from the functioning of the market
mechanisms. Zero growth cannot be a goal of the governmentÕs economic policy
because in this way the state would imprudently forego the individual desires of
people.Ó
2 About economics as a science about man and the logic of manÕs development
see Marshall, A., Principles of Political Economy, Vol. I, translation from English
into Russian, ÒProgressÓ Publishing House, Moscow, 1983, pp. 88—101, 145—166.
3 In a mutually interrelated world, or to be more precise — in a situation of
growing mutual interrelatedness, in a situation of an increasing globalisation of a
number of processes, this is of particular significance. It is especially important to
become aware of the Òbutterfly effectÓ theorem.  This theorem indicates — as Peter
Drucker writes — Òa butterfly fluttering its wings somewhere in the tropical forests
of the Amazon, may influence the weather that will set upon in Chicago a few
weeks or months later.Ó (Drucker, P., The New Realities, translation from English,
Christo Botev Publishing House, Sofia, 1992, p. 167).
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characteristics of the quality of management in a given country,
can of course be circumvented if the discrepancy between the
level of domestic savings and the investments necessary for the
accelerated transformation and development of the economy is
made up for not by means of loans but through direct foreign
investment. Circumvention in this particular case means that
effectiveness becomes the concern of the foreign investor who
has brought his investment into the country. But direct foreign
investment is also far from being an absolute boon. And it is not
somebody else but Milton Friedman himself who voiced a
warning with respect to this.4
5. Almost always when economic growth has been discussed
in Bulgaria, it has been inevitably linked to the privatisation
process. Along the line of this factor of growth however, enthu-
siasm prevails over sober analysis as well. Dominant here is the
notion that privatisation will automatically solve all problems of
the economy. A delusive notion about the velocity and scale of
the privatisation process also reigns supreme. It is considered
that privatisation and decollectivisation can be identical to the
scale and velocity of carrying out nationalisation and collectivi-
sation in the recent past. In fact these are processes radically dif-
ferent in scale and rate of accomplishment. It was possible to
nationalise property overnight by means of force; for about a
year it was possible to accomplish the collectivisation of agri-
culture by force. As life has shown however, it is impossible for
the process of privatisation to be completed within the same
time span in which the process of nationalisation took place; it
is impossible for the process of decollectivisation to be com-
pleted within the time frames in which the process of collectivi-
Foreign Investment as a Renovation Factor for Bulgarian Economy
114/115
additional force). In this way the necessary state of certainty
will be introduced concerning the amount of foreign financial
funds the country needs.
It is insufficient to say that Bulgaria can cope with the diffi-
cult economic situation, that it can make the transition from sta-
bilisation to growth if foreign investments are secured. We need
to know the approximate size of foreign investments. And such
a need also stems from the fact that the level of domestic savings
is lower than the volume of investments we need for the more
rapid economic development of the country.
4. The answer to the question about the amount of foreign
investments the country need brings about another not less
important question, namely: under what conditions it would be
reasonable to resort to foreign savings and utilise them in the
Bulgarian economy? Making use of foreign savings is equal to
the conscious act of introducing disequilibrium in the economy.
This is the reason why the answer to three additional questions
becomes imperative, and these are: a) how large can this dise-
quilibrium be; b) how long can this disequilibrium be main-
tained; (in other words the two questions are closely related to
the circumstances under which certain disequilibrium can or
cannot be maintained); c) what model of a financial programme
is needed for the maintenance of such an disequilibrium?
Because of the fact that foreign funds (savings) must be repaid
in future, it is important that they be used both in a productive
and effective way. Effectiveness bears upon the question about
the optimum and feasible levels of foreign loans as far as their
sustainability is concerned, and the question about the opti-
mum and feasible levels of the current account of the balance of
payments, again from the view point of their sustainability. The
answer to these questions can and must be examined and
regarded in a long-term time span. We must be aware that for-
eign savings do not automatically solve the issues of growth,
and that notwithstanding the importance of securing foreign
savings for the Bulgarian economy, it is twice as important to
solve the issue of their productive utilisation, as foreign savings
can be a particular boon. But at the same time they can become
a factor enslaving the economy, should they be used in an inef-
ficient and ineffective way. Effectiveness, which is an integral
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4See Friedman, M., Privatise, Privatise, and Privatise Again, in: The
Philosophies of Capitalism, translation from English, Pero Publishing House, 1996,
p. 280 — ÒThe next question, M. Friedman writes, refers to the frequent suggestions
for enterprises to be sold to foreigners ... I think that this would be a mistake. First,
the sale can be accomplished at very low prices, almost for free ... Second, in the
long run and from the viewpoint of political considerations, it is not commendable
for a large part of a given countryÕs means of production to be in the hands of for-
eigners. Do remember: foreigners will not invest in your country to help you, but to
help themselves. Foreigners should be completely free to invest, given only how-
ever that this is in the interests of your country.Ó
One should seriously take into account the damage and defor-
mation of peopleÕs soul and body which communism inflicted
on them.
6. It should be borne in mind that the currency board (in its
capacity of an extreme economic policy) was called to the stage
by an extreme economic situation — of a deep crisis and hyper-
inflation. The currency board as a policy for financial stabilisa-
tion was imposed by circumstances because growth was absent
from the economy. Growth is necessary first to ÒrescueÕ the cur-
rency board, and then to make it redundant. In order to make the
transition to a normal economic situation and to normal eco-
nomic policy, it is necessary for the current financial stabilisa-
tion to turn into economic growth.
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sation was accomplished. This is not the result of a lack of will-
ingness, this rather stems from the profound difference between
these processes: they differ both in their essence and way of
being carried out. Nationalisation and collectivisation forego
individual interest; they were actually directed against it, in the
name of the so-called societal interest. Nationalisation and col-
lectivisation were processes analogous — irrespective of how
strange it may sound — to a car accident. For a nick of a second
the car may crash and can be deformed and twisted in the most
incredible way; its engine, units and parts can be irreversibly
damaged. For a nick of a second the bones of the passengers in
the car can be crushed. It is impossible to restore the state of
both the car and the passengers turned casualties from before the
crash. This is how 50 years ago it was possible to accomplish
nationalisation overnight, and 43 years ago to carry out mass
collectivisation. Unfortunately, it is impossible to accomplish
privatisation and decollectivisation within the same periods of
time in which the reverse processes were completed in the past.
In a word, when one relies on privatisation and decollectivisa-
tion as factors of economic growth, he should have a clear idea
about the situation in this sphere. He needs to know the defor-
mations that took place in people first and foremost: these dis-
tortions have resulted from the disturbed organic development of
the economy and society, which took, place about 50 years ago.5
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5 C.f. Brzezinski, Zb., Out of Control (Global Turmoil on the Eve of the twen-
ty-first Century), Obsidian Publishing House, Sofia, 1994, pp. 172-176. —
Deliberating on the process of transformation in the Central and East European
countries, Zbignev Brzezinski comes to the conclusion that the transformations tak-
ing place in these countries amount to the task of making fresh eggs from an
omelette. ÒAs a far-sighted observer — Brzezinski writes — has noted, there are
recipes for making omelettes from eggs but there are no recipes to make eggs from
an omelette.Ó ÒPoland — Brzezinski continues — was never made communist com-
pletely, neither economically (agriculture in this country, certain services and retail
trade remained in private hands), nor ideologically ... This is why the difficulties of
transition in the former Soviet Union are much greater, the stakes are much higher,
and the scale cannot be foreseen ... The efforts Russia will make in the absence of
definite concepts and models should lean on the specific heritage it has received
from communism — not for the sake of its being made to last forever, but for the
sake of people who should be able to free themselves from it in a way conducive
for the establishment of a stable and democratic political system ... It is undeniable
that in Russia — unlike Poland — the entrepreneurial tradition has been almost com-
pletely eradicated, and private businesses have been destroyed. Communism left
Russia the legacy of a society oblivious of the financial intricacies and the compet-
itive mechanisms of the free market, as well as a state-governed economy on which
the huge and inefficient industrial sector weighs as a burden. Given these circum-
stances, each attempt on the part of Russia to imitate the headlong rush of Poland
to market economy could bring about a fatal discord between the political objective
of democracy and the economic objective of the free market ... It will take years for
the former Soviet Union to be able to establish the necessary entrepreneurial ethic
and to privatise the existing economic system, years — in fact whole decades — of
continuous and patient endeavours. Hastiness will cause not only serious losses, but
would probably throw Russia into a revolutionary situation. This probability may
even increase, especially if mass unemployment occurs, brought about by an errat-
ic policy of hectic privatisation and/or the bankruptcy of the major Russian indus-
trial enterprises. The naked reality indicates that even in the best of circumstances
large sectors of Russian industry cannot be privatised because they lack competi-
tiveness, and their closure will generate unemployment to the order of tens of mil-
lions. The situation in agriculture is just as grave. In the conditions of a ruined peas-
ant population and given the presence of numerous kolkhoz/sovkhoz possessing
machinery for large-scale farming only, it is unlikely for decollectivisation to attract
many would-be private farmers; from an economic point of view it can even suffer
a failure. Thus things can turn into historical irony if the collapse of communist
dogmas makes RussiaÕs postcommunist leaders stick to the new dogma of the free
market in a simplified way, regardless of the social price and the political risks. Yet,
such precisely is the advice flowing from the West to Russia. Russia is constantly
made to build democracy and create a free market at one and the same time. This
advice is being turned into a dogma by an elite who have too dim and remote an
idea about the sensitive link between culture and economy and who chant Òfree
marketÓ incantations with the same ritualistic formalism with which their prede-
cessors proclaimed their loyalty to the construction of socialism.
trade grew by 16.8%, that is, from USD 8.4 bn to USD 9.8 bn.
Export increased by 25.3% and totalled USD 4.9 bn. Import in
1997 also reached about USD 4.9 bn, registering a 9.3%
increase since the beginning of the period. Unlike previous
years, 1997 witnessed a positive balance of trade (by prices for
the corresponding year), amounting to USD 28.1 mn. Despite its
overall upward trend throughout the examined period, Bulgarian
trade gradually declined after 1995, as did the trade of countries
in any other region or group.
The geographic structure of Bulgarian export confirms its
primarily European orientation: in 1997 BulgariaÕs export to
Western Europe added up to 35.9% against 32.3% in 1995 and
28% in 1992, or an average of 32.1% for the given period.
Throughout the studied period Bulgarian export was nearly
equally divided among three destinations: Central and Eastern
Europe, Western Europe and countries outside the European
region. By mid-1998 nearly 47% of Bulgarian foreign trade
(50% in the export and 44% in the import) was conducted with
the EU.
The most vivid changes in BulgariaÕs import during the stud-
ied period — an increase of 40.9% — are associated with its part-
ners from Central and Eastern Europe. Import from the CIS
increased to 56.3%, from Russia — 38.8%, from CEFTA — 5.2%.
Import from the EU grew to 31.3% for the same period. Post-
1995 imports dropped by some 14% both as a whole and by geo-
graphic destinations. A marginal growth of 5.2% was registered
in the import from the CEFTA countries only.
Throughout the studied period Russia, Germany, Italy,
Turkey, Greece and the Ukraine retained their lead among
BulgariaÕs trading partners, being accountable for nearly 50% of
its trade. Russia and Germany — traditional partners to Bulgaria
— claimed more than 40% of its import; its export, 40% of which
were divided among the five above-mentioned countries, had a
less concentrated structure. This speaks of tight links between
Bulgaria and its traditional trading partners.
The analysis of the commodity structure between 1992—1997
reveals that the first six positions are occupied by invariably the
same commodity groups, whose share has continuously grown
from 66 % in 1992 to 80% in 1997. This change is conditioned
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Foreign Trade Volume, 
Dynamics and Structure, 
Prices and Conditions of Trade
The openness of Bulgarian economy makes it easy to see that
foreign trade fosters economic growth. While import ensures a
supply of raw materials to the economy, it is through export that
a part of the finished goods are shipped abroad. The increasing
importance of foreign trade in boosting economic growth is evi-
denced by the trend in the correlation between the foreign trade
indicators and the GDP, where the degree of dependence is
greater in the cost volumes, a circumstance indicative of the
impact prices exercise on economic development. 
Once we have identified external demand as a lever to eco-
nomic growth, the next logical step is to examine the opportuni-
ties for expanding the export and the related import, and the fac-
tors that intensify external demand. The most important among
them are: the treaties, entitling Bulgaria to associated member-
ship in the EU and full membership in CEFTA, the free trade
zone agreements and those serving to promote diverse forms of
economic co-operation (avoidance of double taxation, foreign
investments protection, etc.), the overall decrease of duties
(resulting from the operation of the above-mentioned treaties
and agreements and the implementation of the WTO conven-
tions), the dynamics of demand on the external market, non-
price factors having to do with the quality, consumer properties,
design, etc., of commodities, the export infrastructure (the exis-
tence of factors, such as viable, export-promoting entities, an
export-crediting system, an agency for insuring and securing
export credits, etc.).
The state of Bulgarian foreign trade and its prospective
development as a factor for economic growth are best disclosed
by looking at its volume, dynamics and structure. In 1992-1997
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past two years, speaking of a high degree of concentration. In
1997 the first five structure-determining groups of commodities
accounted for a little more than 70% of BulgariaÕs total import —
as much as in 1992. The insignificant variation over individual
years was largely dependent on the changes in the share of the
most dynamic groups, namely textile materials and articles
thereof, and mineral products. 
Over the better part of the studied period, Bulgaria had a neg-
ative foreign trade balance. Only in 1997 did it form a positive
balance of trade in the amount of USD 28.1 mn. A commodity
break-down of the balance would show that prevalent in the
import from countries with which Bulgaria maintains a negative
balance were mineral ores, machinery, appliances, transport
means and pharmaceutical articles; in the export for countries
with which Bulgaria maintains a positive balance there prevailed
light industry products, machinery, appliances, mineral prod-
ucts, pharmaceutical articles, food products. On a regional scale
the greatest negative balance was registered with BulgariaÕs
largest trading partners, Russia and Germany; the greatest posi-
tive balance was registered in BulgariaÕs trade with other Balkan
countries (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Macedonia), and
with some CIS-countries in 1997. 
The contrastive analysis of BulgariaÕs export prices reveals
that Central and Eastern European countries and the CIS offer
the highest prices, a statistic based on the prices established for
the export of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products
and plant products for the CIS, which are twice as high as for the
remaining countries despite the well-pronounced trend of
decline. Next in line are the EU member-states, where the trad-
ing prices are higher than those average for BulgariaÕs domestic
market. The lower price level for the export as a whole is the
result of the considerably lower prices at which similar output is
sold in other parts of the world. A pronounced downward trend
in the dynamics of export prices is characteristic of the Arabic
countries, while an upward trend marks the dynamics of export
prices to the Balkan countries.
To assess the competitiveness of Bulgarian exports based on
the prices negotiated on the external markets, we can apply the
conditions of trade indicator, disclosing the ratio of changes in
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mainly by the pick up of trade in metallurgy products, textile
materials and chemical products. Throughout the period mineral
products held the unchallenged lead with a share of 22%.
Meanwhile the share of agricultural products in the commodity
structure of trade declined.
The largest increase in 1997 was registered by the cost vol-
umes of the light industry exports (textile materials and articles
thereof, shoes) and of mineral products — by 77.9%, 57.6% and
46% respectively, as compared to 1992. Having lasted from
1992 to 1996, the trend of growth of the chemical industry
export vanished in 1997. After a certain, albeit an inconsistent
growth in the export of plant products, food products, drinks
and tobacco, plastics, natural rubber and articles thereof, and
timber until 1995, there has been a durable drop in all of these
groups over the past two years, leading to a shrinkage by half of
the plant products-, and by nearly 10% of the food products
export.
Over the whole period metals (ferrous and non-ferrous), and
their products held the lead, with a share of approximately 20%.
With certain reshuffling over individual years, next in rank were
chemical products, food products, drinks and tobacco, textile
materials and articles thereof, mineral products and others.
Export of livestock and derivative products lagged considerably
behind in this ranking — their relative share in 1997 declined
three-fold as compared to 1992. The first six commodity groups
in the export structure form more than 75% of BulgariaÕs over-
all export for 1997, exceeding their 1992 share by more than 6
points.
Until 1996 there was a continuous upward trend in the
dynamics of the export/import and in most commodity groups,
but it subsequently died down. After that year, only in the import
of textile materials and articles thereof, and of leather and
leather goods, has the continuous growth of the overall cost been
preserved. A stable trend of decline has become typical for the
import of transport facilities, food products, drinks, tobacco, fats
and oils after 1993.
Mineral products, machinery and electrical equipment occu-
py the top two places. Mineral products import (crude oil, nat-
ural gas, petrol products) takes up 1/3 of the total import over the
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ied period this market offered trading conditions above the aver-
age for BulgariaÕs domestic market.
Thus, the study highlights several sectors of the Bulgarian
industry as export-oriented and well-positioned on the external
market, namely, the textile industry, shipbuilding, the shoe
industry, the agrarian industry (agriculture, the food industry,
the tobacco industry, wine-making), the chemical industry
(manufacturing of fertilisers, essential oils, organic chemical
products), and metallurgy (ferrous and non-ferrous).
The change in conditions on the international markets in
1998, accountable for the deterioration of the conditions of trade
and competitiveness of some of the above-mentioned commod-
ity items does not imply that they should be removed from
BulgariaÕs export list. The new situation proves a long-drawn
conclusion — that most of BulgariaÕs export-oriented manufac-
ture is in need of a long-term restructuring policy, ensuring its
improved efficiency and better external conditions of trade.
The Role of BulgariaÕs Foreign 
Trade Policy in Ensuring Economic Growth
In order for foreign trade to foster economic growth more
effectively, there needs to be conducted an appropriate foreign
trade policy involving the liberalisation of trade and BulgariaÕs
speedy integration to the European and global markets. This is
the underlying rationale in the actions of the Bulgarian govern-
ment in its efforts to meet its international commitments in rela-
tion to BulgariaÕs membership in the WTO, the trade agreement
for association with the EU, the agreement with EAST, the
accession agreement with CEFTA, its bilateral agreements for
free trade and others. And although the latest modifications of
the foreign trade regime as of early 1999 could claim that it has
been liberalised to a considerable extent and meets free trade
requirements, there is still a lot to be done with respect to
BulgariaÕs regional foreign trade policy. The course of this poli-
cy which we believe is congruent with the interests of Bulgaria
for full-fledged participation in the international distribution of
labour, integration with the European economic structures and
achievement of an economic growth, could be outlined on the
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the export and import prices. Estimates show that between 1992-
1997 the conditions, measured by the ceiling index have
improved as a whole (106.3), yet there are great disparities by
individual commodity chapters from the customs tariff. Most
commodity items (over 100) are sold at better- and 30% at worse
trading conditions; at the same time they constitute nearly 50%
of BulgariaÕs entire export. 
The fact that 80% of Bulgarian export is concentrated in six
sections of the customs tariff (out of 21 in all), in half of which
there can be seen unfavourable conditions of trade, allows us to
draw conclusions regarding the efficiency of Bulgarian export.
Ferrous, non-ferrous metals and chemical products for instance,
took up 37.5% of Bulgarian export in 1995, yet the conditions of
trade index applied to them was 72.1 and 66.1, respectively.
Machinery took up a little over 9% of the overall export and
although the conditions of trade index was favourable (an aver-
age of 120.1 for the period), its dynamics was inconsistent and
in individual years it dropped below the 100 points level. Textile
materials and articles were the only commodities where a
notable and stable improvement was registered in the conditions
of trade, paralleled by a swift growth of volumes. Good condi-
tions of trade were also achieved in the trade with livestock, fats
and oils, mineral products, shoes, construction materials, but
their share in trade was not especially high. Many food products
were sold in favourable trading conditions, yet these are normal-
ly items with a small share in the bulk of exports. At the same
time the export of staple export goods, such as tobacco and
drinks, was accomplished in deteriorated trading conditions. The
same applied to chemical products, which have a large relative
share and worsened conditions of trade.
A more exhaustive picture of the conditions of trade can be
obtained by scrutinising the conditions of the individual export
markets for the relevant Bulgarian products. A comparative
study reveals that the best conditions of trade were initially
offered by the Central and Eastern European countries and then
by the Balkan countries as of 1997. 1995 was the starting point
for an upward trend of the indicator for the Balkan and Arabic
countries. Sizeable improvement in the conditions of trade was
achieved with the EU member-states: by the middle of the stud-
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traditionally manufactured by all of the above countries, and the
all too quick liberalisation of trade would have an adverse impact
on their manufacture and domestic markets. 
As the agreement on BulgariaÕs accession to CEFTA
becomes effective on January 1st, 1999, mutual trade will
receive a certain impetus, yet no sizeable increase in volumes
should be expected. The lowering or lifting of duties on the
import of certain Bulgarian industrial products will improve
their access to the CEFTA market but while eliminating the dis-
crimination towards them it will not automatically produce a
greater demand for them. The greatest opportunities for boost-
ing supplies are related to pharmaceutical commodities,
machine-building products and spare parts.
The factors, influencing the dynamics and conditions of trade
with Russia, are: an unbalanced volume of mutual trade, leading
to sizeable negative balances for Bulgaria; instability of the
Russian market, application of a series of protectionist measures
and additional requirements, provision of a preferential customs
regime to potential rivals of Bulgaria on the Russian market; a
lack of special agreements as are those, aimed at establishing
free trade zones with the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. All the above, coupled with the severe crisis rocking
Russia, has led to a significant decrease of trade in 1998; how-
ever, the talks incepted on a broad range of commercial issues,
the multiple solutions offered and the understanding shown by
both sides about the gravity of the problem give grounds for
hope that a positive outcome will result.
In a situation like this, any plans and agreements for liberal-
isation of trade would be beneficial. There comes to the fore the
need to draft new strategies and priorities. To ensure a durable
presence of Bulgarian companies and commodities on the
Russian market, there needs to be made a selection of such mar-
ket penetration and expansion strategies, as would permit a more
active involvement of the small and medium businesses in the
export and import, and elimination of a part of the commercial
mediators that encumber trading relationships and render them
riskier. It is especially important for Bulgarian manufacturers to
establish a direct contact with their Russian counterparts or con-
sumers.
basis of the general features of the trends in the development of
Bulgarian foreign trade.
The changes in the geographic allocation of Bulgarian for-
eign trade, which intensified trade with the EU member-states
and notably improved the trading conditions, could be explained
by the relatively low size of trade up until the end of the 80-ies,
the improved trading climate achieved by the signing of the
European agreement, as well as the shrinkage in domestic
demand and the national currency devaluation, rendering export
operations profitable. As a whole, commercial liberalisation and
the greater access to the EU market enabled Bulgaria to boost its
exports, yet the opportunities for this practice were soon deplet-
ed and the positive trend was eventually reversed. Although
nearly 40% of BulgariaÕs competitive exports are still directed to
the EU and succeed in retaining their market niche, the require-
ments towards their quality, manufacturing and compliance with
the EU standards will increase, thus rendering their supply more
and more difficult. In the future, the only talks possible will be
for expanding the EU market access to Bulgarian farming prod-
ucts, wines, fish and fish products. 
Since the collapse of BulgariaÕs trading and economic rela-
tionships with the Central and Eastern European countries
(CEFTA, Russia, CIS, the Baltic States, the former Yugoslav
republics), its trade with them, although accountable for 35-40%
of the total volume of trade, is developing irregularly. The con-
ditions of trade index remains above the average for the country,
yet it follows a trend of continuous deterioration. Moreover,
there are significant differences among the countries in the
above-described region.
In recent years the CEFTA countries have been losing ground
in the Bulgarian foreign trade, although it is on this very market
that Bulgaria achieves the best trading conditions in its export of
agricultural, food and chemical products, machines and transport
facilities. The similar difficulties afflicting transition economies
in their efforts to adapt to free market competition, are forcing
them, while liberalising their trade, to resort to identical mea-
sures of protection towards the import of sensitive commodities
(agricultural products, metallurgical products, textile, ready-
made garments, paper manufacturing). These are commodities,
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policy should be the increased competitiveness of Bulgarian
export products by making use of the specific comparative
advantages of the country. 
Currently, nearly 55% of BulgariaÕs total export consists of
mineral ores, half-finished materials and farming products. This
export structure, based on the manufacturing industries and
those, involving the manufacturing of half-finished materials
(ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, heavy chemistry and
cement industry), could not be the source of a stable economic
growth in the longer-term, since it does not match the structure
of Bulgarian economy. While certain types of export manufac-
turing relied for a long time on preferential pricing, the current
international market conditions call for enhancing competitive-
ness through product diversification and innovation, technologi-
cal advancement, optimisation of the input of energy and mate-
rials in the manufactured products, higher labour productivity,
etc. We are hereby talking about the manufacture of products
with quality raw materials which has established traditions and
boasts a trained workforce, a competent engineering and techni-
cal staff, and a track record of own research results it actively
employs. These products are chiefly marketed to countries with
a developed market economy and consist of textile products and
ready-made clothes, shoes, diverse food products and cans, cer-
tain construction materials, timber products, electrical equip-
ment, etc. Other types of products that fall into this category are
the ones whose manufacture is highly dependent on imported
inputs or is highly energy-consuming (such as the chemical or
pharmaceutical industry), but still possess a significant potential
for competitive advantages. Despite the worsened global market
conditions, industries that export 80% of their production are in
need of an export policy, based on a realistic assessment of the
absorptive capacity of the external markets. 
Industries that are dependent on agricultural raw materials
are working well below their capacity, although they present
unquestionable competitive advantages to Bulgaria. The lack of
a concrete, motivated policy for agriculture deprives the food
industry (dairy, canning, winemaking) and to a large extent the
light industry (textile and shoe industry), from high-quality raw
materials. As a result of this Bulgaria has lost access to the
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The successful progress of BulgariaÕs trade and economic co-
operation with the Balkan states (which have a more than 18%
share in its trade, marked by sizeable positive balances in what
are some of the best trading conditions), is shaped by diverse
factors at play: common boundaries, largely similar socio-eco-
nomic problems at hand, a geographic location which presents
favourable opportunities for implementing large-scale infra-
structure projects, etc. Everything mentioned so far gives us rea-
sons to think that BulgariaÕs active foreign trade policy aimed at
the creation of free trade zones on a bilateral basis with view to
elimination of all non-tariff obstacles and boosting of trade, is a
move in the right direction. The positive impact of the now
effective agreement with Turkey will perhaps be felt not only as
a notable growth in trade, but also as a livelier investor interest
towards Bulgaria. Negotiations for setting up free trade zones
with other Balkan states are still at the expert study phase, await-
ing further significant progress.
The ascending trend in the dynamics of the conditions of
trade indicator in the trade with Arabic countries speaks of their
significance to Bulgarian foreign trade. Until the late 80-ies
these were key trading and economic partners to Bulgaria, to
whom a sizeable bulk of commodities was exported. They were
also a major field for engineering operations, accomplished by
Bulgarian companies. Although in recent years the volume of
trade with this region has been on the wane, a positive balance
of trade has been maintained. In this sense the development of
trade with these countries holds a potential for economic growth.
The key aspects of BulgariaÕs foreign trade policy chiefly
address the issues of rendering Bulgarian export competitive and
opening new possibilities for its expansion on the international
markets. Moreover, one of the major conditions in the way to
BulgariaÕs full-fledged EU membership is its capacity to deal
with the competitive pressure of market prices. It is a fact that
the dynamics of Bulgarian export over the last 5-6 years has
been predominantly shaped by the changes on the international
arena, rather than by its enhanced competitiveness. Yet, in the
long-term these factors cannot be counted on for increasing the
competitiveness of Bulgarian export and improving the condi-
tions of trade. That is why a major objective of the governmentÕs
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First of all I would like to thank Mariela Nenova and George
Prohasky for organising such a diverse and successful confer-
ence and inviting all of us.
In commenting on this paper, let me first mention the basic
point that the paper is right to emphasise exports as an important
ingredient in Bulgarian growth, and in identifying many of the
factors that are important for the export sector. The basic fact
about exporting in Bulgaria that is worth stressing however, is
that despite having one of the highest levels of education in the
world, and extremely low wages, our latest data still shows that
export growth was negative in Bulgaria in 1998. This is extreme-
ly surprising in an economy with such a high level of education
relative to wages and with BulgariaÕs huge success in macroeco-
nomic stability in the past two years.
In order to achieve rapid export growth and rapid growth
overall, Bulgaria must change what it produces. BulgariaÕs
industrial structure was designed in Moscow in the 1950s and
the 1960s, not in Sofia. To a large extent, your industrial struc-
ture is still too close to the one designed in Moscow. Surely the
record of the first half of the 1990s shows that this industrial
structure designed in Moscow will not lead to rapid growth. This
is as true for exports as it is true for the rest of the economy.
Most economies that have rapid growth show dramatic changes
in industrial structure along the way. 
The important point is that to change your industrial structure
you must allow new businesses to form and new industries to
develop. In this regard let me mention a survey of 50 leaders of
Bulgarian firms that were interviewed in a survey that we con-
ducted along with the Center for Economic Development. We
asked whether it was easy or difficult to start a business in
Bulgaria. We also asked the same question in 59 other countries
around the world. Out of 59 countries Bulgaria was dead last:
number 59 out of 59. Apparently people here feel that it is
extremely hard to start a business. How will the new exporting
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European dairy market and to the Russian can market, and has
increased its demand for the import of textile raw materials,
locally produced until recent years.
There also exist industries with a potential competitiveness,
which could exert a greater influence over the economic devel-
opment of the country in the long-term. These are the high-tech
export-oriented industries with a large export volume in the past
that has strongly declined since the early 90-ies due to econom-
ic policy changes or to some insurmountable unfavourable exter-
nal circumstances. Given a sufficient inflow of direct foreign
investments, these industries could quickly regain their compet-
itiveness. These are chiefly high-tech industries developed as a
priority on the basis of the export specialisation assigned to the
former COMECOM member-states (non-standard equipment,
military industry, and electronics). In the past, they absorbed
sizeable physical and human resources and had the relevant eco-
nomic and scientific infrastructure created in their support. To
restore their capacity would not be that difficult a task.
In conclusion, economic development could be boosted by an
increased external demand of commodities with a high degree of
finishing. This calls for utilisation of the competitive advantages
of the economy in the broad sense, and the conducting of an
appropriate policy by sectors of the industry. This potential solu-
tion is best suited to the restrictive conditions of the currency
board, where relatively small-scale resources could be applied in
the development of industries to serve as locomotive engines for
economic growth at present.
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Both of the papers presented by respected colleagues
from the Agency and the Ministry of Trade are indeed very
welcome papers.  They are grounded in a detailed empirical
assessment and analysis of BulgariaÕs trading position since
the start of the transition.  The research includes quantitative
analysis ranging from the broad aggregate of export and
import data as a share of GDP, right down to an analysis of
flows of exports and imports at the detailed level of 97 prod-
ucts in the Harmonised Classification System. The authors
should be congratulated for the effort and attention devoted
to this review.  I would also recommend making this avail-
able in computerised form to stimulate and support follow-
up research by other interested economists.
Exports as an Engine of Growth. There is no doubt that
exports can serve as one of the engines of economic growth
for Bulgaria, and in this regard it is clearly an important issue
for researchers to examine and for policy to address.  
One should note that over the last decade, there have been
countries — primarily in Asia — where rapidly growing
exports have helped strengthen GDP expansion and improve
living standards.  This is revealed in the table below, drawn
from World Bank data: but it also shows that the countries in
the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region — that is essen-
tially the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union — have as a group experience rather
poor export performance over the last decade.  This indicates
that Bulgaria, like others, has a way to climb before its export
performance has a chance to be as strong and as big a con-
tributor to economic performance, which we would all like it
to be.  
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sectors emerge in such an environment? 
It is helpful to think about the discussion on industrial policy
in this context. The paper I am commenting on recommends that
Bulgaria concentrate on Textiles, Shipbuilding, Shoes, Chemical
industry, Metallurgy, and Agriculture. Earlier today Professor
Sachs recommended Light Industry, Agriculture and Food pro-
cessing, Electronic and information processing, and Tourism.
Let me suggest some of the advantages and dangers in this kind
of industrial policy.
First, the reason Professor Sachs recommends policies to
actively encourage foreign direct investment in these sectors is
because it is hard today to find an example of a fast-growing
country that has not pursued some kind of active policy to
encourage foreign direct investment. Ireland is one of the fastest
growing countries in Europe and offers sharp tax reductions to
foreign investors. This is true for many of the other fast-growing
countries. This does not prove that you need foreign direct
investment promotion for fast growth, but it is strong evidence
that should not be ignored.
There is always a bias towards the status quo in economic
structure. Structural change means that people have to work in
new jobs, new businesses have to form, and all of this is costly,
so naturally there is some resistance. The problem with industri-
al policy is that it may actually reinforce this natural bias towards
the status quo. The first reason in intellectual. The evidence to
back up the arguments about what industries to develop tends to
come from what industries exist. By definition, industries that
do not yet exist in Bulgaria have not generated supporting evi-
dence. The second reason is political. Industries that do not yet
exist do not have a lobby to support them. The industries that
exist now can pressure the government for support, and this will
reinforce what you already have. 
So for all of these reasons the danger is that the industrial
policy debate will exacerbate the status quo bias and make it
more difficult for Bulgaria to grow by moving away from your
industrial structure designed in Moscow.
Thank you. 
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¥ Institutional capacity and effectiveness. Here the Bank is
seeking to help, with other donors, on public administra-
tive reform. 
One of the implications of the CBA (which by the way,
certainly helped Bulgaria withstand recent pressures associat-
ed with the Russian financial crisis) is that there is no scope
for devaluation as a way to improve competitiveness and
hence boost exports.  This is no bad thing, as such a policy is
short-term in nature and typically fails to achieve its goals.
Rather a country needs microeconomic reforms, which help
produce productivity gains and control of unit costs. 
Let me say a few brief words about a selection of policy
issues, of policy focus, which are important to export poten-
tial and economic growth prospects as a whole.  
A. Continuing focus on to EU
Here there are many challenges, but one particularly rele-
vant to export performance includes meeting EU standards e.
g. veterinary and phyto-sanitary standards in agriculture and
food processing; and sharpening the competitive edge of
domestic business. Already Bulgaria has about 50 percent of
its trade with the EU (compared to an average of 53 percent
for the 10 applicant countries as a group).  
B. Sector reform — agriculture; tourism; energy
As an example, the World Bank is helping with a proposed
Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL), and invest-
ments, in land cadastre; Irrigation; with other donors support-
ing grain warehousing; port infrastructure.
C. Completing the well-advanced progress 
of trade reform
D. Improving connectivity
This is what one speaker referred to as ÒnetworkingÓ.
The Bank already has investment in railways and tele-
coms, and is looking at ways to improve cross-border trade
facilitation in the context of the SECI initiative.  Other donors
are focusing on roads, airports, and seaports, in a comple-
mentary way.
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Export Volumes: Average Annual Growth: 1987 — 1996
Region Export Growth, % p.a.
ECA 1.3
The World 6.3
East Asia 14.0
The World BankÕs latest global economic forecast is a lit-
tle rosier in terms of the export outlook for the ECA region,
as indicated in the table below:
Global Economic Prospects (October 1998) —
Export Growth, % p.a.
ECA 1997 1998 1998—2007
Export Growth, % p. a. 7.9 3.8 5.7
Nonetheless, if Bulgaria can match this expectation it will
have done well, since we know from the latest figures that
exports are currently being compressed quite sharply.  Indeed
traditional industries — chemicals and heavy metals — are being
squeezed sharply through 1998, and in the first three-quarters
of the year, there is reported trade deficit of USD100m.  All
this simply to recognise that to improve exports is not a short-
term shot-in-the arm for economic growth: rather it is a long
term, strategic plank of economic development.  
Exports, and export growth performance are dependent,
probably in the short/medium term, and certainly in the long
run, on a sound domestic economic environment.  Key ingre-
dients of establishing this sound environment include:
¥ Macroeconomic stability — and here there is a direct and
forceful link with the CBA and its continuance for the
foreseeable future;
¥ Market friendly policy for business, including a regime
which can help attract FDI here the Bank is helping in what
we term Finance and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Loans
(FESALs), which focus on privatisation and other marker
reforms which the Government is pushing forward on
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E. Industrial Strategy
Here there is scope for market-friendly support — not
heavy-handed direct Government intervention — which can
help encourage growth of high-value exports in sectors that
are at present competitive or are potentially competitive.
Sectors worthy of close investigation include, but are not lim-
ited to, high-technology hardware and software; light manu-
facturing; textilesÕ agriculture; and tourism.
Conclusion
Finally let me just emphasise that we have spoken today on
key factors for economic growth — and focused, understand-
ably, on the economic dimension — laws, policies etc.  But we
at the World Bank also want to stress the other dimensions;
¥ social, 
¥ cultural,
¥ human.
It is equally important that we all pay great attention to
these dimensions, if BulgariaÕs ambitious and praiseworthy
efforts to modernise its economy and society are to bear fruit
in better, sustainable, standards of living for all its people,
from the advantaged to the poorest in society.
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The following conclusions have been formulated and sub-
stantiated on the problems explored: 
1.The financial stability, secured by the monetary system of
the currency board is a general precondition for promoting
investment activity and economic growth. Among the other pre-
requisites are achieving political stability, fast and transparent
privatisation, liberalising the markets, reforming the social
sphere, curbing of bureaucracy, crime and corruption. Should
the wishes to eliminate or to ÒmitigateÓ the currency board in
order to stimulate economic growth, including through inflation-
ary financing, be fulfilled, the effect would be just the opposite.
2. The continuing stagnation following the hyper-inflation
and crisis of the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 could be
explained besides with the delay in the privatisation (30% by the
end of 1998 instead of projected 50%), but with sharply
decreased domestic demand. The real salaries and pensions by
the end of 1997 have dropped by 58% and 69% respectively as
compared to 1998, that is twice the fall in the GDP in the same
period — 30 %. The shadowy business groupings and criminal
structures, that have embezzled the balance, are not willing to
invest the Òdirty moneyÓ in the Bulgarian economy. The access
of small and medium private businesses to the financial markets
is impeded. The debt of the state-owned companies that has
reached 12 000 trillion BGL in 1999 has almost paralysed their
activity.
3. Under the Currency board it is impossible to use tradition-
al monetary tools like the base interest rate for example, in order
to exercise influence on the economic cycle. Given the present
conditions, a more substantial decrease of tax rates accompanied
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lation will ensure significant and long-lasting expansion of the
domestic demand, which at least partially will offset the nar-
rowing of the external markets due to the crisis. 
The impetus resulting from lower tax rates stepped up pri-
vatisation and expanded investment and domestic demand could
lead to an increase of the GDP by 8—12 % per year. And this
would not be an economic miracle given the extremely low start-
ing point and the potential of the country. 
4. The amendments in the tax laws made in the end of 1998
reduced the maximum rates of the principal taxes by less than
10%. The main reason for the Government and the IMF to reject
the proposals for a more significant decrease was the risk of
impairing the achieved financial stability. The analysis indicates
that in practice such a hazard does not exist. That is because the
losses of the budget from the decrease in the tax rates are total-
ly offset by the increased volume of budget revenues as a result
of stimulated economic activity, enhanced efficiency and
increased income and collection of taxes. The projected pro-
ceedings from privatisation of the biggest companies and banks
will serve as a reserve and insurance against possible misperfor-
mance. A fact speaking for this is the significant excess in bud-
get revenues and expenditures during 1998 (as of November
17th by 22 % and 18 % respectively recalculated in on annual
basis). Given the particular circumstances in Bulgaria the effect
of the decrease of the tax rates will become visible even in the
first years.
The increase of the budget-financed investments is not an
alternative to a decrease of the tax rates.
5. For each level of state revenues there are numerous possi-
ble sets of taxes through which the necessary funds can be raised
so that the state can perform its allocation functions. A tax-struc-
ture is called Pareto-effective when nobody could improve his
welfare without somebody else to becoming poorer within a
fixed level of state revenues. Furthermore, any choice of a par-
ticular tax-structure influences in a different way the production,
consumption and employment and results in many deforma-
tions, that impede the efficiency of the economy. The optimising
of the tax rates is aimed at minimising the inevitable loss of eco-
nomic efficiency. 
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by a decrease of their differentiation and tax relieves, could give
a definite impetus to enhancement of investments both from
internal and external sources and to accelerating the economic
growth. 
— If the ceilings of the personal income tax rates and of con-
sumption taxes equivalent to them are lowered, the effect on
income would be positive rather than negative, and a definitely
positive effect of substitution would occur, connected with the
supply of labour, than typically occurs in a normal economy.
Since even if tax rates are reduced by 20 and more percent, the
net income of the majority of the population will not reach the
social minimum nor even the existence minimum of poverty.
The value of leisure time continues to be too low as compared to
the prices of consumer goods, that is why these two factors will
stimulate a greater supply of labour. The distortions and dead
weight of losses from tax evasions will decrease dramatically as
a result of reductions in labour employed in the shadow busi-
nesses and in-kind economy and the associated with them pay-
ment of salaries in a non-monetary form or their concealment. 
— The curve of indifference will run at a higher level of labour
supply, as the tax rates decrease significantly and this will cause
a relatively slower increase of the salaries compared to the
increase of the productivity of labour. This will have a positive
effect, i.e. lower prices of goods and enhancement of their com-
petitiveness on the domestic and international markets.
— The reduction of the tax ratesÕ ceilings and elimination of
their differentiation will reduce the sources and incentives for
corruption in the tax authorities. This, alongside with the intro-
duction of a unified information system, will lead to a significant
increase in the collection of taxes and customs duties
— Should the maximum rates of the basic taxes decrease to
30—32 % in the conditions of a financial and political stability,
Bulgaria will gain significant advantages in attracting foreign
investors to participate in the privatisation and technological and
structural renovation of the production. The internal accumula-
tion of enterprises will increase, together with their capacity to
use and promptly repay bank loans.
— The massive inflow of foreign investments, the higher rate
of internal accumulation and increased real income of the popu-
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In order to achieve maximum realism of the model, we could
take into account, by applying adequate production and useful-
ness functions, the linkages between all the branches of the GDP
and different types of consumers (depending on their income),
as well as the appropriate elasticity.  
The scheme for optimisation of the tax rates is based on the
sequenced calculation of a break-even increase of the growth of
the GDP that assures the achievement of the desirable net tax
effect in different options of changes in the rates. Thus one
could perform an expert evaluation of several Paretto-effective
tax systems and chose the best one in terms of the equity, sim-
plicity and flexibility.
An overall assessment of the tax policy in Bulgaria from the
viewpoint of the proposed system shows, that the amendments
made so far in the taxes (including these of the end of 1998) have
not the nature of optimisation. This means that the true optimi-
sation in the Bulgarian tax system, aimed at enhancing econom-
ic efficiency, is still ahead. And only the systematic approach to
the problem, based both on economic, and on the detailed quan-
titative analyses with maximum possible accounting of the com-
plex interrelations in the economy, could lead to the establish-
ment of a maximally effective and simplified tax system. 
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Science has not yet offered a precise prescription for a tax
system with maximum efficiency. Most of the results obtained
are rather qualitative and are not subject to accurate measure-
ment in practice. In the same time any change in the tax system
has a direct bearing on the drafting of the State Budget Act and
requires a most precise evaluation of the implications of any
changes in the tax system. The question is therefore, whether it
is possible in practice to optimise the tax system?
The answer is ÒYesÓ, as evidences from the proposed practi-
cal scheme for optimisation, based on relatively simple math-
ematical equations. 
The following main issues of the particular situation in
Bulgaria have been taken into account: 
¥ reducing the tax rates could lead to significant positive
effects for the economy, that must be accounted for when eval-
uating the net tax effect of tax-decreases on the state revenues;
¥ the main indirect effect of the tax-decrease would be
expressed not mainly in the decrease of the dead weight of the
loss, caused by malformations,  but in accelerating the growth of
the GDP;
¥ the partial legalisation of the shadow economy provides a
bigger potential for accounting growth in the GDP, than the
increase of real investments and employment.  
For these reasons the proposed scheme for optimisation is
based on identifying an adequate quantitative expression of the
following sound economic logic:
This dependence has been put in a mathematical equation by
simplifying the reality though aggregate consideration of the
overall GDP, using the Cobb-Douglas productivity function for
economic growth. The following formulas are given for the two
basic cases: 
¥ total change of a part of the tax rates (on all taxable units —
present and emerging as a result of  alleviation) ;
¥ preferential change of a part of the tax rates (on the taxable
units emerging as a result of  alleviations only) 
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COMMENT
Peter Stella
Resident Representative for Bulgaria, International Monetary Fund
I am grateful to the Center for Economic Development and
the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting for inviting
me to participate in this conference. I also want to thank Paul
Reynolds and professor Dabrovski from Poland for commenting
on the tax holiday issues. I have nothing to add but say that I
agree with what they said. All of our experience and research
back up what Paul Reynolds said about the tax holidays. 
The paper that IÕm commenting on really goes to some of the
fundamental issues in political economy, namely how much of
the economy resources should go to the state, how much should
be allocated by private sector and individuals. Generally I agree
with the conclusions of the paper for the case of Bulgaria today
that more of the resources need to go to the private sector and
individuals and less in the hands of the state. One of the indica-
tors for that is the transfer of physical property from the state
back to the citizens of the state. What IÕd like to do is broaden a
bit the discussion in the paper about tax policy and I think itÕs
particularly important for transition economies that the so called
traditional conventional taxes on the profits of legal entities are
not the sole subject of consideration. It is necessary to consider
what I call Òthe occult taxesÓ or Òthe hidden taxesÓ that are pre-
sent in many transition economies and a number of developed
economies as well to a lesser extent. These are of particular
importance for Bulgaria. 
I would like to give two examples of what IÕm talking about.
First, I have in mind interference with trade of goods and here
one could take the example of interfering with exports and
imports of certain commodities. A lot of governments are trying
to stabilise the prices of certain commodities including some
stock goods. LetÕs take grain for example. What they tend to do
is say: ÒWhen the world market price of grain is very high, the
price at home should not be too high so exports of grain will be
prohibited.Ó This isnÕt written in the tax law anywhere, but in
fact itÕs a tax on the producers of grain and is at the same time a
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concealed subsidy to the consumers of grain products. So itÕs a
tax completely offset by the state expenditure. When the oppo-
site tendency is valid and the world market price of grain falls,
the state tries to protect the national producers of grain and pro-
hibits the import of grain constituting a concealed tax on con-
sumers and at the same time a concealed subsidy to the produc-
ers. Obviously this is a mechanism of the state to unreservedly
interfere with the reaction of the market, with price signals,
which is a fundamental inefficiency no matter how much devel-
oped an economy is. 
Researches show that actions of the kind make it much more
difficult for the grain producers. My personal experience also
shows that farmers tend to constantly lose money. But every
once in a while prices go up and they realise additional profit. If
they manage to keep these profits they will be able to invest and
in the long run survive. But if they are deprived of this opportu-
nity in cases of increase of prices in external markets on the one
hand and the state devoid them of this additional income either
directly or through a tax or simply by prohibiting exports on the
other hand, then agricultural production is doomed. Basically, if
they are not given the opportunity to take advantage of the acci-
dental benefit of their business they will not take the risk to carry
on at all.
So one of the positive tendencies observed in Bulgaria right
now is limitation of state interference in trade and I view that as
a decrease in taxation. 
Another issue of what I call occult taxation or obscured tax-
ation is the inflation tax. I would like to point out that in 1997
we witnessed probably the single largest permanent tax cut in
the history of Bulgaria. You might ask yourselves: ÒWhich tax
was reduced?Ó What do I mean? According to the official fig-
ures, tax revenue as a percentage of the GDP was higher in 1997
than it was in 1996 and in 1998 it was still higher than that in
1997. How can we talk then of tax cut? This was possible owing
to the introduction of the currency board. I think Mr. Angarski
can take credit for the biggest absolute tax cut in the whole
Bulgarian history. This tax, however, cannot be found in the offi-
cial statistics, because the inflation tax in itself is never record-
ed. The government budget t does not have an item or a line
In Bulgaria the payroll tax comes up to 40—42 % of the wage.
That is extremely high. About 60% of the population are
employed in the private sector and only about 6% of the social
security revenue come from the private sector. So that means
94% of the revenue for social payments comes from the public
sector. How can we explain this? Supposedly the public sector
wages are much, much higher than the private sector wages,
which I find a little doubtful. Another hypothesis concerns the
fact that the actual tax on employees in the public sector is high-
er than that on the private sector or maybe people in the public
sector are in early retirement categories and pay higher margin-
al social security contribution. This does not sound veritable
enough. If you do a little calculation in connection with the rel-
ative level of wages, you can come to the conclusion that the pri-
vate sector is maybe paying 6-10 % of what they ought to be
paying in social security contributions. So what does that mean
in a country where a speeded privatisation is being carried out?
It means that if all the public sector employees in industry went
into the private sector and if those social security contributions
fell to the average in the private sector, then the social security
system would lose 300 or 400 million dollars a year, which
would be a devastating blow. That would suddenly impose a tax
increase on the private sector of 300 or 400 million dollars a
year, which could very well crush economy. There is a funda-
mental problem here. If we insist on a hundred percent compli-
ance today, the private sector will hardly survive. There exists an
obvious link between decrease in tax burden and abiding a tax
discipline. 
So in my opinion those are the main issues which should be
considered in relation to tax policy.
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where the inflation tax is registered. 
At the same time all the expenditure related to the inflation tax
never appears in the governmentÕs budget. No one ever voted on
it. And as Professor Petrov and his associate mention on the
paper, the expenditure connected with this tax were probably
some of the most inefficient, corrupt even criminal I should say.
How could we measure the impact of this tax cut? Certainly the
people who lost their life savings in the banking system have a
sense that they paid a tax. People who saw their wages crumble
to nothing can understand what I am talking about. One way to
get an idea of the magnitude of the process is considering the
governmentÕs interest payments percentage of GDP. In 1995 they
came up to 14.1% of GDP, in 1996 they were 19.7% of GDP, in
1997 they had already fallen to 7.9% of GDP and in 1998 they
were 3.9% of GDP. So this gives you an idea of the magnitude of
the tax cut due to the introduction of the currency board. 
Another interesting aspect of tax cut is connected with the
automatic cut in expenses. On the one hand tax was cut and on
the other hand expenses were reduced. Practically in my opinion
this was actually a tax where lowering the rate of taxation led to
an increase in the real revenue from the tax. It is really possible
to cut the tax rate and get more revenue. The researches suggest
that inflation tax is the one tax where you can get more revenue
at a lower rate, because as you all have probably lived through,
at a point when the inflation tax is so high people just stop using
their own currency be it Bulgarian or French or any other cur-
rency so the tax base shrinks almost to nothing. So when con-
sidering the currency board (besides, I have not heard any seri-
ous critics of it) we should not forget its impact on the hidden tax
burden, the population and the occult off-budget expenses asso-
ciated with financing it. 
I would like to say a few words about taxation of labour in
Bulgaria, which seems to be a real problem as the authors of the
Report State. We can view this from the competitive aspect of
economy. Argentina, for example, is thinking of dramatic cut in
payroll taxes and labour expenses as a consequence of what is
happening in neighbouring Brazil; in this connection a decrease
in the taxes for the social security and the social payments is
undertaken. 
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I. CURRENT STATUS
The transition to a market economy has brought the issue of
changing the financial system. Under a planned economy, the
financial sector played the role of a bookkeeper for the real sec-
tor and the public enterprises. Resources were distributed in a
centralised manner by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB),
which acted also as a universal commercial bank. There was a
significant volume of ÒforcedÓ savings.
Over the first transition years, efforts to introduce Ònew rules
of the gameÓ brought the following results:
1. End of the monopoly situation in the sector. A new legal
framework was established.
2. Decentralised management of state financial institutions:
¥ Administrative autonomy;
¥ Autonomy in resource management.
3. Private capital allowed.
4. Privatisation.
5. Increased competition.
6. New financial products.
7. Increased number of branches and offices.
Transformation processes in the Bulgarian financial sector
did not affect the leading position of commercial banks as inter-
mediaries of savings and loans. They continue to be the main
player on the money and lending market.
At the beginning, notable progress was made in restructuring
the banking system into a two-tier one and reengineering BNB
into a typical central bank implementing the countryÕs monetary
policy. On the basis of BNBÕs branches, numerous new com-
mercial banks were set up with government capital; private
banks emerged gradually, to be followed, after 1993, by the first
foreign banks. At the same time, the government policy in man-
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aging the banking system was carried out through BNB.
1. The bureaucratic approach to management was too far
removed from the market principles of managing the economy.
2. Through its participation in the Bank Consolidation
Company (BCC), BNB remained as an owner/executive of the
state-owned commercial banks, which conflicts with its func-
tions as a supervisory body and the national monetary policy-
maker.
3. The lack of any meaningful presence of foreign bank cap-
ital deprived the Bulgarian market of any competition.
4. A policy of tolerating certain banks was applied.
5. The new commercial banks had limited resources (low
capital and lack of public trust). To expand on the market, they
needed funds; and they obtained these from BNB and the State
Savings Bank. The central bankÕs credit expansion resulted in
significant inflation rate levels in our country.
The 1996 — 1997 Banking Crisis. The inadequate govern-
ment policy with regard to the financial system and the slow
down in the transformation of the government-banking sector
led to one of the largest banking crises in recent European his-
tory. Between 1996 and 1997, one third of BulgariaÕs banks
holding a quarter of all assets went under. The large volumes of
bad debt in these commercial banksÕ portfolios, lack of capital,
disturbed liquidity came as the direct outcomes of bad bank
management and the lack of adequate bank supervision. As a
result, trust in the banking system plunged down and remains
low, with the public continuing to hold in hand significant
amounts of cash, thus withholding investment potential away
from the economy.
Recapitalisation schemes. Attempts to improve the financial
health of Bulgarian banks have failed. The stabilisation policy
aimed at removing the consequences rather than the causes that
had led to their poor financial condition. Efforts targeted the
improvement of short-term ratios — mostly capital adequacy,
without providing the banks with any conditions for normal
operation in the long term.
The Banking Sector after the Introduction of the Currency
Board Rules. With the introduction of the Currency Board rules,
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dition and imposing restrictions on the operation of banks under-
going temporary difficulties, and, on the other, of the macroeco-
nomic stabilisation which followed the introduction of the
Currency Board rules and the political changes that occurred.
In general, the developments in the banking sector between
January 1997 and June 1998 could be divided into two periods.
The first period, the one prior to the introduction of the Currency
Board, can be described with macroeconomic instability: a sharp
devaluation of the national currency, hyperinflation, and a drop
in production. The second period, after the introduction of the
Currency Board, is characterised by a gradual macroeconomic
stabilisation of monetary indicators and a considerable improve-
ment in financial discipline.
During the first period, most of the operating commercial
banks significantly improved their capital adequacy ratios by
provisioning for a large part of their doubtful loans. It is note-
worthy that commercial banks managed to meet the provision
requirements for covering their expositions as a result of the
high net gain from foreign exchange caused by the devaluation
of the Bulgarian lev.
Figure 3
Capital Base vs. Primary Capital — in billion BGL
The devaluation, in real terms, of bank liabilities due to the
hyperinflation at the beginning of the year acted as a crucial fac-
tor in improving liquidity in the banking sector in the middle of
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the banking system is slowly emerging from the crisis situation
and a process of financial stabilisation of the operating com-
mercial banks can be observed. This stabilisation came, on the
one hand, as the result of the restrictive measures undertaken,
such as closing down banks in an extremely grim financial con-
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with total amount of deposits in non-local banks exceeding the
amount loaned to the real sector;
¥ Low lending activity: refraining from lending to the non-
financial sector.
Financing the Banks. Banks followed a policy of raising sta-
ble and cheap funds: resources attracted from non-financial insti-
tutions cover two-thirds of asset transactions of the banks. Own
funds were also significant in volume, with ownerÕs equity stand-
ing at over 14.4% of banking resources (over USD 600 million).
II. PROBLEMS IN THE BANKING SYSTEM
Despite the reforms undertaken in the countryÕs financial sys-
tem, there are a number of problems, reflecting the stagnation of
the real economy following the dramatic recession and the bank-
ing crisis.
II.1 Size-related Problems (related to the potential of the
banking system)
1. Low investment potential. Total assets of all banks operat-
ing on the territory of the country are significantly less than the
assets of an average-sized regional bank in an EU country of
BulgariaÕs size. The total banking system assets to GDP ratio is
only 35%, while in developed country this ratio is over 100%.
Table 1
The Banking System in GDP Terms
June 1997 — June 1998 In BGL billion % of GDP
Average aggregate assets 
in the banking system 7.378 35.2
Average aggregate loans 
to non-financial sector 1.941 9.3
GDP generated for the period 20.939
Bank Assets / GDP Loans / GDP
Bulgaria 35% 9%
Poland 39% 15%
Slovenia 69% 52%
Czech Republic 182% 79%
Israel 123% 86%
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the year. The high liquidity of the banks, paired with low Òeffec-
tiveÓ demand and the relatively low requirement of the Treasury
for internal borrowing became the main reason for a record low
in interest rates during the last months of the year. This latter
factor, combined with a fixing of the exchange rates, provides
favourable conditions for revamping long-term lending.
Figure 4
Asset Structure as of June 1998
The low interest rates on deposits (which were negative in
real terms during some of these months) provided no incentive
for economic agents to put their idle funds into commercial
banks. Most of the foreign currency funds held by individuals
remain outside the banks, with economic agents continuing to
make payments in non-banking manners. Income from banking
transactions was low due to the low supply of loanable funds,
with a large portion of them being invested in government secu-
rities, low quality and a lack of variety in the banking products
offered. Another problem encountered by some of the banks was
the large and inefficiently set up branch network, with its high
cost of maintenance.
¥ Characteristics of the banksÕ investment activity:
¥ Maintaining high liquidity: in cash and government securi-
ties, with liquid assets accounting for 69% of total assets;
¥ Export of capital: putting funds in deposit accounts abroad,
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3. Slow-down in privatisation. Most of the state-owned
financial companies, which shape up the structure of the system
have not been privatised.
4. Lack of sufficiently large international financial institu-
tions on the Bulgarian market which could, with their image,
product and customer service quality, quickly win back trust in
the financial system and would foster competition.
5. Corruption.
6. Unsatisfactory performance of the managers of state-
owned financial companies, irreplaceability even in the case of
inadequate management that has brought huge losses.
7. Underdeveloped stock market.
8. Small range of financial services and instruments.
9. Inferior service quality.
10. Personnel (including senior management) lacking the
necessary knowledge and professional experience.
11. Lack of public trust. After the failure of one-third of the
banks and of the financial pyramids, small investors suffer a
psychological block and would rather hold their savings in hand
and not entrust them to financial institutions. The amount of
cash in hand is commensurate to that held at the banks.
12. Grey economy. Illegal business avoids using services
offered by the financial institutions in order to avoid paying
taxes or to cover up illegal dealings.
13. Inadequate oversight/supervision from authorised institu-
tions such as the BNB Bank Supervision, the Insurance
Supervision Directorate, the Securities and Stock Exchange
Commission.
Table 2
Competitiveness Indicators / Financial System Development
Ü Main Criteria and Ratios Ä B
1 Degree of development of financial markets 2.12 53
2 Access to venture capital for start-up businesses 2.72 48
3 Local banks in Bulgaria encountering 
competition from foreign banks 4.56 37
4 Equal opportunity for clients — 
large vs. small businesses 3.56 50
5 Financial stability of banks 3.46 42
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2. Underdeveloped banking sector manifested in the domi-
nation of commercial banks (almost complete absence of mort-
gage banks, investment banks).
3. Low trust in banks among clients.
4. A very narrow market of bank services. The quantity and
quality of banking services and bank products offered is quite
indicative of the development level of the banking system. The
most serious problem is the Òremoved positionÓ of banks vis-à-
vis their clients. There is no market research and, consequently,
products marketed by the banks do not meet the requirements or
the needs of potential clients.
II.2 Problems of institutional frameworks
1. Clear-cut oligopoly structure. Several large corporations
(banks, insurance companies) manage over three-quarters of the
industry.
Figure 5
Bank Asset Structure by Type of Ownership
2. Strong affiliations among financial companies, both on
equity basis (often involving also a pure capital swap) and on the
basis of debt. Financial conglomerates are being set up, which
are not subject to supervision on a consolidated basis. The lack
of sufficient capital and the strong affiliations among the indi-
vidual players create conditions for strong quakes in the finan-
cial system as a whole, as a possibility for chain bankruptcies.
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into providing financing for small and medium businesses. In that
regard, new product and service packages will be developed. New
economic conditions and a stricter financial discipline will require
greater flexibility in management and improving customer service.
The future of banking lies in its improved service quality,
offering custom-tailored products, providing access to interna-
tional financial markets, a client-centred approach.
III. ECONOMIC POLICY GOALS REGARDING 
THE BANKING SECTOR
A priority strategic goal of the policy implemented should be
to promote the development of a healthy and efficient financial
system. The financial system should meet the following criteria:
Efficient coverage/performance of the functions to gather
existing savings and distribute them efficiently;
Discipline in economic agentsÕ activities;
Successful competition with international financial institu-
tions, i.e. complete liberalisation of services in view of the forth-
coming accession to the European Union.
The policy with regard to the banking sector will target the
following basic criteria:
1. Revitalising its activity and its operations in the process of
economic growth by increasing capital resources, confidence in
bank transactions and developing the market for long-term
financing;
2. Strengthening BNB independence. Ensuring conditions
for non-interference with the operation of the bankÕs Issuance
Department acting as a Currency Board. Setting up bank super-
vision that is efficient and works;
3. Ensuring protection against Òslipping back into bad debtÓ,
together with continuous monitoring of the situation in that area;
4. Wider use of local banks in managing government assets
and privatisation of state-owned enterprises;
5. A consistent policy of reducing the government share and
removing the oligopoly in the banking and insurance markets.
Without this, local banks and insurance companies would not be
able to cope with a Bulgarian market open for the entry of for-
eign companies which, in view of our future EU membership,
Potential of the Financial System for Stimulating Economic Growth
152/153
Ü Main Criteria and Ratios Ä B
6 Interest margin (lending and deposit rates) 
compared to international levels 2.78 34
7 Stock exchanges as a source 
of capital for companies 2.18 52
8 Development of the bond market 2.28 54
9 Regulation and supervision 
of financial institutions 3.92 44
10 New banks entry 3.40 47
11 Market determination 
of interest rates on deposits and loans 3.66 45
12 Insider trading (applicable to stock market) 3.61 41
13 Gross investment 
as a percentage of GDP (for 1997)
1991 — 22.6%; 1992 — 19.9%; 1993 — 15.3%; 
1994 — 9.4%; 1995 — 15.7%; 
1996 — 8.4%; 1997 — 11.8% 54
14 Change in gross investment
as a percentage of GDP (1992 — 1997) 49
15 Gross savings as a percentage of GDP 51
16 Change in gross savings (1992 — 1997) 28
17 Share of lending to the private 
sector in domestic lending 50
18 Credit rating of the country — 
MoodyÕs B2; Fitch IBCA B+
Mean of values by column 3.16 45
Note: A — average score for a sample of 50 financial enterprises (on a scale
of 7); B — Place in which the country would have been ranked among the 53
countries examined (Bulgaria not included)
Characteristics of the short-term and mid-term (3 — 5 years)
development of the financial sector.
A prevailing factor in the development of the financial sector
will be the future development of the real sector and the privatisa-
tion process of both financial and non-financial enterprises.
Macroeconomic stabilisation, which has occurred with the intro-
duction of the Currency Board rules, provides a favourable envi-
ronment for the development of the financial sector. Yet the gen-
eral situation in a mid-term perspective will be characterised by a
period of stagnation. In the short run, it is expected that most
investments to be made will be direct, not involving financial
intermediation. Many financial companies will put their efforts
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would come to our country over the next years;
6. Undertaking actions to ensure sustainability and further
development of capital markets so as to increase their participa-
tion in the resource distribution function in our economy, com-
plementing traditional banking mechanisms and instruments for
the accumulation of capital and credit for municipal infrastruc-
ture development;
7. Providing conditions for improving trust in the securities
market; basic market principles functioning properly; saturate
the market to the level of volumes ensuring adequate liquidity
and diversification; more effective protection of non-profession-
al investors;
8. An open, yet selective, policy of providing access to for-
eign capital to the local financial market, a policy promoting
their entry first into areas where there is a lack of local investors.
IV. TOOLS / METHODS
Defining strategic goals is related to specific tools and meth-
ods of implementation.
1. Privatisation;
2. Actions aimed at increasing the capital of financial institu-
tions;
3. Promote and support the process of commercial bank con-
solidation;
4. Increase the independence of management bodies of state-
owned banks from bureaucratic government intervention;
5. Set up legal, organisational and financial frameworks for
the development of a guarantee system promoting small and
medium enterprises, especially at the regional level;
6. Set up and accumulate an efficient Bank Guarantee Fund
to insure bank deposits. This would free the central bank and the
government budget from their involvement in that area.
V. THREATS / POSSIBLE PROBLEMS
1. Inefficient implementation of the financial sector reform
and a slow-down in privatisation. Reform and privatisation
could make it more efficient, representative, competitive and
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bring about growth-oriented transactions;
2. Loss of control over the penetration of foreign business
(supported by its capital strength and technical advantages) as a
result of shifting some of the economic policy tools beyond the
national boundaries;
3. Inefficient local capital.
VI. MEASURING THE OUTCOMES
Financing the non-financial sector at a level equal to at least
20 % of GDP.
sion. I mean a global aspect as a resource of the banking system.
There are however some other problems to be taken into account
as well when discussing the Bulgarian banking system. One of
the global problems of our banking system is the fact that most
of its resources are short-term ones. These are funds of vision.
Reliance on such short-term resources, which could simply dis-
appear all at once, may cause extremely serious problems. In the
context of the banking system of this country this is much more
so with all negative implications. 
This is exactly where our banks will be most vulnerable if
they participate more actively in funding and lending to the
economy. In the event of even minor protuberances in the econ-
omy, and such can occur as a result of the global financial crisis,
of mistakes in the management of the economy, etc., this will
result in a destabilisation of the banking system and will place
the banks in a very difficult situation. That is the reason why
even the biggest banks maintain big amounts of cash as their
assets. And such assets are readily liquid, but not yielding
enough. This is the price we pay for the fear of the bankers who
have not yet overcome the nightmare they were in two years ago.
And to this we have to add the public opinion, the mass media
and sometimes even the politicians who continue to maintain the
view that the people working in the banking system are rogues
who drain the banks for their personal benefit. This has a most
negative effect. 
At present something undesirable is happening with one of
the banks now. Some people see the possible bankruptcy of
Credit Bank as a signal that the Board is facing a failure that the
banking system is at the threshold of a new collapse.
Unfortunately even prominent economists and financists,
experts that I do respect, are taking such a stand. It is wrong to
state that once we have a Board, there can be no bankruptcy of
banks.  There are banks in bankruptcy but the effects are differ-
ent from the time when the collapse of one bank could cause the
collapse of other banks as well. 
And again I do point out that a major problem we are having
now is the one with the short-term resource. There is a ground
rule in banking — short-term resources are not spent on long-
term investments. And each loan — be it for operational capital
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It is obvious that I do not have the time to make more detailed
comments on the issues being discussed today although I was
tempted on many occasions to take the floor when either strict-
ly banking issues, or issues of the privatisation process or of the
taxation policies were on focus. There is an undoubted fact,
namely, what has been achieved in terms of economic, political
and financial stabilisation is quite significant. I am pleasantly
surprised that all speakers, including the representatives of the
Government, have expressed their concern for promoting an
economic growth because the stability will remain very fragile
and temporary. I have stated it more than once that the success-
es scored should not cause complacency, since sometimes even
small obstacles can cause major problems. As for me, who am
basically with a pessimistic mind set, I have reached a conclu-
sion that the economic growth will inevitably be accompanied
with problems. Whether we can secure growth or not is a very
controversial question, because everything boils down to
resources. Of course, we must have a vision, strategies and
approaches, but we must also have money in order to accomplish
the reform. 
At present we are in a situation which reminds one of the
fable about the pig and the pumpkin. We have our objective set
and we know what will happen if we find a way Ôto bite the
pumpkinÕ, but the question is that it is rolling over and over and
there is no way to bite it. We also know that the economic
growth is like Ôthe pumpkin which must be bittenÕ, but the prob-
lem is how to do that.
What is the situation in view of the banking sector? I would
like to dwell on a few aspects of this issue. And I do agree with
what my colleague concluded — that the Bulgarian banking sys-
tem (here I include the foreign banks as well since they operate
as local legal entities) does not have the economic potential to
secure funding for restructuring the economy which will guar-
antee the economic growth. It is quite useless to be under a delu-
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I do not believe that a foreign management of Express Bank
will immediately make it a different bank, or that Bulbank will
become a better bank for the same reason. On the contrary, I am
deeply convinced that deep disturbances will occur in these
banks when their new owners take control. And the biggest prob-
lem is in the fact that no first class banks would like to enter
Bulgaria. We will warmly welcome these 12 or 13 banks to our
country, but only 1 or 2 of the ones operating here are really seri-
ous banks. They have no branch network scarcely any clients and
are only involved in some kinds of transactions that are not
always decent. But it is the persons who permitted these banks to
operate here placing no requirements that are to blame for this. 
At the same time many of the branches of the foreign banks
have set preferential conditions as compared to the Bulgarian
banks, due to the simple fact that there is no requirement that
they should invest their own capital and can therefore attract
Bulgarian enterprises with whatever means they wish. They
offer them loans without requiring security, and when the bank-
ing supervision department checks, they immediately produce
guarantees from their headquarters. This is how they steal enter-
prises and create problems for the other banks, which causes an
effect different from the expected. The situation is really com-
plicated but they have to get used to working under these condi-
tions. Maybe with time they will learn to do so. 
Another big problem that raises the concern of the banking
community this year is the fact that we do not know what the
parameters of the global financial crisis are. This requires from
the banks to double the attention when investing — either in secu-
rities in order to maintain better liquidity and guarantee a defi-
nite yield or in specific capital improvement projects. Even the
best performing enterprises have gone into collapse due to the
financial crisis and the loss of markets, mainly the Russian mar-
kets. Last year there were no problems with the canning enter-
prises when the banks served them. They were desired clients.
This year, however, the situation now has changed dramatically
— full storehouses, no sales and regretfully no prospects. And if
we can not lend to canning enterprises, how can we lend to agri-
cultural producers? The Bulgarian enterprises cannot find a
niche, a market segment in the global economic network. It is
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even — is a long-term investment. If you look at the structure of
resources, you will see that these are mainly funds on accounts,
on payments accounts or one-month, maximum up to three-
month deposits not even one-year deposits. And each loan is
borrowed for at least 5—6 months, or one year, leaving aside
investment loans or privatisation loans, etc. Provided that we
observe the ground rules that you may find in each banking text-
book, we must simply stop lending under the existing conditions
in the country. 
We hoped that the foreign banks would bring about an inflow
of foreign capital. Having analysed their presence in the country
for some years now, I have serious reservations concerning their
actual contribution to the improvement of the banking services,
to the establishment of the principles of fair competition, to
know-how transfer, management, etc. What we mostly expected
from them was that they would bring in resources from abroad
and invest in our economy. The result is just the opposite. Due
to their better reputation, the companies, the most stable compa-
nies keep their accounts with these banks; citizens keep their
deposits there. These banks, however, do not lend to the real
economy; they redeposit these funds abroad. In other words,
they drain Bulgarian resources and channel them abroad, instead
of bringing in foreign resources in the country, as we hoped. 
Now, with the development of the global crisis, these banks
were immediately given instructions from their headquarters to
change policies, cut off half of the Bulgarian banks that they are
working with, check their clients again, etc. In other words, they
are not open-minded to the problems of our economy. Their bal-
ance-sheets may show positive results, due to the simple reason
that they take the best ÔpiesÕ of our economy, i.e. the companies
privatised and bought by serious investors. But they will not
work with our problematic enterprises and problematic econo-
my. So this is a very interesting issue and I will disagree with the
colleague who stated that we have to hurry up with the privati-
sation of the Bulgarian banks. Well, I am not against it, and I
have always maintained that, but to sell a bank at whatever price
only to be able to report that you have concluded a privatisation
deal or that there is no Bulgarian banking system any more — this
is not the best thing to do, in my view. 
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very difficult for them to readjust from one market to another
without any investment, since for this purpose their goods must
have a different technological level and marketable shape. This
in itself is a serious problem. Whether it is food processing
industry, or tobacco industry, or heavy chemical industry or met-
allurgy — all these are branches suffering enormous difficulties,
even collapsing. Which is due, among others — to the conditions
at the international markets. That is why I say this proves to be
neither fault nor mistake of the managementÕs recipe.
Another problem that causes concern in the banking sector is
the delay in the privatisation. It is a general rule that when an
enterprise reaches the point of privatisation, it has already
stopped working. The objective is to have its price fall down, in
order to make its sale possible. No matter whether the managers
work for their own benefit or for an outside client, the manner of
conduct is always the same — to drain it of resources, devastate
it, crush it down, etc. Well, how can a bank work with an enter-
prise like that? And yet another problem connected with privati-
sation stems from the workers-managers partnerships  (WMP). I
have been insistently stressing on this, but enterprises have been
really given to WMPs in an absurd way. What happens is — the
enterprise is brought to frustration by the management of this
same enterprise and then the latter is given to the former? The
privatisation agency should step on the assumption that either
the managers have deliberately brought the enterprise to that
state and in such case they should be held responsible and the
enterprise should not be given to them, or else they do not have
the potential to manage it properly. If that is the case — why
should they be given the enterprise? Besides, even with the most
conscientious WMP there is yet another problem that emerges,
i.e. the mentality of the Bulgarians who cannot assume the role
of shareholders and owners. Their attitudes are different; they
would rather take whatever they can of the money today. With
WMP that undertake to incur rescheduled payment, the enter-
prises have one objective — to distribute their whole profit as div-
idends in order to make the next instalment. Which means that
they do not work with a long-term perspective. They work on a
day-to-day basis and the enterprise cannot therefore occupy sta-
ble positions. 
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Then what is the alternative? Either the enterprise will strive
for some years on end just for the sake of paying the instalments,
or the opposite, when they see no more prospects of paying out
the instalments, the enterprise will be squandered on till full
exhaustion and then passed over to the bank that has supplied
loans. The other alternative is to give it back to the privatisation
body because it turns out to bring little profit. 
I do not want to pose as a defender of the whole banking sys-
tem, but there are real objective reasons that force the banks to
refrain from lending. I would not say that they have stopped
lending even in the condition of chaos prevailing in our econo-
my / financial stability is a different thing/. It is real economy I
mean, the banks take risks when extending loans. They do not
have other alternatives, of course, especially with the collapse of
the capital markets, and the impossibility to earn it from long
exposures, from sale and purchase of forex, etc. They have to
take risks and lend, in order to secure their maintenance. What
are more the expenses of the banks themselves are also growing
— for telephone, fax, EDP, fuel, etc. Therefore they cannot but
lend. But what we heard of in the report investing in securities
in such big scales is not normal. If we add the cash available it
means that a very small portion of the assets are in loans. There
is really some potential, but this is the situation now and there is
something very indicative. The banks are deliberately keeping
low interest rates on deposits and payments accounts. Some of
them are not interested in attracting funds, their rationale being:
ÒIf things go to the worse, then at least we shall not have remorse
of consciousness of having cheated the peopleÓ. On the other
hand, it is enough to redeposit the cheap resource abroad and
gain a small margin for the maintenance of the bank. It does not
matter that much greater profit can be realised, what matters
now is to survive, to keep ourselves on the surface. This is true
of both private and state-owned banks. The state showed once
again how incapable it is of managing. No state bank having cer-
tain resources and potential, having achieved certain economic
indicators, and signed a management contract is paid a certain
sum of money. I have often said, be it trivial, whether a bank will
have 5 bn or 50 bn profit, nobody will say ÔThank youÕ. And
since privatisation is pending, it has to take to risky operations
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I would like to thank all the participants in the conference,
the audience and those who took an active part in it. It is diffi-
cult to summarise in one minute all that was said since the topic
is obviously a broad and very controversial one. First, it is worth
mentioning that the government has already made a lot to accel-
erate economic growth. A few issues of consensus have been
laid down in the discussion.
One of those issues of consensus is the necessity for clear
property relations as a precondition for economic growth. This
means that the privatisation of what has been decided to be pri-
vatised, should be completed as soon as possible.
The other issue of consensus is the establishment of a stable
legal framework, which ensures the economic agentsÕ security
as far as the rules of the game are concerned. This fact requires
a completion of legislation changes, i.e. a completion of the leg-
islation framework of a market economy. It is clear that the
Bulgarian legislation framework should be guided by our strate-
gy of joining the European Union and harmonising our legisla-
tion with that of the European Union. Other issues of consensus
have been laid out, however I cannot dwell on them now. The
economic growth is very important for Bulgaria and if it is not
achieved, then the impact of the macroeconomics stabilisation
will be lost. The topic provokes a lively discussion with really
different opinions on some major problems of the economic
growth. 
The first topic to discuss is about the priority of some direc-
tions of development and the available tax preferences, or some
other. The discussions of such policy extend beyond the hall we
are in now. There are really opposite opinions. In this connec-
tion I would like to repeat the words of Andrew Warner from the
Harvard Institute for International Development: contrary to the
economic logic preferences allow for preservation and long life
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in order to realise big profits, because the managers want to be
placed well before the new owners when they come. 
This is yet another reason that influences the conduct of the
bankers, as well as some other things I would not like to discuss
now. The distinction that all governments so far, including the
present one regretfully, have made between state-owned and pri-
vate banks causes problems. There are invented all kinds of rules
showing different approaches to banks and this naturally creates
mistrust in the clients of the banks, because if you are not in the
list of banks servicing the budget, then you are an inferior class
bank. This is the way of thinking of the common client — Ôthese
are the bad onesÕ and Ôthose are the excellent onesÕ. However,
the excellent ones are under privatisation and soon they will
have a different behaviour.
These are some of the issues that I would be happy to discuss
in greater details. To conclude, I would like to say that, in spite
of all, I am optimistic and do believe that there will be a
Bulgarian banking system and that it will not stand apart when
the complicated problems of our economy are to be solved. The
only thing that the banks need is somewhat greater confidence —
on the part of clients and Government.
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of sectors and activities that have reached ÒmaturityÓ. Due to
that fact they have their lobby which protects them and just
because they are in the age of maturity before reaching old age
and ÒdeathÓ they need preferences to stay alive. At the same time
what is new and is just now emerging, is either invisible for us
or we are not able to evaluate its future potential or it has not got
its own lobby and nobody takes care of it. However, the preser-
vation of dying branches and activities shrink the resource nec-
essary for the new thing to grow and bring about the overall
social progress. So this kind of logic is economically based and
comprises an excellent argument, a good reason for thinking
over all the suggestions for tax or other kinds of preferences that
we propose for one sector or another. 
Of course, this is my point of view. As you could see it is a
very controversial issue. We intend to issue, to publish these
papers, the comments on them, the discussion itself, so that all
of you could have the chance of reading them once again and
assessing your stand on those issues. This conference, in fact,
opens the discussion. It does not close it and its task is to help
the government and all those who make the economic policy
make it in such a way that it should lead to the actual accelera-
tion of the economic growth. 
Thank you.
